The Meaning of Reagan's Victory—Irving Howe

dissent

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

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Irving Howe

How It Feels to Be Hit by a Truck

Nothing could be more foolish than to blink the extent of the defeat we have suffered in the recent election. By "we" I have in mind both the larger "labor-liberal" community and the smaller "democratic left." If Carter's defeat can be attributed in part to both his personality, at once pious and slippery, and the smarminess of his campaign, no such factors can explain the sweeping defeat of many liberal senators. Let us face the facts, bitter as their taste may be.

So here are a few preliminary reflections, put down hastily a few days after the election. Others will continue the discussion in future issues.

WHY CARTER LOST, I think we know. At least a year ago a large segment of the American people turned its back on him. These people decided he was incompetent, untrustworthy, inconsistent. They held him responsible for inflation and unemployment; for the weakened international authority of the United States; for our faltering response to the hostage crisis.

It's worth asking, for just a moment, to what extent Carter *was* responsible. Simply to deny that he was is to surrender political life to notions of historical automatism. Simply to blame him for everything is to yield to the equally dangerous notion that an American president is—or worse, should be—omnipotent and therefore able to "take care" of all difficulties.

Some problems were clearly beyond Carter's control—the OPEC stranglehold, the irrationality of the Iranians, the wearing-out of U.S. plant equipment, etc. But there were also numerous failures of policy. Perhaps the most damaging was Carter's steady drift to the right in economic policy, so that in effect his administration engineered a recession in order to cope with inflation. But, characteristically, he didn't engineer "enough" of a recession for that purpose, since he lacked the ruthless consistency of a Margaret Thatcher. The likely consequence is that the "mild" recession will not cut inflation very much.

What many people seem to have felt about Carter was that he lacked a clear outlook, that he started from no discernable principles, liberal, conservative, or any other. Four years ago during his primary campaign, we said in *Dissent* that in the root sense he was an opportunist. Politically shrewd, he betrayed a final incoherence. Your man in the street might not put it this way, but that apparently is how he felt.

Under Carter the already frayed New Deal coalition disintegrated further. And he hastened the process, too. Was a single segment of his supporters in the 1980 election really enthusiastic? Trade unionists, blacks, women, Jews, liberal intellectuals—these traditional components of the "liberal coalition" voted for him, insofar as they did, mainly because they feared Reagan. Never has that been a sufficient basis for an enthusiastic campaign; nor was it this time. Just as no one could feel about him that he acted out of attachment to principle, so, in some shapeless but also dangerous way, at least a portion of the electorate

We are saddened by the death of our colleague Henry Pachter. The sad news reaches us as we are going to press. In the next issue we shall speak of him more fully.

The Editors

December 10, 1980

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wanted the taste, the sense, the appearance of principle. (It's when policies don't work that people remember principles.) That they found this taste, this sense, this appearance in the threadbare maxims of Ronald Reagan—an amiable, simple fellow who makes Richard Nixon look like an intellectual giant—is a tragicomic sign of our plight.

I suspect that an awareness of how difficult, perhaps intractable, are some of our socioeconomic problems is one root of the Reagan flower (weed, if you prefer). When people talk about the "malaise" of this moment, there really is something to it—the problem is to know *what*. There is a shared sense among almost everyone except the true believers of Milton Friedman and V. I. Lenin that problems are, at least for the moment, out of control; that we have entered a new historical era of limits and retreats; that no one has very good answers. Now, this isn't entirely true. Some of what are glibly called the "tired old answers" are still pretty good. National health insurance, for instance, is still something to be desired and fought for, even though I suspect that a segment of the liberal leadership, quick to retreat, may start doubting that. Nevertheless, the truth is the truth: what we are experiencing is the partial impasse, or breakdown, of the welfare state, a historical improvisation that has been a boon to millions, *a great achievement* of the social democracy in Europe and liberalism in the United States. And probably there is validity to the claim of Robert Heilbroner that the only way some of our difficulties can/will be managed is not through a return to a laissez-faire that never existed and never will, but to some version of national planning and greater economic controls. For many Americans this is bitter medicine; for the corporate elite, which has regained confidence through the first aid administered by the welfare state over the past few decades, it is a medicine they want not to take at all. So they're trying Reagan's laetrile.

SOME OF THE MORE SIMPLE-MINDED ideologues around Reagan, like, say William Simon, really think that "getting the government off our back" will bring back, as if by magic, the paradise of an earlier America, a country of rugged individualism unspoiled by strong unions, assertive feminists, restless blacks, and nasty youth. But there are smarter chaps, like Felix Rohatyn and Irving Kristol, who must know better.

My own persuasion—in the nature of things, impossible to prove—is that Reagan's victory can be half-explained by the hypnagogic effects of this empty phrase, "get the government off our backs." Many people stretch out their hands and yield their hearts to this cry of nostalgia, this hunger for simplicity. They voted for Reagan because they felt, correctly, that he really means it. As Michael Harrington remarks, Reagan is "a utopian with his eyes firmly fixed upon a past that never was as a model for a future that cannot be." (Carter, by contrast, was too smart to mean it when he tentatively ventured into his versions of "get the government off our backs"; but he was also too "smart," in a disastrous sense, to speak out clearly and say it was nonsense.)

At no point did Carter, or any other leading Democrat, challenge this mindless slogan. Get the government off our backs—does that mean not having bailed out Penn Central? Or Lockheed? Or Chrysler? Did Reagan mean that if tomorrow, as is quite possible, the Ford Motor Company (as a result of corporate stupidity unmatched by any government bureaucrats) teeters on the edge of bankruptcy, a Reagan administration will refuse to help it in the name of the Friedman Commandments? Who in his right mind believes this? Who—except for the sincerely benighted dupes of rightist magical thinking—doesn't realize that, like it or not, the interpenetration of state and society, government and economy is inescapable in the era of "late capitalism"? And that the only serious issues are the extent to which that occurs, and more important, the social tilt and animating values with which it is managed?

In the short run, then, Reaganism may be the last hurrah of the more primitive versions of American conservatism, a last ecstatic facing backward to a fancied past. Put yourself in the hands of the god who manifests himself as an "invisible hand" and then all will be good. That this hasn't worked in the past keeps no one who desperately yearns for that past from trying to repeat it. But if Reaganism, the conservatism of the Simple Simons, proves a chimera, that doesn't mean, of course, that a more sophisticated, corporate conservatism won't be edging into greater power—with its own kinds of government controls and interventions. Reagan may, if he presses, cripple minimum wage laws; he cannot, even if he wished to, block the long-range trends toward "corporate statism."

Amiable (or perhaps just lazy?) Reagan may be; but some of the people near him, and many of those supporting him, are not. There is a lot of bad feeling in the country, a lot of social nastiness, a lot

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of mean-spirited selfishness.* (You don't have to be a woman to be like Ayn Rand.)

The motto of the moment seems to be, "Screw you, Jack." In the perverse delight that Mayor Ed Koch takes in putting down minority voices and in the support he gets from Queens and Staten Island, one can locate our deeper atmosphere. In the campaign cry, "help the forgotten middle class," raised by the new senator from New York, D'Amato, one can hear code words for something uglier.

Part of this atmosphere is due to national frustrations, and some of this frustration is understandable. In its popular feeling it takes the form of resentment at seeing America "kicked around."** In its sophisticated form it consists of jeremiads about the dangers of the Soviet Union taking over the world. Here, some sorting-out ought to be done, and insofar as either liberalism or the democratic left allows itself to be tagged as indifferent or hostile to the idea of a legitimate national defense it plays directly into the hands of its enemies. So long as a major part of the world is under the rule of Communist dictatorships, there is a case to be made for a serious defense policy.

But there are also choices. Are MX missiles needed or do they constitute an ill-considered and panicky sign of our inability to cope with difficult political problems? Is there any reason to suppose that if the United States largely increases its stock of nuclear weapons (already enough to destroy the Soviet Union several times over), it will help it in dealing with the most likely points of crisis in the next few years—the Middle East and Latin America? If the United States is humiliated, as it has been, by the new Iranian rulers, might there not be some point in publicly discussing the possibility that this has something to do with the previous support extended by us to the tyrannical Shah? And if the conventional military forces of the United States are in poor shape, isn't that partly the result of a policy that lets affluent white youth off the hook while inducing poor black youth to put itself on it?

Between the ill-articulated confusions and retreats of Carter and the simplistic but emotionally powerful demagogy of Reagan, it was all but inevitable that the latter triumph. We can have no assurance that an effort honestly to explain to the American people the complexities, contradictions, limitations of the role of this country in world affairs would have enabled the defeat of Reagan. But the failure even to attempt it ensured his victory.

"Get the government off our back" and "make America strong again"—empty, sterile demagogy, enough not only to win the support of millions of Americans but of sophisticated intellectuals, too.

There is a kind of wisdom that says, once in office Reagan will shift to the center, as every president does, he will discover the limits of the possible, it won't be such a great catastrophe. I find a grain of truth in this, but not two grains.

Of course, Reagan doesn't want to start a world war. Of course, he won't proceed systematically to dismantle the welfare state, such as it is. But anyone who takes comfort from such reassurances isn't thinking hard enough.

THERE ARE DETERMINED ideologues around Reagan, and they know precisely what they want. They won't be able to do it all, thank heaven, but they'll do enough. They will shift United States policy toward open and unambiguous support of reactionary dictators in Latin America—and thereby work to the ultimate advantage of Communist or Castroite forces. They will stop talking about human rights, even in the partial, inconsistent, but still—let us be fair!—valuable way that Carter did. They will scrap SALT II and "negotiate" with the Russians so as, probably, to make difficult a genuine mutual disarmament—the result of which may well be a terrible nuclear arms race, dangerous enough even if it doesn't lead to war. They will resurrect the language and symbols of chauvinism, which may bring some emotional comfort to portions of the population, as well as to *Commentary* contributors, but will solve no problems whatever.

The men around Reagan are, in their own way, serious and they mean to carry through at least a

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* We are back to the world view Dickens attacked so memorably in *Hard Times*, the sterile form of "utilitarianism" he immortalized in the characters of Gradgrind and Bounderby. Today Gradgrind writes for the *American Spectator* and Bounderby is being considered for assistant secretary of commerce.

** I suspect that this must be one of the strong reasons for the shift of a portion of the blue-collar vote to Reagan, apart, that is, from the anger that laid-off workers rightly feel. Or perhaps the resentment at seeing America "kicked around" and the anger at losing jobs came together in a reaction against Carter.

Still, it is necessary to remember that a majority of Americans, despite the Reagan victory, want many of the social measures, like national health insurance, that we identify with the welfare state. The contradiction between this desire and the responsiveness to "get the government off our backs" is something that requires close investigation.

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portion of their stated program. That is why he was elected.

Suppose, indeed, that Reagan doesn't go at the welfare state with a meat cleaver. Suppose he just uses a scalpel. Or better yet, suppose he just does nothing to implement or improve existing social programs. Don't you see that this is already doing severe damage to whatever we have of a welfare state? By its very nature the welfare state cannot long maintain an equilibrium. It is always subject to serious inner conflicts. It becomes vulnerable, not only to the demands of newly enfranchised or empowered groups, but also to the counterattacks of traditional ruling elites that turn against it as soon as they have been brought to a new confidence by its earlier ministrations. And now, it might be added, by the counterattacks of some middle-class *enragés* in whom ideological venom is not always to be distinguished from racist contempt.

Do nothing about national health insurance; do nothing to plug up tax inequities; do nothing to prevent corporations from devastating industrial communities through plant closings; do nothing to help the inner cities; do nothing to cope with unemployment among black youth—and you have already done sufficient damage to the welfare state, even without dismantling Social Security.

But of course the Reagan administration will do some things, or try to. As it finds that raising expenditures and cutting taxes is strictly Alice-in-Wonderland economics, it will be tempted, if only in frustration, to take a stab here, a cut there at various social programs. Surely it will try to fulfill *some* of its promises to its constituencies, at the moment both enraged and encouraged. (That, by

Why UAW Members Didn't Support Reagan

DETROIT — The nation's auto workers did not rush to join the 1980 blue-collar "revolt" against Democrat Jimmy Carter. Instead, there was early evidence that the UAW rank and file "came home" to the Roosevelt-Democratic coalition and, in the end, poked small holes in the GOP's postelection claim to the hearts and ballots of working-class Americans.

An overriding reason may have been that the economic issues, which cut deeply in Reagan's favor into many union households, had less impact when weighed by auto workers, many of whom are cushioned against inflation and unemployment by cost-of-living and supplementary unemployment benefit provisions in contracts.

The "warmonger" issue, graphically depicted in *Solidarity*, the UAW in-house newspaper, may have made a deeper impression on auto workers than on voters in general. In Michigan, where 600,000 active and retired auto workers and their families make up about 20 percent of the electorate, the UAW delivered about 60 percent of its voting members to Carter, according to election-day exit polling.

The pattern was probably repeated in Illinois (125,000 UAW members), Ohio (200,000) and Pennsylvania (65,000). The ratio may have been better for Carter, according to UAW spokesman Don Stillman, in New England states—New York (85,000) and Connecticut (35,000)—and a little worse in Republican Indiana and Sunbelt states Texas, California, and Missouri.

Meanwhile, blue-collar voters nationally divided almost evenly between Carter and Reagan and less than half of all union-household voters backed Carter, a sharp decline from 62 percent in 1976, according to polls.

"Our people ran a good 10 percent (for Carter) above other union groups," said Sam Fishman, executive director of the UAW-Michigan Community Action Program. "The reason is simple. . . . The American people were more concerned about the poor state of the economy than about the president's argument that Reagan would constitute a danger on foreign policy matters. . . . "

The UAW leadership undertook a "political education" program: anti-Reagan, anti-Anderson, pro-Carter. The effort began in September with a severe negative factor to overcome. The national economic decline and a flood of imported cars had created insecurity, anger, and pessimism among the 1.5 million active and retired members. In Michigan, a poll one week before the election found that 86 percent of the UAW members believed their finances had worsened or not improved in the past year.

However, there also was a strong positive factor at work. The union's "secondary leadership," local officials who form the vital communications link between Solidarity House and rank-and-file members, was overwhelmingly pro-Carter.

Outside plant gates, millions of leaflets were distributed, stressing 30 different themes, including: retiree concerns, civil rights, women's rights, unemployment and, several days before the election, reprints of newspaper stories alleging that Reagan foreign policy adviser Richard Allen had ties to the Japanese auto industry.

"Our effort worked," said Stillman, but "considering the Reagan landslide, that's small consolation."

PETER PLASTRIK

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the way, is a major difference between the Reagan and Eisenhower styles of conservatism: Reagan has behind him, as Eisenhower did not, an active, frothing movement that is going to demand payoffs and won't hesitate to raise hell if it fails to get them.) Surely a Reagan administration will try to thwart ERA; surely it will push further the disgraceful policies of prohibiting Medicare funds for abortions; surely it will throw its corporate friends a tax benefit.

And a word must be said here about the blacks. What can they expect from the Reagans, from the D'Amatos, from the nameless new senators (we shall learn their names soon enough) who have replaced the beaten Democratic, and some Republican, liberals? Who can take seriously Reagan's talk about getting private enterprise to invest in the South Bronx? Who can fail to take seriously his distaste for the minimum wage? The results of this election can only make a sensitive black person feel forlorn, abandoned. Is that not already a disastrous consequence?

For it is not merely a question of what the new Administration may or may not do. It is also a question of who finds encouragement and energy as a result of the election, who sinks into apathy or turns tail.

Doesn't anyone in this country talk any longer about social groups, political publics, and (say it not too loud) economic classes? Isn't there any longer a conviction that parties and candidates stand not just for something but for somebodies?

(And that, by the way, is one reason I had no sympathy for the Anderson campaign: it rested on no plebeian or liberal community, it had no ties with blacks or unions or women's movements. It was strictly a one-man, one-shot affair, an example of the "clique politics" that J. Patrick Dobel analyzed in the last *Dissent*.)

To ask the questions I have italicized above is surely to answer them. The Reagan victory gives new strength and self-confidence—and why not?—to the most reactionary elements in the country: to the Moral Majority fanatics, to the Friedmanite ideologues, to the corporate interests, to the enemies of women's rights, to the Cold Warriors. The Reagan victory tells women to get back to the kitchen and shut up. The Reagan victory tells blacks to take their welfare checks and stay in their slums. The Reagan victory demoralizes the liberal camp, leading to splits, recriminations, dropping out. The Reagan victory signals the few remaining liberals in Congress that prudence requires beating a retreat. Do you suppose many of them will take this as an occasion for forthrightness, for creating a last-ditch defense in behalf of their principles?*

THERE ARE DEEPER TRENDS. Some have to do with technological transformations, e.g., television, which—it is no exaggeration to say—endanger the health of democracy.

The dominance of television in the election has profoundly skewed the political process. We need not romanticize the past, yet if one looks at some of the speeches of Franklin Roosevelt and Adlai Stevenson there was at least an effort at coherent presentation and sustained argument. If one goes further back, to the Lincoln-Douglas debates, the contrast with the present is still more striking. Each of the debaters took an hour and a-half for initial presentations and a half hour for reply; no doubt there was a lot of gas, but to compare the intellectual level of these debates with anything one can hear these days is depressing. Television has, in effect, destroyed the political speech—one reason Ted Kennedy came across poorly on TV was that in his campaign he still used old-style oratory. What we have, instead, is a "debate" in which grown-up people are supposed to answer *in two minutes* enormously complicated and difficult questions. To be sure, the "debate" between Carter and Reagan showed that they barely had enough to say to fill up two minutes—though again, to be fair, this was certainly more true for Reagan than Carter. But there is something about the format that makes for superficiality, sloganeering, quick phrases. It destroys political thought.

At least as destructive is the role of the "experts" who then immediately appear to provide their

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* A call for retreat has already been sounded by Senator Moynihan, the Democrat who worked for Nixon. He has publicly warned against the "danger" that the Democratic party will be taken over by the "left-wing" backers of Ted Kennedy. He does not go so far as to name any of them. But he says they are people committed to "doctrinal purity" who hold to "the premise that government should be powerful and America should be weak." Now, where did we last hear that sort of language—wasn't it from an ex-actor who got himself elected president?

A bit later in the same press conference (*New York Times*, 11/12/'80), Senator Moynihan complained that he could never get Jimmy Carter to consider a proposal that the federal government take over the burden of paying welfare costs from New York City and other large cities.

That's just the sort of thing that could lead someone to suppose Pat Moynihan wants the government to be strong, etc. etc.

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idiotic scorecards and rate the "performances." Everything becomes reduced to personality, style, manner. No wonder the new president is a former actor: acting turns out to be a central requirement for a successful candidate. We have even had to witness the absurdity of a computation of smiles—how many times this candidate smiled, how many times the other. It is as if the whole country were turned into a dismal article in *Psychology Today.*

I find myself in unexpected agreement with the aide in the Reagan campaign who suggested that in place of these inane "debates" each candidate be allotted half an hour a week on prime television time for six weeks before the election to explain his views on crucial issues. A good idea is a good idea, no matter where it comes from.

There are deeper trends. We are, it seems, in the midst of a moral-cultural "counterrevolution" an angry—also, one suspects, scared—reaction to the proliferation of freedoms over the past several decades. There are now in preparation constitutional amendments to make abortion a crime (the wives and daughters of the rich can always take trips abroad), to allow prayer in the schools, etc. A streak of bigotry and intolerance, a moral monolithism, is evident in these evangelical Moral Majorityites. (And by the way, don't those Jewish intellectuals and organizational leaders who slunk into Reagan's camp feel any discomfort about the company in which they find themselves? Don't they see that these Moral Majority fanatics are enemies of that separation of church and state to which American Jews have traditionally been committed?)

What has been happening is, I think, a slow, belated tide of reaction against the counterculture and New Left manifestations of the late '60s, both against what was attractive in them and what was excessive. The willing of simplicity that results in slogans like "Get the government off our backs" finds a moralistic equivalent in a snarling intolerance of cultural and social difference. The Yahoos are up in arms again. And now—this *is* new!—they have as their allies New York intellectuals, only yesterday the friends of Paul Goodman . . .

This reaction not only constitutes a massive

The Sad Story of Gene McCarthy

Two weeks before the election, I was surprised by a small story in the back pages of the *New York Times.* "McCarthy Is Said to Back Reagan"—that was the headline. The brief but unambiguous dispatch told how McCarthy had met with Reagan, and offered to do "anything Reagan forces ask to aid the campaign." To an extreme cynic, of course, this need not have come as a shock. It has been a long time since McCarthy worked seriously against a Republican candidate for president. In 1968 he deferred his endorsement of Humphrey to the last possible moment, when Nixon had already clinched the election; in 1972 he was on McGovern's side, but aloof from the contest; in 1976 he ran as an independent, and with a few thousand well-placed votes nearly robbed Carter of the presidency. Still, in supporting Reagan he was consenting to Reagan's platform. It amounted to a confession that the liberal principles that McCarthy had once espoused, and of which the Republican platform of 1980 was the simple negation, had become to him a hollow thing.

I think our mistake about Eugene McCarthy has always been to suppose that someone so plainly not an opportunist must be an idealist. He is, on the contrary, a creature of self-will. Ever since the summer of 1968, he has cared chiefly for an image of himself—an image that others helped him to invent—and to this he has sacrificed opportunity and principle alike. McCarthy sees himself as an outsider to the noise and dirt of politics, a man of spirit, serenely above the battle, to whom the hectic rush of the present, into destruction or another day's uncertain calm, can be viewed as the goings-on of a distant galaxy. This pose he learned from Robert Lowell, and their friendship was the worst thing that ever happened to McCarthy. For he had it in him to be, not a good poet, or even an intellectual above the common run of dry wits in his generation, but a liberal senator from Minnesota. Little by little he gave up on that, while his public character turned into the volatile compound of petulance and spleen proper to a modern intellectual.

Some day a historian will have to put together the pieces—faced with the ungrateful task of proving that the McCarthy of 1980 was a natural outgrowth of the McCarthy of 1968. I wish him luck. For the time being, the betrayal may seem a little less staggering when we recall that even then, McCarthy could not help giving the impression that he had better things to do than deliver speeches, run for office, and improve the lot of the poor and the helpless. An intellectual, of all citizens, should know that there is no escape from politics; there are only intervals of pretended indifference to it. McCarthy tried to stretch these into a way of life, and a way of life *in politics.* It was a pleasant charade but, now that the mask is off, we can see that no happy end was ever in store for him. From the moment he chose to set himself above mere politics, McCarthy was bound to fall.

David Bromwich

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turn against the late '60s; it also shows, I fear, some touches of symmetry with the political culture that characterized the more extreme aspects of the late '60s. Not, of course, in content, but in reach and claims to authority. One can detect, then and now, in the fringe extremisms an unwillingness to accept the limits of politics, an insistance that personal morality and public policy must be intertwined. (In fairness, however, I would add that even the wildest apostles of the '60s counter-culture didn't propose to legislate against people whose ways of life they disliked.) Distorted religio-cultural emotions and yearnings are strongly at work—enraged demands that what Beckett in *Happy Days* calls "the old style" be enforced by the police. The politics of the New Right seem largely to be motored, indeed, overwhelmed, by diffused and churning religiocultural sentiments.

Arms must be twisted, laws passed, people jailed: thus The Good will prevail. That such methods are themselves a denial of moral good is an argument that, right now, in certain parts of the country, will get you nowhere.

There are deeper trends. In an essay I wrote for the *New Republic* two years ago I argued that

> The main thrust of American social and political thought since World War II has been toward the right. There have been interruptions, of course. For six or seven years the New Left took center stage and conservative ideologues went into retreat, partly because some of them, headed by Irving Kristol, had imprudently endorsed Richard Nixon as the candidate of "prudence." (I assume that conservative thinkers drawn to theologies of Guilt can yield to the smaller experience of shame.) Now, in the 1970s many of the themes first announced in the 1950s by rightward-moving publicists are being rehearsed again, though usually at a lower intellectual level.

I will not repeat here the reasons given in that article for the long-range rightward trend of American thought—if you're interested, you can find the piece reprinted in Dissent Pamphlet #1. We have to recognize that apart from short-range factors in Reagan's victory, we are dealing here with a long-range, though not of course smoothly upward, trend. Here, too, there are many reasons, but it is enough to cite only one. The welfare state in both Europe and America has achieved some remarkable successes in humanizing capitalist society and cushioning the blows that society periodically delivers to people spread across the lower levels of the income scale. But it has, apparently, reached an impasse, creating, through both its successes and failures, a range of problems to which we have not, or not yet, worked out sufficient responses. I want to stress here the phrase, *through both its successes and failures.*

The air is full of attacks, mendacious from the right and feckless from the left, on the welfare state. It is not enough, this welfare state. It is not good enough, it needs ultimately to be "transcended," or modified, or improved. But first of all, it needs to be protected. And let us not, in the present atmosphere, allow ourselves to be deflected from recognizing that it is a great achievement. *It has improved the lives of millions without endangering the liberty of anyone.* That there should be a reaction against it; that it should have thrown up unforeseen difficulties; that in some of its aspects it is irksome—of course. But whoever would abandon or destroy or starve out the welfare state is an enemy of progress.

AND NOW? WHAT IS TO BE DONE? To try, of course, to resist the assaults likely to come from the right; to stiffen the folding backs of some of the congressional liberals; to hold together the remains of the liberal-labor coalition.

But more, we need some sustained thought, some sustained intellectual work. The conservative intellectuals, in opposition for some years, did take the trouble—enormously aided of course by corporate beneficence—to do programmatic work. They may not have used such terms as "welfare state" or "late capitalism," but from their own point of view these were the phenomena they were dealing with. You can say that what they came up with was pretty shoddy—Kemp-Roth tax cuts, the Laffer curve, Friedman economics, etc. All right; but what emerged from their work was at least a recognizable, coherent world view, a principled opposition to the welfare state (which in practice they will not be able to sustain). We need not respect their results in order to acknowledge their effort. Still more important, to acknowledge the consequences of their effort. I am not saying that the votes of the Moral Majorityites were cast out of enthusiasm for the papers of the American Enterprise Institute. I am saying that there was a tacit link between the two, since in modern politics some effort at intellectual rationale seems necessary.

No equivalent efforts, despite the valuable work of such individuals as Michael Harrington, Gus Tyler, and Robert Heilbroner, was made on the other side. In part, this was for lack of support. The massive entry of the corporations into politics, and their shrewd recognition that intellectual

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work is a useful political tool, has put the labor-liberal forces at a serious disadvantage. But not a fatal disadvantage.

The thoughtful people, the specialists who remained committed to liberal and democratic radical values need to sit down—not for one of those dubious rah-rah conferences on how to put our Humpty Dumpty together again—but for a few years of sustained programmatic work. We need specialists in the political process, for example, to reexamine the primary regulations, some of them put into effect through liberal enthusiasm but with unforeseen disastrous consequences. The present primary procedures allow small and militant minorities often to impose their will on shapeless majorities; they transform electoral campaigns into boring ordeals; they seem to lead to less rather than more participation. Is there a way to reform these procedures without going back to old-style Tammany bosses? Surely this is a matter worth careful study.

So, too, are the socioeconomic problems regarding the welfare state. Isn't there *some* ground for complaints about the bureaucracies of government? Can we find programmatic bases for linking together domestic liberalism with a sober concern for national security? Is it possible to protect the personal freedoms of women, gays, lesbians, without inflaming the prejudices of vast numbers of middle-class persons? And if we are rightly suspicious of the blather about liberal programs being "tired," must we not recognize that the prevalence of this blather requires us to reexamine our premises?

This may seem like an excessively intellectualistic approach; but it is not. The conservatives understood, or sensed, the need for combining their version of intellectual work with hard organizational work. At least in this respect, we have something to learn from them. Nor need our side be so lavish with institutes and centers. Two dozen serious and qualified people should be put to work—and told not to be in too great a hurry. And so far as I can see, it can be only the unions, or the more responsive among them, that will trouble to provide the support for such an effort.

All of us, of course, have to engage in this work of reflection, calmly and self-critically, even as public events and governmental decisions may rouse us to indignation and protest. Between the First World War and the New Deal there were years of reaction in the United States, but also years in which liberal and left intellectuals were doing the work of programmatic preparation that enabled the advances of the '30s. Between the preparatory work and the upsurge of industrial unionism in the CIO there was an important relation.

A last word, now, to ourselves, socialists of the democratic left. Defeat is not the best culture in which to nurture keen thought, good feeling, high energy. But that is where we are. We need both to hold firm to our basic values—our vision of a human community marked by freedom, fraternity, participation, and egalitarianism—and to avoid the tendency to retreat into a kind of "fundamentalism." If you don't know what to do or say, you sing "Solidarity Forever." Well, by all means, let us sing; but let us also keep our eyes firmly on the mainstream of American political life and avoid repeating those tragic errors of sectarianism that have been our special curse.

We have known defeats before, we will gain victories again. □

Schadenfreude

My German dictionary says that *Schadenfreude* is a feeling of malicious delight in the discomfort of others. The element of *Schadenfreude* was especially strong in the recent sad election, especially among some of our liberal friends. And almost all of it at the expense of poor Jimmy Carter.

No political leader has ever deserved more completely to drop into oblivion than poor Jimmy. Still, there was a kind of nasty crowing on the part of some independent spirits who tried to blink the magnitude of defeat by writing, as did Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. in the *New York Times* of November 6, that "for all the sound and fury of the electioneering there was, as John B. Anderson tried to demonstrate, little difference on some basic issues between the Democratic and Republican candidates." Notice the weasel-worded "some"—human rights, Salt II, judicial appointments, women's rights, social programs?

Carter merited severe criticism from the liberals and the left, some of that criticism appears in these pages. But to comfort oneself, if that's what Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. is doing, with the notion that "it doesn't make much difference" seems politically obtuse. And if we're ever to rebuild a liberal-labor-left coalition in this country—one in which friends like Schlesinger surely belong—we'll have to abandon the righteous indifference to the realities of social and political life that his sentence, alas, seems to betray.

— S. P.

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Matthew Slater

Food Assistance and the Left

Liberals and leftists often find themselves in the uncomfortable position of either defending welfare programs they know to be insufficient or running the risk of losing the modest benefits those programs provide. This was the situation last spring when the Food Stamp program neared bankruptcy and supplemental appropriations were sought in Congress. Conservatives attempted to stall the appropriations or at least to reduce the amount requested by the Carter administration. The program had grown in participants and cost far beyond their expectations. "We have been quite generous," said Senator Henry Bellmon (R-Okla.), and it is time to impose "discipline" on the Department of Agriculture.[1] House Agriculture Committee Chairman Thomas Foley (D-Wash.) promised that the bill authorizing supplemental appropriations would also include new antifraud measures. But the benefits to millions of people receiving stamps, he argued, far outweighed the program's problems. A compromise was struck on the appropriation, and the bill passed.

And the left? What could be done other than agree with Foley? Nothing could be gained by letting the program lapse and much lost. But the temptation was to scoff at Food Stamps as a "band-aid measure," much as conservatives are tempted to cite it as another example of "throwing money at problems." The crux of both criticisms is the same: that the program does not solve the problem it is supposed to address. The left argues that this particular program is not able to solve the problem; the right questions whether there can be any governmental solution.

Such criticism is possible because underlying the food assistance programs is the mistaken notion that society can somehow eliminate poverty by treating its *effects*. This notion is mistaken in the same way an alcoholic is when he cures a hangover with another drink.

Food assistance programs do relieve some of the misery of poverty, but they cannot alter the situation that makes relief necessary: this society still is not structured to let millions of people feed themselves. A real cure requires overcoming our "great tradition of optimistically viewing most obstacles to social progress as external to the structure of society itself."[2]

But is there any reason beyond this to say that food assistance has failed, to discount the relief provided by the programs over the past 12 years? Given the current political climate, so critical of social spending, it helps to make clear what food assistance programs have done and can do, what they cannot do, and what role the left can take in their defense.

THE FIRST FOOD ASSISTANCE program was begun during the Great Depression. However, the food benefits were mostly an afterthought to the primary goal of the program—to boost farm income and halt the flood of farm closings. A direct food distribution program was begun in 1935. By 1939 some 13 million people were receiving government commodities. A second program using stamps to distribute food-buying power was begun in 1939, but, as World War II helped decrease unemployment and food surpluses, the Food Stamp program was deemed unnecessary and eliminated in 1943. Other programs to minimize farm surpluses were started thereafter, including a new Food Stamp program in 1961.

Beneficial as these programs were for recipients, they remained a by-product of agricultural policy. There was no larger purpose until reports of widespread hunger in the U.S. appeared in the late '60s. These reports were in part a response to disillusionment with the status of poverty policies at the time. Workers in the field had discovered that the War on Poverty could do little to meet the immediate needs of poor people and so joined the poor in demands for direct and substantial government help. But by 1967 political enthusiasm for helping the poor had eroded considerably.

Advocates of direct aid had to find some way to regain the political initiative; hunger was the issue they found. They used hunger as a metaphor for poverty, to express the outrage they felt at seeing the deprivation that as many as 15 million Americans were forced to endure. Hunger elicits an emotional response and suggests a more urgent problem than some amorphous "poverty." As Senator George McGovern (D-S.Dak.) put it, hunger "exerts a special claim on the conscience of the American people."[3] Moreover, hunger was a problem that could be solved or so it was said, and this appealed to an American cultural tendency that Stanley Hoffmann calls "skill thinking." "Political issues," Hoffmann writes, "tend . . . to be reduced to a set of technical problems that will be handled by instruments which are equipped to deal

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with material obstacles but much less so to cope with social ones."[4] "Skill thinking" disposed of hunger easily. The problem was basically technical in nature: solving it required nothing more than getting food to people. The "technical know-how" was available,[5] *we had "the tools at hand,"*[6] and, unlike poverty in general, hunger was "susceptible to rational solution."[7]

Since hunger was viewed in this technical fashion, social questions could be ignored and the politically sensitive issue of income redistribution avoided. For food assistance is not immediately seen as a form of redistribution. Instead of a hand dipping into the citizens' own pockets, it appears to them as the sharing out of some vaguely imagined agricultural surplus in which they have no financial or personal interest.

By the end of the '60s, for the first time since World War II food assistance programs experienced substantial growth because of the needs of poor people rather than the vagaries of agricultural production. In the decade from 1968 to 1978 the number of food assistance programs doubled. Expenditures for such programs went from about $1 billion in fiscal (FY) 1969 to over $8 billion in FY 1979, and in FY '80 expenditures for Food Stamps alone will top $8 billion. The impact of this growth can be assessed from the changes that have taken place since 1968 in the Food Stamp program (FSP).

One of the program's biggest problems was the extent of local discretion and variations. It was left up to the discretion of the states and counties to decide whether to distribute Food Stamps within their jurisdiction. In addition, each state could set its own criteria for Food Stamp eligibility. This meant that "those counties which traditionally had been least responsive to the needs of the poor and hungry were given veto power to prevent the program from reaching its intended beneficiaries."[8] And, finally, the allotment of Food Stamps per household was not sufficient to buy an adequately nutritious diet.

Some of these problems were solved administratively in 1969, but changes in the program's structure were not added to the law until January 1971. These amendments set national standards for eligibility and increased federal participation in the program's administration and administrative costs. In determining eligibility and benefits, deductions from gross income were authorized so that participation would not be artifically restricted "when other important human social needs [such as medical and housing costs] made legitimate claims on the household budget."[9] Periodic adjustments were mandated so that real benefits would not be reduced by inflation.

Additional important changes in the law were made in 1973 and 1977, but the 1971 amendments were critical because they made the Food Stamps program "the first universal, national welfare program with national eligibility standards based on need and not on particular household characteristics."[10] Nine days before the 1971 Food Stamp amendments were signed into law, the Senate rejected President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan (FAP), which would have provided the first set of national standards and benefits for cash welfare. The Congress's willingness to establish one type of program but not the other tells us a great deal about the strengths and weaknesses of welfarism in the United States.

When Nixon first proposed FAP, Food Stamps and other forms of welfare were to be eliminated in its favor. When it was pointed out that many recipients of both Food Stamps and Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC) would lose benefits if the two were replaced by FAP, Food Stamps were restored in their own right. In the end FAP died because it satisfied neither liberals nor conservatives. Liberals thought that, even with Food Stamps, too many people would lose benefits and that a higher income should be guaranteed. Conservatives voted against FAP because they thought that even the modest cost increases it entailed were too much along with the ever growing Food Stamp budget. While the role played by the FSP in the demise of FAP may displease some people, one of its positive aspects is that it surely has made evident that hunger indeed is an issue in our country. Any program designed to supplant food assistance would have to meet the standards set by FSP. Hunger now had been shown to exist as a national problem and the needs of hungry people had been quantified, so to speak, by the distribution of Food Stamps.

The FSP and other food assistance programs have helped meet those needs. Even though they have not yet brought aid to all eligible recipients, they do give the most assistance to those with the greatest need (lowest income). My own research, measuring the impact of a variety of factors on infant mortality, shows that Food Stamps and the Food Distribution program have been more effectively tied to need than has AFDC, if one accepts high infant mortality rates as an indicator of need.[11] The programs are effective. The Field Foundation sent a team of doctors in 1977 to repeat an investigation of poverty, health, and hunger conducted in 1967. Its evaluation is representative

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of the findings of other research regarding the impact of food programs. "The doctors again fastened onto food aid as the one concrete area in which they believe there has been significant progress."[12] My research suggests that food assistance has contributed to the decline in infant mortality rates in the U.S. between 1961 and 1975.

NEVERTHELESS, SUPPORT FOR FOOD ASSISTANCE programs is declining because the programs are perceived as not meeting nutritional goals, not helping the truly needy, not working to the point of eliminating the need for their own existence, and not working quickly or inexpensively enough. Such criticism is inevitable because, unfortunately, the rhetoric that made possible the political and substantive gains of food assistance has little to do with the reality of the programs.

The nutritional potential of the food programs had been overstated, and this indeed created a serious problem of discrepancy. Hunger was isolated from poverty and presented as a distinct political issue, even though there was little evidence that hunger existed independently of poverty. Food assistance then was sold to the public on a nutritional basis—hunger would be relieved, malnutrition cured. The programs, in fact, were not set up to do that. Since identifying nutritional deficiencies on a case-by-case basis would be a prohibitively costly way of determining program eligibility, nonnutritional criteria were set up to establish an individual's need for food assistance. Poverty emerged as a promising criterion because poverty was implicitly the way by which hunger was shown to be an extensive problem. Then, too, the few programs aimed at alleviating hunger that existed prior to the '60s used income as the principal determinant of eligibility. The hunger/poverty distinction was found to be untenable in practice even though it remained part of the public justification for the programs. It was decided that Food Stamp eligibility and allotments, and eligibility for other food assistance programs, should be determined according to income level. As a result, the possibility of fulfilling the immediate nutritional goals of the food assistance programs is almost nil. No cases of malnutrition would be specifically treated by them (except in the WIC program), because nutritional status is not the criterion for assistance; poverty is.*

*The WIC is the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children, administered by the Food and Nutrition Service of the Department of Agriculture. WIC recipients are pregnant women, women nursing infants up to six months, and children up to five years old. This is a time of life with exceptional nutritional demands, and program participants are persons suffering of nutritional deficiencies or at risk of developing such deficiencies. They are given foods that will meet their exceptional needs, and WIC also provides nutrition education. WIC projects are usually located at health centers, so that other health problems may be identified and treated. Much anecdotal evidence of nutritional success has accumulated since WIC began in 1972. A nutritional evaluation of the program is now getting under way.

There is a second discrepancy between the rhetoric and reality of food assistance. In the early '60s the notion of a cycle of poverty became popular. It never developed into a guiding principle, because it was not evident where the cycles began or ended or where intervention would be helpful or even possible. At the same time, scientists were beginning to believe that maternal malnutrition during pregnancy as well as infant malnutrition might result in an infant's irreversible brain damage. While this has not yet been proven, in the late '60s it suggested a new and workable cycle-of-poverty theory. Children whose mental development is impaired by malnutrition would never be able to reach their full potential and thus never be able to support themselves. Their adult poverty would result in new generations perpetuating the same conditions in their children. Giving food to mothers and children in those critical years seemed a logical way of breaking that cycle of poverty.

This new cycle-of-poverty theory has invited arguments about the long-term yields that investment in food assistance would bring: decreased welfare dependence and increased economic prosperity. There is, however, no prospect that the return on greater food assistance to the poor will be more than a halt in the growth of welfare rolls and greater economic output. Conversely, there is a very real prospect that, even with extensive food assistance programs, welfare rolls will continue to grow; just feeding people does not produce the jobs necessary to allow them to support and feed themselves.

These problems would not exist had food assistance been promoted as a way to ease the deprivations of poverty. The programs have done that. But the problem of hunger *per se* has been oversold ever since 1968, particularly to conservative congressmen, who have been consistent supporters of food assistance for nutritional purposes but have resisted all changes or aspects of the programs that could be construed as having nonnutritional goals.

Ironically, then, the programs are in jeopardy and risk being called failures, because they have

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successfully treated the lack of income while ostensibly treating hunger or the lack of food. That this is hollow criticism can best be seen in its most extreme expression. Nutritionist Nevin Scrimshaw wrote, "The commodity distribution and food stamp program . . . may function as a useful income supplement for some poor families, and they have certainly contributed to the adequacy of family diets, but they have largely failed in their stated mission, the prevention of individual cases of malnutrition."[13] But this assessment can only be sustained by the most literal reading of the concept of food assistance. It surely cannot be called a failing to add to the income of poor families—for if people are poor and are *not* hungry, it is almost certain that they have inadequate clothing, or inadequate shelter, or inadequate medical care. It surely is not a failing to add to the adequacy of the diets of recipients even if specific nutritional diseases are not cured. As one nutritionist put it, "'We are a nation of nutritional illiterates, yet we expect the poor to exercise some special discipline of nutrition knowledge that the rest of the country lacks.'"[14] The only way to be sure that food assistance programs cure nutritional disease is for the government to tell recipients what foods they may eat and then force them to eat those foods—a level of government intervention in the life of the individual that no one would countenance.

The claim of conservatives that we are being cheated by food assistance, because it is not doing what they thought it would or should do, is a phony one. If literal hunger has been oversold since 1968, it was just as eagerly overbought. Supporting attempts to end hunger was a way of saving face for people who opposed other antipoverty measures. When reports reached them of poor Americans with "swollen bellies. . . crippled bodies [and] vacant stares of hopelessness and despair,"[15] how could they resist the impulse to lend a helping hand? Conservatives chose, however, to call the problem they were willing to solve "hunger" rather than admit that this hunger was just another side of the same poverty they had always ignored and for which they denied any responsibility.

Food assistance programs have succeeded as much as this kind of program can be expected to succeed. Nevertheless, there is deceit and there is failure in food assistance. The failure is not that food assistance programs have not ended hunger and eliminated the need for assistance. The failure, rather, lies in the very idea, espoused by conservative critics, that such technical programs as food assistance can solve social problems; that treating the symptoms of a problem will eliminate its causes; that feeding people will end their poverty.

To achieve social progress we must stop avoiding the complex causes of poverty and such troubling questions as income redistribution. We must get beyond "skill thinking" and devise a true social policy that has set as its goal the development of self-sufficiency among the nation's poor. This will require overcoming such barriers to self-sufficiency as racial and economic discrimination, functional illiteracy, and political structures in which the poor have no voice. Technical programs such as food assistance make most sense, then, when implemented as part of a more comprehensive social policy aimed at the underlying causes of the need for assistance.

NOTES

[1]Quoted in "Food Stamp Bail-Out Near," Logan (W.Va.) *Banner*, May 15, 1980.

[2]Anthony Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology—the 'Issue-Attention Cycle,'" *Public Interest*, Summer 1972.

[3]Senator George McGovern's Introduction to Nick Kotz, *Let Them Eat Promises* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1971), p. xiv.

[4]Stanley Hoffman, *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 148.

[5]The Citizens' Board of Inquiry into Hunger and Malnutrition in the United States, *Hunger, USA* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 10.

[6]Quoted, *ibid.*, p. 7.

[7]Kotz, McGovern's Introd. to *Promises*, p. ix.

[8]Citizens' Board, *Hunger, USA*, p. 66.

[9]The Congressional Budget Office, *The Food Stamp Program: Income or Food Supplement?* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 7.

[10]*Ibid.*, p. 7.

[11]Matthew D. Slater, "Hunger in America—Ten Years Later," undergraduate thesis, Harvard College (unpublished), 1979. A summary of the statistical results will appear in Slater, "Food Assistance Has Helped," *National Food Review*, U.S. Department of Agriculture, forthcoming.

[12]Nick Kotz, *Hunger in America: The Federal Response* (New York: The Field Foundation, 1979), p. 10.

[13]Nevin Scrimshaw, "Myths and Realities in International Health Planning," *American Journal of Public Health*, 64: 8, p. 793.

[14]Anonymous professor quoted in Kotz, *Promises*, p. 113.

[15]Robert Kennedy, quoted in Citizens' Board, *Hunger, USA*, p. 7. □

To Our Contributors

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Patrick Lacefield, Mark Levinson
and Joseph Schwartz

Another View of the Draft

In our previous issue we printed a comment by a student, Jerry Watts, regarding the draft and its critics. Here is another comment, in part a reply to Watts, from a different point of view. We shall be glad to continue this discussion with brief statements from other readers. — EDS.

In war, the Greek historian Herodotus once explained, truth is the first casualty. But sometimes where questions of war and militarism are concerned truth departs from the scene long before the first shot is fired. So it is with the national debate over draft registration and the possible return of military conscription. After President Carter's State of the Union message in January 1980 announcing draft registration, a mass movement arose opposing this step toward the eventual resumption of conscription and a further escalation of the new cold war.

The Carter administration's rationale for the draft was shaky. The draft was yet another gesture designed to send a signal to the Soviets about Afghanistan—an irrelevant response to Soviet aggression. Neither would the draft particularly strengthen the U.S. armed forces (already 3 million strong) since the real needs of the military lay in retention of noncommissioned officers, skilled technicicans, and better supply and maintenance. When it came right down to it, the Senate majority leader Robert Byrd admitted that registration would not significantly improve our mobilization time in case of war (as a report from the Selective Service confirmed—much to the Administration's chagrin).

A more surprising argument, expressed in fashionably liberal columns on the Op Ed page of the *New York Times* and even in the Fall 1980 issue of *Dissent* by Jerry Watts, postulates that military conscription is in no way connected with an increased predilection toward ill-advised interventions overseas. The argument runs along the following lines: because the present volunteer force is disproportionately poor and nonwhite, opposition to the draft is objectively racist and inegalitarian. This is particularly true, so the argument continues, given the predominantly white middle-class composition of the antidraft movement. Not only would intervention abroad be less likely, since middle-class kids and parents would have a stake in a draft army, but the poor and minorities would be far better off. To oppose the draft, according to Jerry Watts, is to be guilty of "bourgeois antimilitarism."

Responding as democratic socialists active within the antidraft movement, let us first take the question of interventionism and the draft. The United States has more than adequate forces, given upgrading in certain areas, to defend any legitimate interests without the draft. As socialists we should demand no less and no more. The military draft in the hands of an interventionist-minded administration—one with its sights set on the halcyon days of the 1950s rather than the global complexities of the 1980s—constitutes a blank check on American youth to be drawn whenever and wherever our leaders see fit. While the draft was not a precondition for U.S. involvement in Indochina, it enabled the Pentagon to call on a huge manpower pool to help sustain that mistake, a mistake that could well be replicated by a Reagan administration. As the congressional black caucus, the first group of elected officials to oppose reinstitution of the draft, wrote on June 14, 1979:

> Equally as troubling is the extent to which the draft facilitates involvement in foreign conflicts. . . . As the Vietnam War again illustrates, the burden of stopping an undeclared war through congressional action is exceptionally difficult, no matter how wrong the war, and the burden is rightfully and constitutionally placed on the President to demonstrate to Congress the need for a draft at time of war.

One cannot examine the draft in a political vacuum. The draft registration program of the Carter administration was part and parcel of a new cold-war milieu that frightens our West European allies with its simplistic nature even as it scotches any substantive progress on the grave issues of arms control, of nuclear proliferation, and growing great power intervention in the Third World. Add to this political context a dash of election-year bravado by Carter, a feint to the right to outflank Reagan, and you have ample reason for all Americans—be they socialist or not—to withold the blank check of conscription until or unless vital needs involving our *legitimate* security interests dictate otherwise.

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The antidraft movement is in truth a whole mishmash of elements ranging from the libertarians on the right to Marxist Leninists on the left. All too often it has been perceived as a movement primarily dedicated to saving white middle-class college students from a de jure conscription while neglecting the de facto economic conscription of poor, working-class, and minority youth. Democratic socialists, ourselves among them, have worked to turn that around. Democratic socialists played a central role in the broad coalition that organized last March's massive antidraft demonstration in Washington. The call to that rally condemned the poverty draft resulting from the lack of job and educational opportunities in the civilian sector and emphasized the need for full employment. (It also included a strong denunciation of the Soviet aggressison in Afghanistan). And—for the first time—trade unions were brought into the antidraft movement in that action on March 22 with endorsements, support, and turnout from various internationals, regions, and locals of the UAW, the Machinists, AFSCME, District 1199 Hospital Workers, the AFGE, and others.

It is a half-truth only to suggest that middle-class hegemony in the armed forces will make ill-fated interventions less likely, just as it is to suggest that minorities would benefit from a draft army. The draft facilitated the expansion of the Vietnam War in a major way while middle-class casualties were only a minor factor in turning around public consciousness—and then only after a half-dozen tragic years. It is similarly simplistic to argue that minorities will gain a better deal in a conscript army. First of all, many of the advantages of the volunteer forces—higher pay, better fringes, increased advancement opportunities—would be expendable to armed forces blessed with a surfeit of conscripts. Second, the draft as an institution has always and will in whatever future incarnation be a reflection of the class society in which we live. We will not gain a draft bereft of advantages and escape clauses for the upper classes. Neither can you insure that the poor and the working class will not largely inhabit the infantry and other high casualty branches in disproportionate numbers. Watts's piece ignores the stark reality that even with the "egalitarian draft" 50 percent of the casualties in Vietnam were black or Hispanic though less than 20 percent of the armed forces at that time were nonwhite.

For all the fashionable talk about how much "fairer" and "beneficial" a draft would be for minorities, can someone please explain why no national black or Hispanic organization supported draft registration? Or why every single black and Hispanic member of Congress voted *against* draft registration on Capitol Hill? Those facts alone should give rise to second thoughts on the part of those who accuse the antidraft movement of ignoring the "expressed needs" of minority Americans. The question of how to share a *legitimate* military burden in an inegalitarian society is a complex one. Obviously, one who chooses to oppose an inegalitarian draft must fight for greater civilian opportunities for those now subject to economic conscription. And that is why in a pamphlet written in January 1980 *at the start* of mass antidraft activity, to over 30,000 people nationwide, the Youth Section of the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee wrote:

> Recognizing that unemployment rates of more than 40% among Black, Hispanic and working class youth lead to a cruel form of "economic conscription" into the volunteer forces, we call on anti-draft activists to make the demand for full employment an integral part of a broad anti-draft movement which organizes well beyond the campuses.

If what Jerry Watts and other critics of the antidraft movement are saying is that the central question is how to achieve social justice at home and abroad then we have no quarrel with them. We do not wish to make a fetish out of our opposition to the draft. Reagan claims, for quasi-libertarian reasons, to oppose a peacetime draft (we doubt, however, that he will end the current registration program). Yet his administration poses a serious threat to world peace. His plans for increased military spending, reviving the B-1 bomber, building the MX missile, and achieving nuclear superiority ("achieving the unachievable") make it imperative that democratic socialists help build a responsible, mainstream antimilitarist movement. The revival of cold-war politics, which began with President Carter's proposal to renew draft registration, has led us to the brink of a renewed arms race that could threaten our very existence. Now the central question remains whether the antidraft movement can become an antimilitarist movement, fighting for both a rational foreign policy abroad and social justice at home. □

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Poland

1. Abraham Brumberg

The Revolt of the Workers

"Proletarians of all countries, unite—as long as it's possible!"
Attributed, whimsically, to Lech Walesa, Head of Solidarity.

And so, for the fourth time in three decades, Poland again seems to be teetering on the brink of disaster. A society, held together by an omnipotent party disposing of all the instruments of political and social control, again has found its voice and forced the rulers to listen.

Who would have thought a year ago that a series of "work stoppages" in the summer of 1980 would result in the formulation of a "free and independent" trade union numbering about 9 million members, and that the party-controlled Central Council of Trade Unions would formally dissolve itself? Who would have believed that the Sejm (parliament), a sham body—which only four years ago voted (with one abstention), via a special constitutional amendment, to sanctify the subordination of the country's political system to the Communist party and of the country as a whole to the Soviet Union—would become the scene of fiery speeches denouncing the Sejm as nothing more than a "kind of decorative façade or a rubber stamp to seal the decisions made elsewhere"? Who would have believed that Czeslaw Milosz, winner of the 1980 Nobel Prize in literature, whose works have not only been banned but excoriated in the Polish press, would be interviewed via telephone, in Berkeley, by Radio Warsaw—and that his works would be mounted in a solemn exhibition in Lublin?

Who would have thought a year ago that high-ranking members of the ruling elite, some of them uncomfortably close to the now deposed Edward Gierek, would be arrested for bribery, embezzlement, illegal currency transactions, extravagant personal enrichment—and that workers who had been paid handsome sums for building sumptuous villas for their "leaders" would relate their experiences over public television? Or that the Workers' Self-Defense Committee, KOR, periodically called an "antisocialist nest," would be described in the following terms by a Polish writer, a member of the party:

> It was KOR, not we, who declared support for the [striking] workers in 1976. It should be given credit for it. . . . There is no basis for either trumpeting about antisocialist forces or frightening our allies. . . . It was not KOR that carried on official propaganda; it was not KOR that disorganized our economy, involved the country in debts that have brought it to the verge of bankruptcy, that has patronized thieves and spendthrifts. The Party's own leadership has been responsible from start to finish for the real and tragic defeats suffered by the Party.[1]

And who would have expected words such as these in an interview with a high official of the now defunct Central Trade Union Council in Gdansk, published in the Belgrade daily *Politika* on October 15, 1980:

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> In many factories, especially the big ones, those who were appointed trade union leaders frequently also got higher pay and therefore they would draw closer to the administration and the director. In some instances, unfortunately, the director had the trade union chairman in his pocket, for he could increase his pay when necessary. . . .

The conditions that precipitated the current crisis in Poland bear a marked resemblance to those that occasioned political crises in the past (1956, 1970, 1976). Indeed, the causes of political unrest in Eastern Europe have been endemic to the area as a whole. Consider the following indictment:

> Suppression of the democratic rights and freedoms of the people, violation of laws, licentiousness and misuse of power which gravely and unjustly afflicted many citizens. . . . A precipitous expansion of heavy industry . . . an economic policy that . . . led to the exhaustion of its material and human resources. . . . Illusory promises made to the workers. . . . Independence, diligence, expertise, and the initiative of people were not appreciated, but subservience, obedience, and even kow-towing to higher-ups were. . . . Lack of frankness, bureaucratic phrasemongering. . . . People unlawfully condemned and persecuted . . . their families and relatives subjected to mistrust and humiliation. . . . Trade unions taking inadequate care of the interests of the workers. . . . Low standard and shortage of services of all sorts, which reduced the standard of living and aroused justified discontent. . . .

An excerpt from a KOR leaflet? Or perhaps from a speech by the trade union leader Walesa? Hardly. The quotation above was drawn from the Action Program adopted by Dubček's reformed CP in April 1968.[2] Insert the word "Polish" and the story is virtually identical. Go back to some of Nagy's statements of 1953-54, or to the disclosures made by the Hungarian party in 1956, again substitute "Polish" for "Hungarian," and the similarities are no less striking.

But only in Poland have such upheavals occured with regularity, and only in Poland has the ruling party found itself challenged by a rebellion at once national—that is, embracing in effect all groups of society—and disciplined. Poland, then, is different, and while there are parallels with other East European Communist countries, no understanding of the current situation and future prospects is possible without an examination of the factors that make Poland, in some essential respects, *sui generis*.

Why "Political Pluralism"?

IT HAS BY NOW BECOME almost commonplace to say that Poland enjoys a sort of "political pluralism." The term, I think, is appropriate, yet once it is accepted as a workable description, what happens to the theories of "totalitarianism"? This is not a matter of arid scholasticism, for it still seems part of conventional wisdom to equate totalitarianism with communism—that is, with a one-party system. The assumption that Communist systems are immutable is also shared by some prominent authors of East European "revisionism" who had at one time subscribed to the (perhaps equally untenable) view that Communist regimes can evolve into genuine forms of social democracy: thus Leszek Kolakowski's recent quip that "the concept of nontotalitarian communism seems to many of us like the idea of fried snowballs."[3] Yet if it is true, to quote Kolakowski again, that the Polish party, like all the other ruling parties in Eastern Europe, has never relinquished its "unrelenting drive to nationalize everything, including culture and memory, feeling and thought, as well as . . . the need to destroy all forms of communal life than those it sets up itself,"[4] it is equally true that this urge has never been successfully consummated.

There are a number of reasons why Poland has not developed into a full-blown totalitarian state, and all of them relate to its history, traditions, and political culture. For the past 300 years it has survived as a nation without genuine statehood (except for the wretched two decades between the World Wars). Polish nationalism has been kept alive by aspirations for independence, repeated insurrections, intense religious faith, and a no less intense hostility to Russia—the most powerful and ruthless of the three historic enemies

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of Poland. For the majority of Poles, the Soviet Union is heir to Czarist imperialism, and the Communist party little more than its agent. The Nazi-Soviet pact; the massacre of 15,000 Polish army officers at Katyn in 1940; the refusal of the Soviet armies, then at the Vistula river, to come to the aid of Warsaw's June 1944 uprising against its German occupiers—all these have hardly disappeared from the Poles' collective memory. It is not surprising that the Communist party commanded so little popular support before the war, and even less when it seized power under the protection of Soviet bayonets.

Even this sparse recital should make clear why Poland could never succumb to complete Sovietization, and why, almost from the beginning, a form of pluralism has existed in that country. The latter term, however, should not be misconstrued. At no time has the party been willing to share its decision-making power with any other social groups. It is, in fact, this dogged resistance to any meaningful co-participation in the process of politics that constitutes one of the basic causes of the current crisis.

Still, the party had to acquiesce to a de facto private sector and contending centers of influence. Since 1956, most of the country's tillable land has been owned by private farmers. While the means of production remain firmly in the hands of the government, some form of private initiative has been tolerated. Since that formidable enemy, the Catholic Church, could not be crushed, the state settled for a policy of attempting to contain its public activities while refraining from interfering in its purely internal affairs. Lay Catholic groups have been allowed to run their clubs and publications. Until the mid '50s there was only one lay Catholic organization: Pax, led by Boleslaw Piasecki, the rabidly anti-Semitic leader of the prewar fascist party Falanga, who had endeared himself to both the Moscow KGB and the Warsaw regime by promising to enlist the support of the Catholic masses for the "task of rebuilding Polish statehood."[5]

After Gomulka's accession to power in 1956, the liberal lay Catholics were allowed to establish a loose coalition called Znak (Sign). In time both Pax and Znak split off into factions, some closer to the totalitarian philosophy of Pax, some closer to the liberalism of the original Znak, and all vying for influence among the Catholic population, in the episcopate as well as in the party—and all thus contributing to the "pluralization" of Polish life. (Lest these details seem arcane, let me merely mention at this point that it is precisely one of the offshoots of the original Znak—the Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia—which has, next to KOR, played an important role in the formation of the "Solidarity" unions.) Finally—and again, as in no other country in Eastern Europe—the regime has tolerated pockets of autonomy within the intellectual community, such as the Writers' Union, some scientific organizations, and even a few departments within the universities.

Political Opposition

IF I DWELL on the term "pluralism," it is partly because precisely that demand—for *genuine* pluralism—constitutes the common slogan of today's political opposition, and partly because precisely that half-hearted, grudgingly tolerated, and never fully realized "pluralization" of Polish life has provided the ground for a political opposition. In assessing the current situation, many analysts rightly stress the emergence of various oppositional currents in the wake of the Polish workers' uprising of June 1976. Yet it is hardly fortuitous that among the most active members of KOR, as well as of the more nationalistically inclined Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCIO) that emerged in March 1977, there are many people with considerable experience in past political struggles.

Between 1956 and 1976 political opposition was fragmented, unorganized, and parochial. Intellectuals and students would periodically protest excesses of censorship or demonstrate for freedom of expression or social justice, usually getting thrown in jail for their pains. But their actions were episodic, lacking in ideological continuity, and above all were never coordinated with other groups.

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The workers proved to be the single most powerful adversary of the party, in effect bringing down three governments in succession (in 1956, 1970, 1980). But the workers had been leaderless and, until recently, apolitical. What's more, almost all of the opposition activities of that era were based on the assumption that the political system could be reformed "from above," as a result of—in the words of the young historian Adam Michnik, one of KOR's founders—"realistic policies implemented by intelligent leaders."[6] This assumption was held as much by secular intellectuals, many of whom had broken with Stalinism but refused to abandon their dream of "socialism with a human face," as by liberal Catholics, whose overall strategy was to obtain political concessions in exchange for loyalty to basic party policies. As for the Church, it kept its distance—from the political activities of the liberals and ex- (or neo-) Marxists, the lay Catholics, and from the workers. In January 1971, during the workers' uprising in Gdansk, the Church in effect cooperated with the party, urging the workers to preserve calm and order, go back to work, and not endanger the existing political order.

By 1976 the situation had changed drastically. "Revisionist" faith in the possibility of the party evolving toward greater democracy had been shattered by the events of 1968, when protesting students were set upon by the police and by groups of workers incited by demagogic and anti-Semitic slogans. Another lesson had been learned from the bloody suppression of the workers' rising in December 1970: namely that, without an alliance between intellectuals and workers, no pressure against the regime's policies could succeed. The events of 1968 also had dismayed liberals of the Znak persuasion, and by 1976 many of them were thoroughly disillusioned with their policy of endless compromise with the regime. The episcopate, too, found that its attempted "dialogue" with the regime benefited neither the Church nor its faithful.[7] When in June 1976 the government again announced a precipitous rise in food prices, and when workers—for the third time in 20 years—again struck for "bread and freedom," the disparate elements of the opposition came together. Nothing has been the same since.

Pressure from Below

ONE RESULT OF 1976, directly bearing on the current situation, has been a formulation of general goals and principles of action, embraced with remarkable unanimity by nearly all oppositional groups regardless of ideological coloration. The basic objective, according to Adam Michnik, is to achieve the gradual democratization of Polish society by compelling the system to enter into a dialogue with the society. In his essay "The New Evolution," Michnik spells out some of the opposition's major demands: genuine representation for workers; an end to preventive censorship and to the steady diet of absurd and mendacious propaganda; students' participation in running their own affairs; an end to discrimination against religious believers. The era of seeking to change the nature of the party from within, of placing "too much hope on the intelligent 'leaders' of the Party," of succumbing "to the specious argument that one must not make life too hard for the existing leaders in case their successors prove to be worse"—all this came to an end. Michnik does not exclude dialogue with those elements in the United Workers' (that is, Communist) party that are guided by pragmatic considerations:

> A Party "pragmatist" has no reason to wish for democratic changes, to hope for political pluralism or for workers' self-government. But the same pragmatists have reason to think that a compromise with the forces struggling for political pluralism can be more effective than brutal repression. The pragmatist knows full well that instead of solving the problem, repression simply forms the basis of further outbreaks of popular discontent, with unforeseeable consequences. And this is why he may become the *partner* in a political compromise with the democratic opposition, but never its *ally*.

Above all, Michnik argued, "the duty of the opposition is to participate continually and systematically in public life, to create political facts through collective action, and to propose alternatives. All the rest is literature."[8]

Another leader of KOR, Jacek Kuron, further elaborated strategic principles proposing as the optimum form of opposition national self-defense based on solidarity:

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> Open protest, synchronized in a number of centers unites the country and becomes a social movement. A social movement is a joint form of action in which every participant realizes his aims by acting in a small, independent group. . . . [which] retains the right to act on its own initiative.[9]

Trade Unions: Pluralism in Action

TWO YEARS AGO, when I was in Poland and listened to Jacek Kuron's enthusiastic outline of his vision of a network of autonomous "social groups" that would gradually force the government to yield to their demands, I thought it rather too good to come true. My thoughts went back to my first visit to postwar Poland in 1958: then Gomulka had already embarked on his so-called little stabilization strategy, yet the atmosphere was still charged with hope and excitement. I also remembered, even more sadly, the many Czech intellectuals I spoke to back in June 1968, in Prague: their euphoria, too, was contagious—and cruelly aborted barely two months later.

Certainly, by summer 1978 there were plenty of signs that social tensions were nearing a breaking point. Gierek's policy of rapid development of Polish industry, financed by Western banks and paid for by increasing exports of coal, copper, and other products, had come thumpingly to grief; inflation was reaching astronomic proportions; shortages of food and customer goods were mounting; agricultural production was again declining; the foreign debt stood at about $16 billion. The government simply refused to draw any meaningful conclusions from the June 1976 riots: not only did bureaucratic disasters and contradictory ad hoc measures proliferate (as is now officially admitted), but the system of extreme political and economic centralization was continued. No serious consideration was given to structural economic reforms and no effort made to draw nonparty groups or individuals into the party's confidence.

Political opposition groups were spreading, becoming more self-confident. Serious criticism of the party's policies and the country's general political and economic plight began to emanate not only from outside the Establishment, but also from scholars and intellectuals within the party. The censorship apparatus was exposed to public view (and ridicule),[10] students, farmers, and workers began to organize themselves into the kind of pressure groups that Kuron and other opposition spokesmen were advocating.

But independent trade unions? I recall talking to one of the editors of *Robotnik* (The Worker), a four-page off-set newspaper edited by members of KOR, with contributions from workers throughout the country. *Robotnik* was designed explicitly to instruct workers on how to conduct their economic and political struggles. With understandable pride, the editor told me that the weekly now appeared in 20,000 copies,[11] but he candidly admitted that the goal of organizing parallel trade unions could hardly be realized within the foreseeable future. Yet in retrospect Kuron's proposals seem like rather weak tea. For now independent trade unions have become a reality and the official unions have disappeared. KOR and *Robotnik* have exerted enormous influence on both the unions and the behavior of striking workers. It is enough to look through any issue of that newspaper (published with only one break since September 1977) to realize how closely the editors have addressed the problems of industrial workers, while at the same time stressing—in concrete detail—the relationship between workers' demands and those of other aggrieved groups. Articles have dealt with such subjects as the reasons for recurrent food shortages, police repression, the structure of trade unions in Western democratic countries, the history of the Polish labor movement, Polish-Soviet relations, agricultural problems and peasants' attempts to organize themselves, recent experiences of Polish workers in establishing ad hoc forms of collective bargaining with management, and the nature of Polish labor laws.

Or take the practical advice *Robotnik* gave on May 30, 1980, under the heading "How to Defend Ourselves":

> One can distribute pamphlets from the highest landing of tall apartment buildings. . . . Don't

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forget to include a few issues of *Robotnik*. . . . Another useful way to protest is to paint slogans in aerosol—it's faster that way—in public places. . . . Action in defense of arrested workers is essential, especially by their co-workers. If other methods fail, one can resort to strikes. . . . The demands of each strike must contain, in addition to economic matters, specific demands for an end to political repression as well.

On September 5, *Robotnik* published a "Charter of Workers' Rights," which constitutes perhaps the first programmatic document of the nascent free trade-union movement. It dealt with wages ("pay should rise at least in step with the cost of living"), the struggle for "a 40-hour work week without reduction of wages," occupational safety, open and equal sharing of material privileges "to liquidate privileged groups, e.g., the militia and party apparatus," and the need to organize free trade unions.

During the strikes this past summer, KOR set up an information bureau that supplied both the country and foreign correspondents with a daily stream of carefully documented information, particularly valuable during the first week of July, when the official media either kept silent or presented palpably distorted information.[12] It was due largely to these efforts that on August 14 the official media were finally forced to acknowledge massive labor unrest throughout the country. The August 15 *Robotnik* carried a long editorial called "What to Demand," which again showed the editors' meticulous attention to social and political ramifications of labor unrest. In addition to economic demands, this editorial urged the workers to press for the formation of free trade unions, freedom of speech and association, and an immediate change in the government's agricultural policy. "The authorities," said the editorial, must also "present a sensible and coherent program for the liquidation of poverty, in which over 3 million citizens, including about 40 percent of children and young people, are forced to live."

KOR has obviously been a thorn in the flesh of the authorities. Michnik and Kuron have periodically been accused of spreading inflammatory "antisocialist views," of inciting the workers to riot, of voicing "extremist" demands. On August 20, a number of oppositionists, including 14 KOR members, were arrested on charges made of whole cloth. Indeed, the very slogan that KOR and *Robotnik* had launched was, "Don't destroy—organize!" Both Michnik and Kuron made it emphatically clear that they were not opposing Poland's political system, the "leading role of the Party," or Poland's membership in the Warsaw Pact. Quite the contrary: Kuron even praised the government for its "sense of realism," saying, "We must work to increase the area of freedom and to diminish the area of totalitarianism, without exceeding the limits set by the Soviet tanks."[13] As striking proof of the importance that the worker-intellectual alliance now has in Poland, Lech Walesa, head of the "Solidarity" Union, made the release of all political prisoners one of the conditions for signing the agreement with the authorities on August 31. Shortly thereafter he invited Kuron to act as adviser to the Interfactory Consultative Committee, the body that was forming the new, independent trade union. Clearly, so long as the workers' movement survives, so will its alliance with the opposition.

Problems and Prospects

ONCE MORE, TO THE PRESENT—AND TO THE FUTURE. I began writing this article in late October. Now, nearly four weeks later, it strikes me that the opening section has acquired an air of antiquity. How relevant will my closing comments be five weeks hence, when they finally reach the reader?

Events in Poland are developing with unprecedented speed: official disclosures about the misdeeds of the Gierek regime, which in September and October strained the credulity of Poles and the world outside, now lost their piquancy, having been superseded by even graver and more electrifying exercises in "criticism and self-criticism." Behavior that seemed heroic in the aftermath of the Gdansk Agreement looks fairly ordinary today—and may well evoke little more than a knowing smile come January 1981.

A few weeks ago, the party's credibility

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seemed to be at an all-time low. Not merely had its version of Marxism-Leninism long ceased to be a source of ideological mobilization, but even attempts to use it as a fig leaf for expediency were laughable, greeted by the average Pole with contempt and derision. In October warnings by so stalwart an official "liberal" as Mieczyslaw Rakowski, editor of the influential weekly *Polityka*, that the party must keep its promises to the workers and allow them "to participate in the political process," or else face "a catastrophe," were eagerly quoted by Western observers (including myself) as evidence of remarkable candor as well as of an internecine struggle whose outcome could not be predicted. By now every Polish high school student knows of the fierce debates within the inner councils of the elite and, what's more, couldn't care less. For the party has not merely lost its credibility. It has clearly been divested of the power to rule—unless it shares that task with the rest of society. The so recent pleas that the regime honor its pledges to the workers now sound absurd, weeks after the authorities swallowed their pride and allowed Solidarity to acquire legal status; after Kania openly asked Walesa and his 10 or 12 million trade union followers to "help" the party by becoming its ally in the reconstruction and renovation of their "beloved homeland"; after a leading Catholic member of the Sejm (that is, not a party member and not even a "non-party Bolshevik") has been appointed Poland's deputy prime minister, and after the party press actually has opened its pages to officials of the new independent trade unions.

IT SEEMS pointless, therefore, to trace the most recent developments *in extenso*; the daily press has proved reasonably equal to this task. Instead, let me add a few comments on current trends and on their implications for the future, as they appear from the vantage point of late November 1980:

1. The changes of the past five months are irreversible. Whatever the future may bring—continuous chaos, economic collapse, Soviet intervention (about this more below), or a gradual but perceptible resolution of the crisis—Poland will never return to the *status quo ante*.

2. "Genuine pluralism" is no longer a slogan, a dream, or (to those who dread it) a nightmare, but part of evolving reality. It may, of course, yet be aborted—or may take unexpected forms. In itself it is not synonymous with stability, with the attainment of a decent living standard, or with the solution of social ills that have concerned parts of the opposition at least as much as the problem of political democratization (e.g., how to deal more effectively with the persistence of thievery, alcoholism, xenophobia, narrow-minded exclusivism, and so forth). Yet this new "pluralism" represents a momentous achievement, and it is slowly becoming part of the country's collective consciousness.

3. It is difficult to judge how the party intends to deal with the new reality. The evidence is, to say the least, contradictory. At the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee, held early in October, the new First Secretary fully admitted that the party was facing "the most difficult crisis in the history of the People's Poland," a crisis whose roots lay in "faulty economic and social policies as well as in improper methods of government"; and in his final speech Kania promised greater cooperation with labor unions, nonparty people, other social groups, and the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, the party thus far has not shown any readiness to decentralize its economic system, introduce any meaningful market mechanisms, or remove the discriminatory restrictions on private farming that have had such disastrous effects on Poland's agricultural production. Perhaps, by the time these lines appear, it will have done so: given the steady and indeed catastrophic erosion of its authority, the party's interests lie in swiftly setting guidelines for the changes ahead.

Yet what are we to make of the many conflicting signals? The rise of General Moczar and his henchmen to new positions of prominence is hardly good news.[14] Nor is the fact that "antisocialist elements"—specifically KOR—are still singled out for attack (this after Walesa, the object of Kania's touching

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courtship, has again publicly praised it). It is also disturbing that he old practice of scapegoating still prevails, as demonstrated at the October Plenum, where much more was said about the "guilt" of Gierek & Co. than about endemic features of the country's political and economic system. Still, following the Plenum there were massive personnel changes, many of them of a potentially salutary character.

Faced with all these contradictory signals, one can safely venture only this—that the internal party strife is going to continue. Those forces within the ruling elite (not born-again "liberals" but, to use Michnik's and Kuron's term, "pragmatists") who understand that the party can save itself and the country only by acceding to the basic demands of the society—and by working with it, rather than against it—are not having an easy time of it. Nor will they in the foreseable future.

4. It also remains to be seen whether the workers will be able to maintain the extraordinary mixture of confidence, moderation, calm, and intransigence they have displayed during the strikes. Fissures and differences between "militants" and "moderates" are now in evidence. If allowed to fester, they will have the most deleterious effect on the workers' ability to withstand the still powerful attempts by the regime to undermine the strength and effectiveness of what Kuron has called the emerging autonomous (or self-governing) groups in the society (see his article on p. 34). Thus far Solidarity has apparently followed—both in theory and in practice—Kuron's advice to resist "co-optation" and to act as a continuing source of pressure on the authorities.

Here a word must be said about the paramount importance of the Catholic Church. Cardinal Wyszynski has openly thrown his support behind Solidarity: "I am with you," he told a visiting trade-union delegation on October 19; "you will survive and hold out." But the primate—and the episcopate—may also be expected to warn against excessive zeal and militancy, to urge moderation and, indeed, given the immense moral stature of the Church, to play the part of supreme arbiter between the workers (and society as a whole) and the ruling authorities. This is clearly something the party is acutely aware of: one of Kania's first acts was to hold a meeting with Wyszynski, which (according to the official communiqué published on October 22), resulted in a "common view that constructive cooperation between the Church and the state serves well the interests of the nation, and that is why it will continue in the name of Poland's well-being and security." Walesa's attitude is no less relevant. Solidarity, he declared in an interview published in the Warsaw newspaper *Kierunki* (October 5), will be open to believers and non-believers alike. But all of them regard the Church as a model for "moral justice and honesty," as "the foundation upon which the crisis could be solved"—this despite the fact, he added, that the Church has of course "its own, specific tasks, and the workers have their own. . . . We [the union] are not going to build chapels or propose religious services." This statement is surely remarkable as much for its political sagacity as for its open-mindedness.

As for the future, then, there are, as I see it, three possibilities. One, the labor unions (and other organized groups) will preserve their élan and cohesiveness, and eventually force the authorities to pay heed to reasonable yet firm demands. Two, the power of the militants will grow—very likely as a result of stubborn and disruptive tactics pursued by the regime—and their demands will escalate beyond objectively reasonable limits. Three, the élan and unity of the labor movement will be slowly eroded by internal squabbling, cynicism, and disillusionment. The last, I think, is the least likely; the second potentially dangerous; and the first clearly the most desirable of all.

5. Enough has been written on Poland's economic plight to make clear that this is perhaps the most crucial and intractable problem facing Poland today and in the foreseeable future. Most economists agree that even if profound structural economic reforms are introduced, Poland's need to produce enough for export to repay its staggering foreign debt ($22 billion, and bound to soar in

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the next few years) will entail a considerable lowering of the standard of living. Continuous wage increases and strikes are no answer. In this sense the party's constant appeals to the workers to go back to their jobs and reestablish industrial discipline and productivity are not mere ruses. Whether the workers will choose to believe party promises—that this time the necessary sacrifices will not be exacted from them alone, but from the whole society (including the "red bourgeoisie")—and indeed whether Poland's workers will pay heed to exhortations from authorities they despise remains to be seen.

A great deal depends on the West, too. In the 1970s, Western bankers inundated Poland with massive credits, used by the government for investments in heavy-industry projects. The policy was ill conceived, utterly mismanaged, doomed to failure. Its only beneficiaries were the various bureaucracies, and its victims were the workers, the peasants—indeed, the population at large. It is probably this very policy that brought the country to the present state of collapse, and triggered the explosion of mass discontent. If economic aid is to be extended to Poland—and it is mandatory, lest Poland completely disintegrate—it must be given on condition (subject to continuous supervision and verification) that it be used not only to feed the population, but also to enact sweeping economic (which is to say also political) reforms.

6. Finally, there is the problem of the reaction of the Soviet Union and at least of some of its East European allies—a problem that preoccupies some Western observers to the exclusion of any other present and potential developments in Poland. Since so much has (and will have) been written on this doleful subject, let me add merely a few comments here. In the last analysis, Soviet actions are determined not by "ideological" but by practical considerations. That Moscow is concerned about the developments in Poland, that the growth of autonomous social groups and institutions challenging the Communist party's monopoly of power—and forcing the party to deal with them—is viewed with the greatest alarm by Moscow is beyond a doubt. Clearly, other countries in Eastern Europe are bound to be affected by the rise of independent trade unions (and tomorrow by other independent bodies as well): the Poznan riots of June 28, 1956 took place a day after the stormy meeting of the Petofi Circle in Budapest that ushered in the Hungarian revolution; the March 1968 student demonstrations in Warsaw were obviously not unrelated to the heady developments in Czechoslovakia; and there now is evidence of the effects of the Polish strikes on the Baltic republics, the Ukraine, and beyond. Why else would Janos Kadar join with Moscow's Czech satrap Vasil Bilak in issuing a condemnation of the "antisocialist forces" in Poland? It is also indisputable that any explicitly anti-Soviet rebellion, or the collapse of the party's authority both in substance and appearance, or (however unlikely the scenario) a Polish repudiation of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, or any open advocacy of a multiparty system would make the compulsion to invade well-nigh irresistible.

Still, right now it is difficult to see what Moscow could gain from trying to subjugate a country of 35 million people. If in 1968 the Soviet Union finally—after considerable vacillation—embarked upon a military "solution" of the Prague Spring, it was in part because of its certainty that the Czechs would not resist. ("In any case," Dubček assured Brezhnev, "dear Comrade, we shall certainly not fire upon soldiers of the Soviet Army.") In Poland, not only would there be resistance by the soldiers, but probably most of the officers of the Polish army, as well as the country as a whole, would put up a determined struggle. (At the October Plenum, Polish Minister of Defense General Jaruzelski told his comrades that both the enlisted men and the officer corps of the Polish armed forces would never again fire on striking workers. The implications of this tacit bond between the workers and the army in the event of a Soviet invasion are obvious.)

A naked, brazen invasion, then, shorn of any even remotely plausible pretense of "popular support." A bloodbath, followed by a massive, indefinite and transparent military

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occupation. For, unlike in Czechoslovakia and in Hungary, there is no faction in the Polish party (however hidebound) that would cooperate with the Soviet army; to do so would be to sign one's own death warrant. Nor could the population, even more fiercely hostile to the U.S.S.R. than to its own leaders, be forced to go back to work, much less to maintain the kind of discipline and productivity that are essential if the country is ever to emerge from its present state of ruin and bankruptcy. Moscow therefore would be compelled to prop up Poland economically, to the tune of billions of dollars—a task for which it is hardly equipped, with its own dismal prospects of precipitous economic decline, shortages of manpower, and rapid depletion of energy resources.

There also are all the other consequences of such an invasion—such as perhaps an irrevocable break with various Communist parties throughout the world and with Moscow's clients in the Third World, and the collapse of any attempts to reach an understanding with Western powers (followed by a strengthening of Western alliances, the end of economic supports for the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, and a vastly accelerated arms race that Moscow can ill afford). One can only conclude that Brezhnev and the aging men around him would have to be desperate to consider paying so staggering a price for the dubious advantage of bringing a renegade to heel.

Yet I am deeply conscious of the fact that our own concepts of "rationality" cannot easily be projected upon the Soviet leaders, that the Politburo's estimation of "cost-effectiveness" may yet prove appallingly "illogical" from our point of view—and that my analysis may thus prove to be dismally wrong. Still, Poland has already produced so many "fried snowballs" that it would not be astonishing if it were to produce the biggest of them all. If it does, it will live up to the noble old Polish revolutionary slogan: "For our freedom—and yours!"

November 30, 1980

Notes

[1] Stefan Bratkowski, Radio Warsaw, September 9, 1980.

[2] Action Program adopted at Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia on April 5, 1968; in *Documents on Today's CSSR* (Prague: Svoboda Publishing House, July 1968).

[3] As quoted in *Flashpoint Poland*, by George Blazynski (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 376.

[4] *Dissent*, Summer 1980, p. 318.

[5] See Alexander Korab, "Piasecki and the Polish Communists," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, D.C.), November-December 1957, and Lucjan Blit, *The Eastern Pretender* (London: Hutchinson, 1965). The story of Piasecki boggles the mind. Before the war, he advocated the forcible expulsion of all Jews from Poland, and his Falanga specialized in throwing bombs at Jewish stores and May Day demonstrators. During the war Piasecki headed an organization that dreamed of establishing an "imperial Slavic state," with Poland at its head, on the ruins of both bolshevism and nazism. Having led armed raids, first against the Germans and then against the Soviet troops, he was arrested by the Soviet secret police, only to be allowed out of jail a few months later, with a mandate to found a pro-Communist Catholic organization, with its own press, daily paper, and vast network of economic enterprises. In October 1956 Piasecki warned that any attempt to bring Gomulka back to power would endanger the country's "raison d'état" (that is to say, Moscow would be annoyed). He survived nevertheless. In March 1968 Piasecki's newspaper provided the most perverse "justification" for the anti-Semitic campaign led by Mieczyslaw Moczar, then Poland's minister of the interior, by arguing that "international Zionism" had entered into an unholy alliance with West Germany in order to discredit Polish communism, and that the striking student leaders—only some, incidentally, of Jewish origin—were agents of that sinister conspiracy. Piasecki died two years ago, but Pax—under the leadership of one of his prewar fascist henchmen—marches on. Its current policy, predictably, is to stress Poland's "moral" obligations to Moscow and to issue shrill attacks on "antisocialist elements."

[6] Adam Michnik, "The New Evolutionism," *Survey* (London), no. 100, 1976.

[7] The Church's policy vis-à-vis the regime is highly complex. In the 1960s the Church began taking a progressive stand on economic and social issues, thus moving closer to the fundamental ideas of the Second Vatican Council. It also demanded concessions from the state—greater access to public media, the right to legal status, greater possibilities to offer catechism lessons to schoolchildren, and so forth—in return for its support for the government's efforts at achieving social stability. But after the June 1976 workers' uprising, the Church came out openly in behalf of the persecuted workers, began to cooperate tacitly with the Opposition, and started to voice demands for economic and social justice, for freedom of expression and abolition of censorship—in general, for human rights. See my article "The Open Politi-

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cal Struggle in Poland," *New York Review of Books*, February 8, 1979.

[8] Michnik, "The New Evolutionism."

[9] Jacek Kuron, "Reflections on a Program of Action," *Polish Review* (London), vol. 22, no. 3, 1977.

[10] In 1977, an official from the censorship office in Cracow defected to Sweden with 600 printed pages of directives and regulations—for instance, "No information should be passed out about the annual coffee consumption in our country," and lists of foreign periodicals and authors that must never be mentioned in the press. The publication of these directives by KOR in Poland—and then in the West—was a major embarrassment to the regime. See *Index on Censorship* (London), July-August 1978.

[11] Jan Litynski, one of the editors of *Robotnik*, told me in a telephone interview on September 2, 1980 that the print run of his newspaper had then reached 40,000—a figure subsequently confirmed by other sources. See "After Gdansk: Two Interviews," *New York Review of Books*, October 9, 1980.

[12] "Work stoppages" was the general euphemism. The reward for outrageous idiocy should surely go to one newspaper, which—after 100,000 had already laid down their tools—reported that "recently there have been cases where workers, after mutual clarification, brought the director bouquets of flowers."

[13] Reuter, September 1, 1980.

[14] Moczar is not only the head of the Government Control Commission, which now is investigating charges of widespread corruption among government officials. He also has recently been reappointed chairman of the Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy, the Polish veterans' organization (a position from which he had been ousted by Gierek). At the recent Congress of that organization on All Souls' Day, Moczar gave the opening address. According to the Polish news agency PAP (November 4, 1980), he then "recalled that Poland was the country that had suffered enormous human losses during the Second World War," among them "three million Polish citizens of Jewish extraction who for centuries have been living among us in the Polish lands, co-creating our history, making a great contribution to our culture and science." Perhaps it was the somber Christian holiday that brought about this jesuitical piece of oratory. □

2. Stefan Bratkowski

A Revolt for the Possible

Stefan Bratkowski, an eminent Polish journalist, is one of the principal leaders of the study and discussion group called Experience and the Future, whose reports criticizing the country's situation and proposing reforms have created a sensation in Poland over the last two years. This article is reprinted, with permissioin, from Le Figaro, *Sept. 4, 1980. Last November Bratkowski was elected by his colleagues (the first to hold this position and not closely associated with the establishment) chair of the Association of Journalists.* — EDS.

The September revolt in Poland was no starry-eyed event. It was a down-to-earth revolt. It took place in a bizarre country that is ruled by a Communist party more than two-thirds of whose members believe in God, a country in which the party's Politburo holds absolute power but in which for a period of ten years almost all major investment decisions, involving billions of dollars, have been manipulated by local lobbies or by those of the lower-level branches of various industries. A country in which the government seemingly, because officially, exercises monopoly control over information, whereas the true monopoly lies with foreign shortwave radio services whose broadcasts are listened to by members of the highest organs of government. Finally, a country in which independence is the obsession of every citizen and romanticism is the basic ideology; but where the painful and bloody lessons of geopolitics have taught the entire nation to main-

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tain self-control and to display political discipline.

One could multiply these paradoxes, but the last is the most important. Everything that has been happening recently in Poland has not only been carried out in the name of common sense but has been carried out with common sense. The young workers in the naval shipyards of Gdansk are filled with pride, and no wonder. They have been able to control the life of an agglomeration numbering almost a million inhabitants, and they acquitted themselves wonderfully well. They successfully developed a new form of strike that tends not to disturb unduly the public's daily life. The city's public-health services and businesses were officially on strike but they carried on with their duties "for the public good." Impeccable order was maintained: contrary to what happens in normal times, nothing disappeared from the property of the striking enterprises. For the duration of the strike, lawbreaking and alcoholism dropped sharply in the striker-controlled city. (The strike committee forbade the sale and consumption of alcohol, and even privately owned restaurants voluntarily observed the prohibition.)

The youthful dockers and other workers are proud to feel that they represent all the workers in the country who helped them as best they could by going on strike out of solidarity, sending money, and offering statements of support. Their immense power sparked a certain euphoria in these young people but, at the same time, in their demands this power was intentionally curbed, and they presented only two of the demands from the list of indispensable reforms formulated by the 140 or so intellectuals in the Experience and Future (DIP) group. The DIP itself is guided by the principle of taking into strict account how much of what is necessary can be obtained.

How is one to explain this further paradox? First of all, Polish workers, and especially those in the new industrial centers and in the western areas, are for the most part young people. Despite all the flaws in our school system, they are, in general, quite widely educated. They know nothing of the past experiences of the labor movement, but they have an inkling of their significance and are able, as it were, to relive them. Second, the last 25 years have taught them that because the government is accustomed to being all-powerful, it reacts nervously and can be overquick on the draw. Accordingly, the first thing to be done was to accustom the government to a dialogue. And third, extremisms of whatever kind are, traditionally, alien to Poland. Even Stalinism has not been fully achieved here.

The whole problem lies in the fact that nothing works here as it should; with the kind of system of economic management that exists in Poland, the Lord Himself would have to hand in His resignation at the end of three months. Before, under the reign of the patriarch Gomulka, it was still possible to control economic stagnation. What has happened with the economy after ten years of a government that is feudal in style is there for all to see. The government machine has got out of order because in the present system the Politburo is all-powerful, and over the last five years it has assumed responsibility for everything down to the distribution of tacks, while at the same time all avenues of contact with public opinion were closed. A senseless propaganda campaign boomeranged. Public-opinion polls in earlier years had shown consistently that Poles would go so far as to endure hunger, even, but not propaganda that they felt was demeaning. ("They're not even capable of lying intelligently! They take us for idiots.")

Under such conditions, the example of Hungary was bound imperceptibly to push people toward revolt. In Hungary, a country lacking in the enormous natural resources that Poland possesses, the economy was in good shape. The government was functioning, and as party leader Kadar was forever saying, his party must govern as if every other minute there were to be free elections. In the

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minds of millions of Polish tourists, both workers and intellectuals, this anchored the conviction that "it is possible," that "there is a way." At the same time, the works of Soviet economic and management thinkers, which were published and available in Poland, contained the same suggestions for reforms and changes in the economy.

As a result, not only was it perceived to be "possible" but also necessary here in this part of Europe existing under the Soviet umbrella. Anti-Soviet resentments are not absent in Poland. It would be hard for that not to be so. For that matter, sometimes it has been the government itself that has aroused them by brandishing the Soviet scarecrow before the noses of its critics and using the Soviet alibi to justify its incoherent economic decisions. However, apart from a few very small and insignificant groups, no one—not even the most influential opposition group operating on the fringes of constitutionality, the Committee for Social Self-Defense (KOR), which at one time used to display its anti-Sovietism—encourages anti-Soviet feeling today. On the contrary, KOR has recently stated that it fully recognizes the political status quo in Poland.

In none of the strike actions have anti-Soviet slogans been in evidence, nor have there been attacks against the basis of the Polish government, which the Soviet umbrella protects. This attitude has not been determined by fear or by the conviction that, this time, no one in the West was disposed to "die for Danzig" (today Gdansk), but quite simply by an understanding of the nation's self-interest.

The Soviet Union is not going to stop being the Poles' neighbor; nor, what with trade being established on sound footing, is it going to stop being an important economic partner. Nor will it stop being a world power, either. This is why the revolt in Poland is led by a romanticism that is geopolitically controlled. After all, the average Pole is convinced that even for a world power it is preferable to have a stable, reliable ally, an ally that freely defines itself as such rather than a colony that regularly must be pacified and have its debts paid off.

This autumn Poland will still be experiencing numerous tensions and difficulties, which will not be economic in nature. Let us hope that the government will be able to adapt to the necessity of leading a political action rather than scowling at itself in the mirror of

Polish Jokes

Political jokes in the Communist countries have a cathartic function. They are both an expression of inner freedom and a substitute for freedom of expression. They are also the manifestation of the proverbial "wisdom of the people," reflecting their experience, their irony, and their sorrows. They testify to the psychological authenticity of the motives that move the opposition.

On workers

Q. Why does the Polish working class refuse to work hard?

A. We know from history, comrade, that the ruling classes never work hard. . . .

On socialist medicine:

An overworked doctor in an overcrowded Warsaw hospital tells the nurse in charge that he is in a hurry, so would she please give him the average temperature of all the patients in her ward. . . .

On socialist realist art:

An impressionist is a painter who paints as he feels.

An expressionist is a painter who paints as he sees.

A socialist realist is a painter who paints as he hears.

On Party secretaries:

The problem is that in the field of economics they are capable of nothing, while in politics they are capable of anything. . . .

On Polish-Soviet relations:

Party Secretary Gierek makes one final request before the Pope leaves for Rome: "Your Holiness, could you please arrange a divorce between Poland and the Soviet Union?"

"My son, of course I can. But I am afraid you will have to pay alimony."

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its own propaganda; similarly, that the Polish people will be able to practice the art of settling problems without giving way to passions. The Gdansk charter, as the workers call the agreement reached with the government, not only gives the unions the possibility of self-management. It also creates a kind of model for the management of public affairs.

All this notwithstanding, Poland will not stop being a bizarre country. The workers are singing in chorus the national religious anthem, "God, you who watched over Poland . . . " and "The International," but when the primate of Poland, who is considered even by party leaders to be the country's biggest political authority, called on the workers to end the strike, the response was a series of solidarity strikes. Not out of a spirit of opposition but out of ordinary common sense. Even common sense has been democratized in Poland, and for that matter the Polish people have taken socialism more seriously than has the government ruling in its name. The question now is, will the government take the people more seriously, and will the people be able to take the government at all seriously. Neither is impossible. The first step has just been taken.

Translated by ADRIENNE FOULKE □

3. Jacek Kuron

What Next in Poland?

The following article, slightly condensed, is taken from Information Bulletin, *Warsaw, no. 6, 1980. Its author is a leading figure in the Polish democratic movement. The article has been translated and annotated by Abraham Brumberg.* —EDS.

Imagine for a moment that our railway system, whose timetables all are determined by one central authority, suddenly has to cope with an influx of trains whose schedules are to be worked out jointly by passengers and railway workers. Much the same problem will arise for a social system all of whose institutions are directed by a party-government that suddenly has to deal with independent trade unions. Surely, a social system, even of a totalitarian nature, is never as perfect as a timetable; and surely it cannot operate according to two mutually contradictory principles.

The problem can perhaps best be understood in terms of our national economic plan. Every fall, between September and October, the managers and employees of our enterprises are presented with a meticulous economic plan for the forthcoming year. This plan usually invites considerable criticism—some of it severe, some less so; as a result the central authorities come forth with a plan that altogether ignores this criticism. But now this scenario can no longer be repeated. Now that the people have created their own organizations, they are conscious of their strength. Now, at meetings of the workforces at various enterprises, the plans for the following year are being seriously questioned and rejected. Will the authorities, then, be able to work out a plan that will be effective as well as truly consonant with the demands of the society?

This problem indeed is fundamental to

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our system, and there have been many attempts to solve it. In 1956, it received the serious attention of economists and of enterprise managers as well as workers' self-governing bodies. Yet neither then nor since has it been successfully resolved. No one is now devoting any serious attention to this problem, but eventually an economic plan will have to be evolved that is acceptable to the whole society, or there will never be a workable plan. In that case, the trains, governed by conflicting timetables, will inevitably collide.

We can observe the same phenomenon in other areas of social activity that have been spurred by the creation of the independent trade unions. I know of apartment cooperatives whose members, in order to govern themselves cooperatively, have begun to make use of their statutes [officially guaranteeing autonomy—A. B.]. Analogous actions now are underway in medical cooperatives—to be followed in the very near future by autonomous organizations of consumers, peasants, and others. The peasants' efforts to organize themselves constitute an important link in the chain of agricultural self-governing institutions whose program has now been formulated by the various new peasant organizations.[1] The program facilitating autonomy for higher educational institutions—and thus in the areas of scholarship and science in general—is advanced by educators forming their own trade unions, as well as by the emerging independent student movement.

Each of these movements—and I have by no means mentioned them all—aims at the radical curtailment of the central authorities' spheres of activity. Each contributes to the disintegration of the centralist system. In order to halt this process of disintegration, the party-government apparatus must either subordinate these autonomous social movements to its own directives, thus depriving them of their essential meaning, or alter the whole system in the direction of democracy—and do so as swiftly as possible.

The first solution is improbable. Our society has already—for the first time in 35 years—organized itself without depending on the government authorities, thus providing democracy with a measure of real insurance. The central authorities are helpless in the face of organized society. They now are deprived of a social base, for they can no longer count on and appeal to the support of any social groups. They can only resort to the use of armed force; and under the present conditions, it would be that of an alien power.

Is there another, possible solution? Can the apparatus change its character and system in a short time? This, I am afraid, is not very likely. Yet if it proves incapable of changing quickly, will it not resort to the suicidal attempt of arresting this movement by force? Such an attempt could well end in Soviet intervention, and the regime is invariably inclined to use this threat. Yet one cannot possibly assume that the threat is completely empty and unreal. Shouldn't we, therefore, try to stem this movement in time, so as to lift the threat of intervention?

Before we answer this question, we must realize that every social movement has its own dynamic, one that is not susceptible either to arbitrary direction from within (its leaders) or even more so from without (its advisers).

The Dynamics of Social Movements

THE PUBLIC, FOR YEARS DEPRIVED of its rights, for years intimidated and humiliated, now constitutes a powerful force yet is not fully conscious of it. Our citizens do not believe they can attain their objectives, the more so since they are frequently unable to articulate them. They simply rebel against existing conditions, and against the authorities whom they hold responsible. Even those who are involved in various activities are not confident that success is within their reach. Therefore it is necessary to formulate minimalist goals and to mobilize society around them. If we were to put forward far-reaching slogans, such as complete state sovereignty and parliamentary democracy—which no doubt are the deepest aspirations of all Poles—these slogans would

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not elicit mass support, if only because in the opinion of most citizens they are simply unrealistic.[2] This is why we must formulate specific and thus far limited goals, based not only on what our society regards as ultimately desirable but also necessary at this time.

We can see this process most clearly in the development of the enormous strike movement of this past July and August. How long it took that movement to formulate the demand for independent trade unions! How long was the path it traversed—from the timid formation of the Workers' Committee (whose name would not even be mentioned) at Ursus,[3] all the way to the splendidly formulated demands regarding organization, freedom of speech, the freeing of political prisoners, and the like.

This past July, during the strike of the Lublin locomotive engineers, its employees disbanded the old Works Council,[4] and they demanded new elections. At the time this demand corresponded to the actual aspirations of the workers regarding genuine representation. The strike leaders who had formulated these demands were subsequently elected to the new Works Council.

If, however, during the strikes on the Baltic coast, the local strike committees had restricted themselves to the demands made previously in Lublin, their leaders would shortly have been displaced, and the whole movement might have suffered an irreparable blow. And if elections had been held, they would have certainly not redounded to the benefit of the strike leaders. This is precisely why the leaders of today's trade unions cannot under any circumstances formulate a program designed to limit the exercise of democracy only to the area of wages and working conditions. They cannot ask society to desist from evolving a program that will facilitate autonomy in cooperatives and in the countryside, in the country's economic system, and in the scientific and cultural areas. That is to say, they could ask people to desist—but no one would listen to them, and their authority would quickly evaporate. Nothing whatever is to be gained from silently passing over the problem of disintegration of power. It is a fact. And if that fact is not taken into account by the program of the democratic social movement, a defeat of the greatest magnitude is bound to ensue. The weaker the central authorities, the less capable they are of adapting their policies to the new situation, the quicker the movement's radicalization. And here radicalization means to turn explicitly against the regime and its political structures.

Each successive step, all threats notwithstanding, weakens the perception of danger. It is true that we Poles are cognizant of the danger of Soviet intervention. But the authorities, as well as some segments of the liberal intelligentsia, have exaggerated and misused it. In the Lublin strike, which had not yet generated any political demands, the threat was used openly and to a considerable extent successfully. As the strike waves spread, the threats lost their potency. During the strikes on the Baltic, the authorities did whatever they could to disseminate rumors of an impending Soviet invasion. The strikes were successful—regardless of whether or not the rumors had any substance—because, in the consciousness of the workers, the threat lost much of its meaning.

Is it possible to define the limits of the movement's dynamics? Both possible and necessary. Yet the only path open to this movement is to go on developing while also being fully conscious of its limitations.

We have entered an era of a mass movement. Only those who clearly and publicly define their objectives, as well as their fears, have any chance of success. Ambivalent statements and political arrangements or discreet negotiations will have no effect on the movement; they will only encourage rumors and intrigues. Democratic relations help to bring differences into the open and then to resolve them. The time has come for open formulation of democratic programs and, simultaneously, for public discussion of these programs. Until we have succeeded in elaborating a common program we are bound to differ, and it is most important that everyone be clear wherein these differences lie.

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The proposal for open and clearly defined programs and their limitations will no doubt meet with the objections of those who are convinced that it is dangerous to pronounce certain words, as well as the names of those who voice them. Yet they would be right only if the analysis presented here were clearly incorrect.

That is, if we could assume that the process of democratization could be limited to trade union activities in the areas of wages and working conditions, and that, moreover, these unions would be able to restrain the people's wage demands despite the decline of the living standard and without a realistic program of economic improvement or, more accurately, with a program formulated—not for the first time—by the central authorities.

I regard this as a utopian and indeed as an adventurist notion. I don't think that the Soviet regime would take such propositions seriously. Either it will be willing to accept the democratization of Poland—to be sure, within certain limits—or it will send its tanks across the border, whatever words we employ.

There is a chance social movements can follow a path that will enable them to voice and realize their demands within the boundaries that safeguard national security. This chance is the elaboration of a program of democratization, consonant with the people's aspirations, yet one that also will not overstep those boundaries.

The general direction of this program has been worked out some time ago by various groups working with KOR: the people around the periodical *Robotnik*; the Free Trade Unions of the Baltic Seacoast; the peasants' self-defense committees; representatives from the student solidarity committees, and so forth. It is a program of social self-defense, and it has been concerned primarily with the organization of trade unions, professional and local self-governing bodies, the autonomy of people working in the scientific and cultural fields—in a word, democracy at the lowest primary social level.

This movement cannot possibly aim at removing the ruling authorities but by its very existence it will present them with specific demands. On the other hand—and this is of crucial importance—it will also help the authorities in implementing these demands. I am referring here to the concerted efforts of managerial experts, scholars, economists to work out a program of economic reform and to create various self-governing bodies that will bring about these reforms. In the long run, these efforts should expand so as to include eventually the activities of the whole state administration.

We have started on a road of no return. I think that today the Soviet Union will come to terms with the democratization of Poland from below, in order to avoid the necessity of military intervention. Tomorrow it may consent to further democratic developments, in exchange for a guarantee of its military interests. A day after tomorrow . . . but why engage in ceaseless prognostications? What is important is that Polish society be ready to utilize every real opportunity—that it continues to organize itself into self-governing movements.

Urgent Tasks

WHAT, THEN, are our immediate goals?

First: We must clearly and explicitly define the tasks of the newly emergent trade unions as organizations defending the interests of the working people. It is important that the unions refrain from playing any role in the organs of administration, that they not be involved in initiating or elaborating the economic reform program, or in any other similar activities; in other words, that they do not take the place of the powers that actually run the country.[5] It is hardly surprising that

Bureaucrat's Voice

It is our duty to state most firmly that no acts aimed against the basis of our political and social order in Poland can or will be tolerated. On this fundamental issue, no one may count on concessions, compromises, or even hesitations.

Edward Gierek, First Secretary
Polish United Workers' Party

August 18, 1980

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the trade unions have been subjected to this kind of pressure from the authorities, which see them as the bridgehead in the society's attempt to organize and manage itself and thus determine its own fate. This is vividly illustrated by the Gdansk Agreement, which after all constitutes a compact between the rulers and society, and which in effect pertains to almost all aspects of public life. But trade union leaders must resist this pressure; not by rejecting it altogether, for that is impossible, but by assuming co-responsibility only for the determination of matters expressly relating to the interests and demands of the working people.

From this point of view two of the Gdansk unionists' proposals seem to me of special importance. One is the concept of professional "miniparliaments" [*sejmiks*], which the unions would help to create or, more accurately, whose activities they would help bring about. In these "mini-parliaments" employees would consider numerous problems in their capacity as co-managers of the enterprise or perhaps even of a given branch of their industry as a whole. The responsibility for the decision would be shared by the members of these "mini-parliaments" and by the ruling authorities with whom they would negotiate—but not by the trade unions themselves. The second proposal is even more interesting. It concerns the works councils and the social-welfare funds, which hitherto were dispensed by the old [official] trade unions.[6] According to this second proposal, the funds should be at the disposal of a council, a "mini-parliament," elected by all the employees of any given enterprise, and it would not be formally connected with the trade unions but its members would be chosen from lists proposed by trade unions and other organizations. Again, the trade unions would not replace the works council—they would merely participate in and monitor the electoral process and, through their representatives, would exercise an influence on the activities of the council. They would aid and defend it—yet, to repeat, not replace it. The palpable advantage of such an arrangement would be that of easing the burden on the young trade union officials, and by sparing them the numerous administrative functions to preserve their working-class character. Such councils would in effect constitute a marvelous school of democracy.

Second: I regard as the most urgent task of the moment the creation of a movement aimed at bringing about national economic reforms.

As for the trade unions, they should address themselves to such matters of everyday concern as the occupational and health conditions for workers. But trade unions represent only one point of view, and only through negotiations can that point of view be accommodated with others. The trade unions cannot presume to speak for society as a whole. The interests of society will emerge from discourse and compromise, which are endemic to the democratic process. . . .

The accommodation of different interests and divergent points of views can be accomplished only by social movements. Trade unions can play a decisive role in the give-and-take between the various representatives of society. But this is not enough.

We are witnessing the rise of an autonomous peasant movement. To this movement falls the task of pressing for agricultural reforms, and it is up to various experts in that field to provide this movement with the widest possible support. After all, the peasant movement must adjust its own interests to those of the interests of industrial workers and of the national economy as a whole.

In addition to the need of autonomous activities of workers and peasants, of people engaged in scientific, scholarly and cultural

More Information

For readers who would like to have more information about the struggle in Poland, we recommend *Survey*, a quarterly published in London (write to Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London NW10 ODD). Its Autumn 1979 and Winter 1980 issues contain a great amount of authentic and interesting material translated from Polish sources, much of it from the Samizdat or semi-Samizdat publications issued by the Polish opposition. — Eds.

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work and economic management, it is necessary to bring about the concerted defense of legality, of an independent judiciary and of independent lawyers.

In the face of this pluralization of social movements, any attempt to centralize and control them from above is doomed to fail. Hence accords—not of an organizational, but of a programmatic nature—are absolutely necessary. Those who participate in these social movements should come together to work out a common program, to differ, share, accommodate and unite. We are confronted with the colossal task of constructing a democratic order. It can only be attained through democratic means.

Notes

[1] The efforts of peasants to organize themselves in defense of their rights and in opposition to official discriminatory policies—as ruinous to the welfare of the peasants as to the state of Polish agriculture in general—began in 1978 with the formation of a number of peasant self-defense committees, the appearance of a number of periodicals, the creation of the Farmers' University near Warsaw (modeled after the "Flying University" organized by scholars connected with KOR), and of the Interim Committee of the Independent Agricultural Labor Unions, which on September 24 applied for official registration in a Warsaw court. The Interim Committee now has its own paper, *Rolnik Niezalezny* (Independent Farmer). On July 20, the representatives of all peasant self-defense committees and publications addressed a letter to the striking workers, fully supporting their demands, outlining their own grievances (old-age pensions, which are not ony significantly lower than those offered to city workers but are also predicated on the recipient's transfer of his land to the state; abysmally low prices for produce sold to the state; inability of private farmers to obtain loans for land equipment, new buildings, and stock, and thus to increase their productivity; complete lack of democracy in managing their own affairs, with the peasants being "completely at the mercy" of the local party and government authorities)—and urging that workers and peasants work together for the good of "the whole nation."

[2] Both Kuron and Adam Michnik have consistently maintained that the oppositionist movement must concentrate on immediate economic, political, and social goals rather than on the achievement of full independence and sovereignty, lest such demands precipitate a Soviet invasion. This point of view is shared by KOR as a whole, but not necessarily by other oppositionist groups. The Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCIO), for instance, while positing independence as the *eventual* goal, has nevertheless put greater emphasis on it even in its regular activities. Since 1978, ROPCIO has organized three huge mass demonstrations to commemorate Polish independence and the rout of Soviet armies by Marshall Pilsudski in in 1920, and their publications have given considerable prominence to patriotic and national themes. The programatic as well as analytical papers issued by the anonymous Polish Independence Accord (PPN) also have stressed that attainment of national sovereignty should not be postponed until the distant future but should be regarded as an integral part of the gradual democratization of Poland. The most extreme position has been taken by a Polish journalist named Leszek Moczulski, who left ROPCIO to set up, on September 1, 1979, a clandestine "party" called Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN). In Moczulski's view, no serious changes can possibly take place in Poland as long as it remains under Moscow's control. Hence the achievement of independence must be the sole, supreme, and immediate objective of the opposition. In a telephone interview with the West German weekly *Der Spiegel* on September 15 of this year, Moczulski asserted that the attempts to set up independent unions were doomed to failure and restated his aim of struggling for "an independent, sovereign Poland, free of Soviet supremacy and of the totalitarian dictatorship of the Polish United Workers Party" (CP)—for which he was promptly put under arrest. While all other oppositionist groups have demanded his release, they have emphatically dissociated themselves from the views of his conspiratorial "party," which may well consist of no more than a handful of people. Moczulski's political past is suspect: in 1968-69 he was a "Moczar man," contributing regularly to the weekly *Stolica* (Capital), at that time one of Interior Minister Moczar's vulgar nationalistic mouthpieces.

[3] The Ursus tractor factory near Warsaw was the scene of the first strike on July 1, '80, as well as of the first workers' protests against price rises in June 1976.

[4] The works council was the basic enterprise organization of the (now defunct) official trade union structure.

[5] Kuron is referring here to the attempts by the authorities to "co-opt" the unions, rather than to grant them genuine autonomy.

[6] The old trade union councils administered a network of rest homes, vacation resorts, and medical facilities, all of which will now presumably be transferred to the jurisdiction of the independent unions. □

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Herbert J. Gans

What Can Be Done About Poverty?

Egalitarian Social Policy in the 1980s

One of the many useful by-products of the War on Poverty was the revival of interest in greater economic and political equality. Although initiated by Michael Harrington and other socialist writers on poverty, the revival came about because researchers and practitioners in the antipoverty program realized that most poor people in America suffered less from extreme material deprivation than from having fewer of the basic goods, services, and rights that make up the standard of living enjoyed by the average American. In short, the main pathology of poverty was seen to be inequality. Egalitarian ideas had just begun to flourish when the War on Poverty ended in the early 1970s, and they now have lost much of the popularity they had then achieved. Nonetheless, it is worth asking how they will fare in the 1980s.

Poverty in the 1970s

IT WAS no coincidence that the War on Poverty began during a period of affluence, although even then it was never more than a skirmish. In times of austerity, however, institutions and individuals have less money and sympathy for the poor, so that since the start of stagflation in the early 1970s the poor have again become more unequal. Unemployment has edged upward, the gap between the poverty line and the median income has widened (as has the gap between black and white incomes); and perhaps the most important economic indicators for the poor—the minimum wage and average welfare benefits—have lagged far behind the rise in the cost of living.

The political power of the poor, in Washington and elsewhere, also has declined. Suburbanization has continued to erode the power of the old cities in which the poor are numerous; migration from the Northeast and Midwest to the South and Southwest has cut into the power of those states in which economic liberalism had its strongest political base. The Democratic party, once a defender of the poor, has also been suburbanized, even as it has continued to unravel; and most suburban voters are not ready to do anything for the urban or rural poor, except keep them out of their own communities. In consequence, even normally liberal Democratic politicians may be reluctant to support an urban policy or welfare reform and guaranteed income policies that would aid the urban poor.

Allies of the poor are less numerous than in the past. The labor unions, which still provide more political support to the poor than anyone else, have their own worries. Some union members are fearful that poor people, in the U.S. or in low-wage foreign countries, are ready to take their jobs at lower pay. Liberal political organizations with upper-middle-class constituencies continue to lobby for the poor, but upper-middle-class enthusiasm has weakened. Even in the late 1960s, as the discussion of antipoverty issues moved toward the inevitable conclusion that poverty was really inequality, and that neither could be affected significantly without some redistribution of income and wealth, these liberals became, understandably enough, nervous since their incomes would most likely be cut by redistribution. At that time some began to pay greater attention to "social" issues on which they could take liberal stands, such as

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nuclear energy, environmental protection, and abortion. Perhaps the best indicator of the erosion of upper-middle-class support of antipoverty policy is the fact that the socially liberal upper-middle-class candidate in the 1980 election, John Anderson, was not just an economic conservative but a Republican.

The politically most important supporters of the War on Poverty were the mass of moderate-income lower-middle- and working-class citizens who had tolerated the government's programs in the 1960s. Now they were turned away mainly by the inroads of stagflation. Although characterized as a conservative "me generation" in the 1970s, this group is actually still in favor of some government intervention in the economy—but now for itself rather than to aid the poor.

As the economy and the government's economic policies squeeze moderate-income taxpayers, they in turn support further squeezing of the poor. The younger and more aggressive among the poverty-stricken then "fight back" with increased delinquency and crime, persuading more taxpayers—and politicians—that the poor are incorrigible and undeserving. Perhaps the War on Poverty also changed the moral climate sufficiently so that now, when the more affluent squeeze the poor, they must rationalize their guilt by inventing a rise in "undeservingness" among the poor.

Antipoverty Policy in the 1980s

THESE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL patterns seem destined to continue during the 1980s. As a result, the prospects for egalitarian politics—or even for modest antipoverty policies that have minimal or no redistributive consequences—are not hopeful. Nor are there any indications that a change in trends—a miracle or a disaster—would enable the poor or their allies to press for egalitarian policies. Economically and politically powerless people do not have much leverage over political or policy processes unless they are in some way needed—and the poor seem to be needed neither by the economy nor the polity.

If the poor were needed in the economy, many could presumably leave the ranks of the poverty-stricken. Some economists have argued that as energy costs continue to rise, industry will have to become more labor-intensive, substituting muscle and craft for oil and electricity. Even if this argument turns out to be accurate, the substitute labor may not come from today's poor, for firms may migrate to low-wage countries or draw on additional legal or illegal immigrants always ready to come to America. Some demographers expect the aging of the population to produce a labor shortage before the end of the decade, but no one can be sure that this will occur or that it would be solved by recruitment from the now underemployed, unemployed, and unemployable.

Alternatively, if the poor were needed by a political party with a presidential victory or a congressional majority at stake, they might obtain governmental aid that would help them out of poverty. The 20 percent of the population earning less than half the median family income or even the 12 percent below the official poverty line could be a formidable asset in an era of political fragmentation. Admittedly, the poor are not a homogeneous group or voting bloc. Their ability and willingness to vote seems to be limited. In a vicious cycle that has so far not been halted, poor people lack incentive to vote because politicians pay so little attention to issues that concern them. As a result, politicians continue to be inattentive, which then further discourages voting—or other conventional political activity—among the poverty-stricken.

This vicious circle may not yield even to the best-intentioned politician, for the polity will probably not respond to the demands of the poor. These demands are largely economic, which the government either cannot satisfy or which the affluent majority would forbid it to satisfy.

In an economy dominated by automating oligopolies and multinational exporters of jobs, the poor are no longer even essential for keeping a lid on the wages of other workers. The principal power they retain is their ability to disrupt the social order through actual or

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threatened demonstrations, riots, and other kinds of symbolic or physical "violence."

Organized protests of welfare recipients and the ghetto uprisings of the 1960s helped maintain the War on Poverty, but it is not clear that welfare recipients can mobilize once more or that large numbers of ghettos will "explode" again. While anger and despair seem to be as pervasive as in the past, ghetto inhabitants know that they were the ones who suffered most the last time, and that the police now are more heavily armed than in the 1960s.

Since the end of the 1960s, disruption by the poor has mainly taken the form of crime, which is not normally viewed as a protest against poverty. As a result, few people have noticed that increases in unemployment or underemployment correlate with and precede increases in crime. Still, since most poor people are law-abiding, unemployment or poverty alone cannot be sufficient causes of crime. Even if they were, eliminating poverty is an expensive method of fighting crime. So far, it remains cheaper to hire more police and to hope that crime will take place on somebody else's block.

Although the traditional liberal solution to crime—providing employment—is currently unpopular, the government is fortunately still pursuing and experimenting with employment programs, especially for youth. But even if a lowering of the obscene levels of unemployment among poor young people (estimated at about 35 percent among blacks and over 60 percent in some ghettos) would reduce crime or head off future ghetto explosions, no one has yet figured out how to employ them on a massive basis. White adult employers and workers are scared of them, both for being young and black, and many firms looking for unskilled help find it easier and cheaper to hire adult illegal aliens, who cannot afford to complain about working conditions.

Prospects for an American Welfare State

IF MORE EQUALITY and greater social justice for the poor do not seem likely in the 1980s, there is another scenario, in which a large number of nonpoor Americans, fed up with inflation and scared of rising unemployment, use the powers of their number to push the government and the economy in a more egalitarian direction.

They are the semiskilled and skilled blue-, white-, and, among women, pink-collar workers: people who hold the steady, relatively well-paying and, so far, secure jobs in what economists call the primary labor market. These workers have not, for the most part, been subject to the low wages, layoffs, and disappearing jobs of the secondary labor market in which the working poor are typically employed. However, the stagflation of the last ten years has halted their upward mobility; and the disasters that have befallen the automobile and steel industries, once bulwarks of the primary labor market, have brought unemployment to previously economically secure workers and have scared others in similarly marginal American industries.

No one can know whether "primary workers," who, with their families make up an American majority, will act politically if their economic condition worsens—and whether they are likely to move to the left in any significant numbers. Were they to do so, an American version of the West European and Scandinavian welfare states might be in the offing, if only because these states have, until recently, been very successful in maintaining full employment. An American welfare state could also foster a more egalitarian society, reducing some of the inequities between the rich minority and the moderate-income majority although, as I will suggest later, the poor would not necessarily benefit.

At present, however, this scenario is unlikely. Political change is less predictable than any other, and the American political system is sufficiently fluid to make political surprises possible, particularly in an economic crisis. Even so, welfare state policies requiring egalitarian government intervention in the private economy would be strongly opposed by various coalitions of affluent corporations and by other organizations and individuals,

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whose veto power appears to remain massive even as political parties continue to crumble. That opposition acts like a permanent low-pressure system on the political climate, discouraging people from carrying out or supporting political actions that they know to be in their own interest.

Other structural and cultural patterns act as additional obstacles to fundamental welfare-state policies. The blue-, white-, and pink-collar workers in the primary labor market are not a class (new or old), a stratum, or even a group with similar interests. Since rates of inflation and especially rates of unemployment vary considerably among the country's regions, these workers ultimately act as diverse groups of people suffering an only somewhat similar fate because of the workings of the economy. Although a minority is unionized, even it lacks a history of political activism. The rest are not easily organized; they are physically hard to assemble, and they lack the common culture that helped bring European workers together and enabled them to build a strong labor movement and powerful labor parties.

European workers joined in a strong labor movement because they faced formidable social and other barriers to upward mobility. Americans, on the other hand, have always expected that their children would obtain better jobs, higher income, and greater occupational prestige. An American labor party did not come into being largely because enough American workers hoped or assumed that their children would be middle class. As a result, the multigenerational working-class family that long characterized Western Europe and made its members enthusiastic unionists and socialists has not been prevalent in America.

European workers have realized since the 19th century that improvements in their income and quality of life depended on a welfare state, but equivalent Americans continue to have faith that they can make it "on their own," through economic growth overseen by private enterprise. Americans continue to view government as an adversary, taking their earnings for public purposes that do not benefit them. They prefer disposable private income over public goods, and feel they would be hurt by the higher taxes a welfare state might impose. A significant minority of workers has come to favor "supply side" economic policies, which aim to deal with inflation by cutting back government welfare expenditures and to reduce unemployment by increasing tax and other subsidies to private enterprise.

Obviously, these attitudes did not develop in a vacuum. Just as restricted European opportunities in the past created worker realism about the need for a welfare state, the plethora of American opportunities led to worker innocence about the virtues of economic individualism. The rise of stagflation and the halt of economic growth are of such recent vintage that many people do not realize both may be permanent; moreover, no one can guarantee that they will be. Occupational and political beliefs as well as expectations for the future have therefore not yet been adjusted, and even American workers who have always been cynical about capitalism's concern for their well-being cannot yet entertain the possibility that an expanded welfare state would improve their economic position.

Under these circumstances, it should not be surprising that neither inflation nor unemployment have yet produced a political shift to the left. The two economic debacles in fact have not produced many significant political reactions of any kind. Many people are angry. But either too few have so far been hurt seriously enough to react politically; or they have been hurt so seriously that they have become politically impotent; or they are not a significant political force, like the old and the poor who have been seriously hurt by inflation. Meanwhile, some political discontent over the economy has been drained off by the biannual national elections, in which people can vote an incumbent president or Congress out of office, hoping the next one will do better. Moreover, many people realize that their elected representatives are not able to do much about inflation or unemployment in the first place.

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Effects of Rising Inflation and Unemployment

BUT WHAT IF the economy deteriorates further, producing a few years of double-digit inflation and/or rising levels of primary labor market unemployment? Such levels of inflation have in the past defeated incumbent politicians and parties at the ballot box, but they have not led to support for structural change in the economy. Worsening inflation would surely bring on wage-and-price controls, already favored in public opinion polls, and if they fail, perhaps a scheme to control prices and profits more than wages. Ultimately, hard-pressed people could even look for ways to recoup economic losses, such as soak-the-rich tax reform.

Except in wartime, the history of American tax reform has been dismal, partly because those who would pay higher taxes have flexed their political muscles quickly and effectively. The moderate-income majority has therefore found it more rational to press for reductions of transfer payments to the poor, who lack such muscle. If and when these payments cannot be cut further, sufficient political support may develop for tax reforms that soak a small number of the very rich in favor of a large number of moderate-income people—and precisely because the very rich are small in number. While there are said to be 500,000 individual millionaires, they could be outvoted by the mass of people of average income, if it were politically mobilized. The trouble is that not enough money can be taken year after year from even that impressive number of millionaires to make a sizable egalitarian dent. A more productive tax reform scheme would need also to redistribute income and wealth buried in trust funds and corporate coffers; and the corporations, at least, are not only good at lobbying but can also talk about eliminating jobs, a threat that could scare off supporters of redistributive tax reform.

A rise in unemployment is apt to generate stronger political reaction than even a 15-20 percent increase in inflation, because joblessness has a far more drastic impact. The recent spate of layoffs has not yet produced visible political effects, perhaps because it still appears to be concentrated in the secondary labor market, in which workers have long had to accept layoffs as inevitable; and because those laid off from primary labor-market jobs are still collecting unemployment insurance.

If, however, unemployment rates among male primary labor-market workers who have not been laid off for years should reach 10 or 15 percent in many parts of the country, political reactions can surely be expected. Although some unemployed people suffer from depression that renders them politically apathetic, unemployed activists will be supported by people who fear future joblessness, as well as by businesses whose existence depends on the expenditures of the employed. At such levels of joblessness, the country's political and economic leadership is apt to reinvent a New Deal to save capitalism once more, even before large numbers of people mobilize to demand action.

The specific policy reactions will presumably begin with longer and more generous unemployment insurance. Private enterprise may receive new tax breaks and other subsidies, but since its ability to save and create jobs has not been noteworthy, eventually government would have to act directly, with whatever intervention was necessary in the private economy. Then corporations could perhaps be required to invest in labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive activities, to save jobs at the expense of profit, and to restrict the export of jobs. Government then might be allowed to create jobs by improving public services, by competing with private enterprise—and surely also by thinking up new military ventures and weapons.

At that point, the crucial question will be whether government can create enough jobs in a declining economy to defuse unrest and prevent further economic decline. By that time, the European welfare states, which are currently faced with the beginnings of high unemployment, may have set an example that America could follow. If they fail, all modern societies must presumably think

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about schemes to share the existing jobs, in ways that do no significantly reduce people's standards of living even as they spend less time on the job.

Government intervention in the economy does not a welfare state make. It would be illusory to think that America will necessarily model itself on the social-democratic European welfare state, partly because of its individualist traditions, partly because of the weakness of its labor movement. Fuller employment could be traded off for political dominance by government or corporate economic planners, not to mention excessive bureaucratization and Bertram Gross's "friendly fascism." So little is known about the ideological proclivities and underlying attitudes of primary labor-market workers that no one can say whether they would support a publicly or a corporately controlled economy if it came to that choice. In any case, it would be dangerous to underestimate the strength of individualistic values among America's workers, or the extent to which actions reflecting these values exist to protect them from a variety of businesses, professions, and bureaucracies seeking to intrude into their private and familial lives to advance one or another public interest, alleged or real.

The Exclusion of the Poor

GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS to save and create jobs, and to install redistributive tax reforms, may not necessarily result in more equality for today's poor. Many of them are rapidly becoming members of an underclass cut off from the institutions providing access to the rest of the economy and polity. As a result, the contemporary underclass could turn into a political-economic caste, peopled, of course, mainly by blacks and other darker-skinned groups. Even if that does not happen, reforms engineered by or for the working and lower middle classes are likely to be designed to help only them, with a few crumbs to the poverty-stricken. If poor people became part of a coalition to bring about reform they might be properly rewarded; but the poor are rarely invited into coalitions. Some reforms would of course be universal, for the the poor—as well as the rich—benefit from price control. However, tax-reform schemes that redistribute monies to the moderate-income population but not to the poor are perfectly conceivable, particularly since the poor no longer pay federal taxes. Nearly full employment could be achieved in the primary labor market without drastically improving conditions in the secondary labor market.

What, then, will happen to today's poor? Most likely, they will travel a similar but narrower version of the path open to the poor of previous eras. The highly ambitious and fortunate few will find a niche in the primary labor market, but not all will be able to pass their achievement on to their children; and the less fortunate majority will remain in the secondary labor market. The least fortunate will die prematurely or deteriorate into what Hylan Lewis has called the "clinical poor": the chronically ill, mentally disturbed, or permanently angry people who become known as multiproblem clients to welfare agencies and as the undeserving or dangerous poor to their fellow citizens.

The poor European immigrants of the late 19th and early 20th centuries seem to have experienced these diverse fates, and there is no reason to believe that the poverty-stricken of our era will do better. Changes in the economy suggest it may take them longer to escape poverty than their European predecessors; continued racism in America suggests that this will be particularly true among the black and Hispanic poor, and that fewer will be able to achieve economic security.

The Long-Run Outlook for More Equality

THESE OBSERVATIONS, predictions, and guesses lead to a gloomy outlook for egalitarian policies. The longer-run future can only be imagined; but even so, I still agree with de Toqueville's conclusion, now over 150 years old, that "the more I advanced in the study of American society, the more I perceived that . . . equality of condition is . . . an irresistible revolution which has advanced for centuries in spite of every obstacle." Equality is,

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however, neither irresistible nor a revolution but the outcome (among people who are needed economically and politically) of sets of rising expectations and new entitlements that exert constant pressures on the elite, notably politicians seeking reelection. These pressures are not very visible, and are not even perceived as egalitarian, but represent demands for increases in resources and rights among those who previously had less. Nor are these pressures usually the result of deliberate planning; often people suddenly disobey orders or rules they had previously obeyed, and as often as not the order-givers retreat quietly, and the rules are no longer enforced.

The processes of equalization operate more quickly and effectively in social and legal than in political and economic areas, but even there they are slow and lurching, with forward movement only slightly outdistancing regression. For example, many citizens have achieved more control over their own lives and the polity, but corporate power has also increased over the last half century. And while World War II created a slightly more egalitarian income distribution and postwar affluence increased the number of people able to enjoy the American standard of living, economic wealth and power have also been centralized and further concentrated in a smaller number of larger firms.

Equalization, in fact, is not inevitable, and if a permanent decline of economic growth in America results in sharper conflicts over the allocation of scarce resources, a return to greater inequality is also imaginable. Much depends on what the Third World nations, which seek greater equality for themselves and sometimes for their citizens, can do to and take from America, and it is entirely possible that egalitarian pressures inside America will be set aside to deal with worldwide struggles about international equality. But it is also possible that the people who seek more equality in America will be major supporters of the fight against more equality for the Third World.

A hopeful scenario would imagine an eventual compromise among the developed and developing nations to allow de Tocqueville's irresistible revolution to continue in America. Perhaps by then someone somewhere will have invented the blend of economic egalitarianism and political and personal individualism that, I suspect, all societies must eventually achieve in order to make the good life available to as many people as possible. □

Postscript

THIS ARTICLE was completed in July 1980, and although I sought to look at egalitarian possibilities from a long-range perspective, I implicitly expected four more years of Jimmy Carter. Writing a few days after the Reagan landslide, I still stand by my long-term scenario: that egalitarian policies are possible if and when there is high unemployment among primary labor-market workers.

I was wrong, however, on some short-term issues. For example, I underestimated the extent to which inflation could produce a significant political reaction, for what happened to the U.S. Senate on November 4, 1980 comes close to structural change. Even so, I cannot imagine that many of the normally Democratic blue- and white-collar workers voted for Reagan believing that he would end inflation. They voted for him because they wanted him to replace the incumbent rascal but also because Reagan talked their language, culturally and politically.

The election results show that unemployment has not yet become a serious political issue, at least among that half of the population that still votes. Presumably, the workers who supported Reagan will quickly look elsewhere if the Republicans opt for higher unemployment in the primary labor market, but for now, the extent to which these workers accepted Reagan's individualistic ideology suggests again that they remain willing to take their chances with a so-called market economy. If they will ever support egalitarian policies, they will not necessarily favor the welfare state of American social-democratic theory or of Scandinavian practice. □

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Olivier Roy

What is Afghanistan Really Like?

The following article, reprinted with permission from the excellent French monthly Espirit *(in some respects a French* Dissent*), presents the first serious social portrait we have seen of Afghanistan society. Without glossing over its inequities or technological backwardness, Olivier Roy paints a picture far more complex than the ignorant or malicious talk about "feudalism" that apologists and half-apologists for the Soviet invasion have spread. Some of the author's references are to French political figures, but no one should have much trouble finding American equivalents.* — Eds.

People became interested in Afghanistan only after the Soviet intervention. As to what is really going on there, a certain consensus seems to exist in France, at least on the left: the old Afghan regime was a form of retrograde feudalism that one would hesitate to support even as one condemns Russian intervention. Many people take this position without realizing that they are covertly advancing an old colonialist argument that confuses technological backwardness with a lag of civilization and that, in the name of progress and history, justifies moving from an outdated to a newer mode of production at the expense of those who are supposed to benefit.

Not only is such an analysis colonialist or racist, it conceals an important development: there was indeed a "revolution," or rather a leftist putsch, in Kabul in April 1978. And Soviet intervention is only to be explained by the fact that this putsch failed. One must, then, examine this failure because in it we may find the key to why many revolutions in the Third World have turned out badly. The failure is not to be explained as a result of unlucky happenstance or, as in the case of [Hafizullah] Amin, one individual's madness; it is, rather, the logical consequence of the seizure of power by a fraction of the intellectual lower middle class, which finds in Marxism an ideology that promises to promote its own social advancement.

SUPPOSEDLY, the Red Army intervened at the request of the party in power to liquidate the bloody dictatorship of Amin (who was that party's leader) and to fight the great feudal landlords who were supported by American imperialism and its Pakistani agents.

The first contention is laughable. At the height of [Amin's] massacres, Soviet advisers already controlled all the rolling stock the Afghan army and government possessed (some 5,000 units in August 1979). Indeed, Soviet pilots crushed the mutinies of allegedly leftist units in Kabul and Herat that summer. For Amin's dictatorship to crumble, all the Russians had to do was not to intervene but, on the contrary, to hold off. Amin cannot be held solely responsible for the massacres: they began under [President Noor Mohammad] Taraki and continued under Babrak Karmal; and the same men continued to hold the same positions in the government. There is continuity in the system, even if Amin was more paranoid than the others.

Nor does the argument of foreign intervention hold water. To this day, the guerrillas are armed with miserable old rifles or weapons

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recovered from the Afghan army, as anyone who has visited guerrilla units can attest. As for "infiltrations" across the Pakistani border, they do not occur because of complicity on the part of the Pakistani government but because the latter is incapable of sealing off an artificial frontier peopled on both sides by the same tribes, the Pashtoons and the Pathans. The Pakistani government's unwillingness to aid the guerrillas is obvious: it fears Pashtoon irredentism, and it has no wish to be drawn into even a local skirmish with the Russians.

The real reason for Russian intervention was that the Afghan 1978 revolution foundered; its leadership could neither solve economic problems nor make itself even tolerable to the people; indeed, on every sensitive issue it offended them. The people's refusal to accept the revolution is what Georges Marchais [leader of the French Communist party] has called "feudalism." What does this Afghan "feudalism" consist of?

WHEN MARCHAIS SPEAKS of the despotism of the big landowners, he is defining feudalism not in Marxist terms but according to the clichés of history texts written during the Third Republic, which saw colonialism as the civilizing mission of the 19th century.[1]

Whether one takes the word "feudal" in its narrow meaning ("agrarian workers have a right to use and to occupy the terrain, but the property itself belongs to a hierarchy of nobles"[2]) or in the broader sense ("neither the labor [of the field worker] nor the product of that labor has as yet become a simple object of free exchange"[3]), in neither case is Afghanistan a feudal country.

The regulations governing land ownership in Afghanistan vary widely, by region, but there are certain constants. The very large holding (more than 250 acres, which is not so enormous) is extremely rare. A rich peasant may own 25 acres of irrigated land, a moderately well-off peasant from five to ten acres, and a poor one fewer or none. There is neither a class of big landowners nor a mass of agricultural proletarians. What I observed at first hand, in the township of Alingar, in Laghman Province, corresponds to the figures of Gilbert Etienne[4]: 25 percent of the population are rich landowners, 50 percent are middling landowners, and 25 percent are landless peasants who must hire themselves out as farmhands. Aside from the *gerao* system (explained below), the third group has no share in the property's yield and must subsist exclusively on what wages it earns. The small-scale independent landowners constitute the majority—the proportion diminishing somewhat in the northern plains but increasing in the mountainous regions.

We must also recognize that here land has no value unless irrigated: the fundamental problem is not land but water. Nonirrigated land (*lâlmi*) is free: whoever sows it owns outright whatever he may reap. At issue is the apportioning of water, and this is where the notables in a community can exert their influence so that certain people get extra water. I am not saying that Afghan society is egalitarian and democratic; there is certainly a form of exploitation that benefits the notables (the *arbab* or *mâlek*), but this is in no way specifically feudal. The exploitation may be direct: the owner may hire a farm worker or he may make an agreement with a sharecropper; the latter has a right to a share of the crop, which ranges from a half to a sixth depending on whether or not the worker brings his own tools and seed. Indirect exploitation works by the *gerao* system: a peasant borrows money at a usurious rate (50 percent), he leaves as bond a field he works, and the yield from it goes to the lender until the debt is paid off. (The debt doubles regularly, given the rate of interest.) The occasions on which debt is incurred are frequent: supplementary food supplies between harvests and especially marriage (the bride-price is exorbi-

[1] The misuse of the word "feudalism" has been well analyzed by Jean-Pierre Chretien ("We Are All Feudal Afghan," *Esprit*, February 1980).

[2] CERM pamphlet, "On Feudalism" (Editions Sociales, 1971), p. 13.

[3] Ibid., p. 15.

[4] G. Etienne, *Afghanistan, or the Risks of Cooperation* (Presses Universitaires de France, 1972).

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tant, going as high as $40,000).

But these factors are not enough to create a class of exploited peasants: the small-scale landowner who is in debt will still manage to live as a small-scale landowner, particularly since his creditor is not necessarily a notable but may be another small landowner like himself. Problems of exploitation are overshadowed by a more basic issue—demographic pressure. The small property is fragmented by inheritance; the rural exodus is negligible, and agricultural earnings do not increase. There was a definite decline in income for the small landowner class in the years before the 1978 Communist revolution: however, changing the landownership statute was not sufficient to check this downturn (even had the change been made for this purpose, which was not the case). The fundamental problem remains: the amount of arable land must be increased by extending the irrigation system. This is what the Afghan peasants consciously expected from the overthrow of the old regime. They expected also a reform of the sharecropping system and an impartial control of the distribution of water and fertilizer.

But the peasants did not expect the overthrow of their societal patterns. There was no revolutionary situation in the countryside. The organization of the Afghan peasantry remained complex but flexible. The word "feudal," as Marchais uses it, does not refer to a mode of production in the Marxist sense but to technological backwardness that extends to the country's entire civilization: as in the case of the 19th-century colonialists, a country's backwardness alone is considered enough to justify colonization. One sees here the same contempt for the culture of societies that are technologically weak, the same blind faith in a progress that rejects all vestiges of the past, the same ethnocentricity that congratulates the Red Army for having put an end to the economic exploitation of the native population—but which would never dare call on it to deliver, say, the Breton peasant from the tyranny of the Agricultural Credit Bureau.

The only "feudal" element in the Afghan countryside (in the Marxist sense of the term) is the unobtrusiveness of the state. No civil government, no census records, no direct administration except in the cities: the village *mâlek* provides a minimal representation with regard to the central government (call-up for the armed services, collection of taxes, and so on). The same *mâlek* assumes certain responsibilities: he pays the local mullah, sees to it that strangers are housed, and sometimes finances certain public works of local concern (especially in Nuristan). The state is represented in the countryside by a handful of teachers and by small, widely stationed garrisons of maybe a dozen soldiers dressed in rags (before the Russians came along to fit them out with uniforms) who doze away the day in broken-down barracks under the command of a *hâkim*, a sort of district chief. Now and then a Land-Rover comes by with several functionaries on an inspection tour.

Most Afghans live a long way from the central government, from which they can expect only troubles (the most recent revolution will not change their minds on this score). The state means Kabul, and Kabul is the center of perdition, corruption, apostasy. Culturally and in relation to their daily way of life, the Afghan peasants are much closer to the local notable than to the government functionary or the revolutionary cadre, both of whom come from the city, dress in Western style, and are bored stiff. One must not visualize the Afghan notable in terms of one of our West European petty squires. Peasants and notables dress and speak alike, they meet every day, their sons study with the same mullah. It takes time to perceive, behind the façade of traditional courtesy, the fine points that distinguish the hierarchy. And this cohesion is reinforced by the not inconsiderable factor of religion.

At first glance, Afghan Islam does not appear to share the restless spirituality of Iranian Shi'ism. The village mullah is often illiterate and recites the set phrases without always fully comprehending them; he is often an old man with no special training who has achieved his position because of piety. Further, the Afghan clergy is by no means

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cohesive, like the Iranian clergy. In the cities one finds theologians, educated for the most part in Cairo, and Muslim intellectuals. But the religion of the countryside is centered entirely on rites and externals: woe to him who does not observe Ramadan, who drinks alcohol, whose conduct is immoral, or even woe to him who does not say his prayers. In the Pashtoon countryside, such lapses may lead to death. But behind the formalism, faith is very much alive. After a few days of climbing in the mountains, when the difficulty of ascent makes for intimacy, the guide will begin to talk of life and death and start to quote Sa'di or Hâfiz. The surly illiterate peasant will suddenly question the Westerner about materialism, and then as abruptly launch into a defense of his religion. This was true even of a very young boy who asked a traveler for an explanation of Christianity and ended up sharing his doubts about Mary's virginity. For Afghans, their religion is much more than an agglomeration of practices: it is truly a vision of the world, and the source to which they invariably refer whenever they speak of justice, liberty, or ethics—in short, whenever they speak of humanity. And God knows, Afghans dote on such discussions. The idea of atheism is inconceivable.

We have, then, a poor country that is medieval rather than feudal, and in which for ten years economic problems have been getting worse. The small agricultural landholders' income was diminishing because the size of individual parcels kept shrinking as a result of demographic pressure. Famine swept the countryside in 1971, 1972, and 1973. [Mohammad] Daud replaced the king in 1973, promising rapid economic growth. This was a failure. The weak Afghan middle class lacked substantial capital resources; it preferred to stick to what it knew (especially trade) rather than plunge into an industrialization that posed risks because the infrastructures were weak. Local artisans were ruined by what few industries were set up, and by foreign trade. The lower middle class—artisans and petty merchants—sought refuge in Islam, while the intellectual fringe adopted a local version of Marxism. The masses grew poorer. The tourist trade destroyed certain traditional trade channels and by pushing up the prices of certain merchandise (the famous Afghan coat, for instance, got to be completely out of reach for most Afghans). From 1975 on, revolution was in the air. No one knew who would bring it to pass, but everyone suspected it would start with a military putsch. The revolution took place as foreseen, but foundered. For two reasons: lack of a social base and failure of agrarian reform.

The revolution began in April 1978; in August 1978 I witnessed its arrival at a small town in Laghman Province. The turning point came in the fall. By July 1979 we could no longer return to the Laghman area—it was in full insurrection.

A REVOLUTION is not made without a social base. Official slogans talk, of course, of the working class. Now, in Afghanistan it doesn't exist—or rather, it is as embryonic as Afghan industry. In 1970, the census reported 30,000 workers (as against 47,000 civil servants), who were better paid than the unskilled laborers who make up the mass of those who rely on their brawn to make a living. But this group of 30,000 does not yet constitute an authentic social class. The revolution of April 1978 was a military putsch with no popular support. The social base of the putsch consisted of a petty bourgeois intellectual fraction: teachers (the *mo'allem*), students, civil servants, and officers of the technical branches of the armed forces, in particular the air force. These people felt boxed in by traditional Afghan society, and its cohesiveness became a straitjacket for those who no longer subscribed to its values. Moreover, the capitalist economy's failure to get off the ground blocked all hope of upward mobility for them.

I knew teachers and officers posted to the small mountain villages, in Laghman, Badakshan, and Nuristan. Isolated amid a population whose languages they sometimes did not speak, bachelors for years at a stretch since they could not put together the bride-price, and underpaid: they did not mix well

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into village life. The villagers considered them foreigners. There they were, forced to give lip service to religious practices that often no longer had any real meaning for them. In turn, they considered the centuries-old behavior of the peasants an obstacle to social progress—or what they thought of as progress: access to a modernity that fascinated them and of which they felt cheated. One has to have witnessed the yoke of village tradition (especially as practiced in Pashtoon or Nuristani villages), which considers any reform or even novelty almost a sin (*bida'*), to understand how the generous modernist spirit could be transformed into resentment, if not hatred, of peasant obscurantism.

What attracted these petty-bourgeois intellectuals was not socialism: it was simply *modernity*. For them, Marxism was no more than an access road to the highway of modernity; Marxism was the poor man's modernity.

Their model became the city of the West as they conceived of it: factory, paved streets, cars, property, women without the veil (and accessible), marriage by choice, films, radio, electricity, alcohol sold without restrictions, and so on. Education and production: nothing typically socialist, simply a shortened version of our [Western] 19th century. Nothing was envisaged for the countryside other than to bring it into line with the towns. There was none of the understanding of the rural world that enabled Mao to make a Communist revolution with peasants. The new revolutionary cadre of Afghanistan, erstwhile teacher or student, saw the farmer as a pupil who had to be taught *everything*: how to wash, feed himself, dress, and, above all, how to think. And he did not hold this view necessarily out of any totalitarian spirit, but rather as an extension of his didactic assumption that the Afghan peasant knows only his prejudices. Granted, life is hard, especially for the women, who either live cloistered lives or are made into beasts of burden. Still, one sees the consequences of these prejudices: napalm is the extension of rapping the ruler on the knuckles ("It's their own fault, they've understood nothing"). And the women who were supposed to be liberated are the first to burn. . . .

Well before the revolution, the petty bourgeois dressed like a West European, shaved his beard in favor of the small moustache characteristic of the leftist Afghan cadre, and replaced his turban with an astrakhan cap. And especially, in his eager haste to find an escape, he read. In general, he chose to read extracts (like Mao's *Little Red Book*) or basic tracts (the *Communist Manifesto*). The future revolutionary cadres thus got a smattering of a superficial Marxism, but never for a moment tried, as Marx or Lenin would have, to examine the concrete situation in their country. In a remote village in Nuristan, I met a left-wing teacher who explained to me that in this village the "proletarian line" had to be made to prevail. (I never saw him again and, for his sake, I hope that he was transferred to Kabul before the putsch.)

The use of revolutionary vocabulary yields odd results. So great is the Afghan intellectual's scorn or just ignorance of his traditional culture that translators import the political vocabulary of West European languages almost wholesale, and simply transcribe it phonetically. Proletariat becomes *proliter*, democratic *dimocratik*, coup d'état *Koodéta* (using the phonics of the Persian of Iran); the same rendering applies to socialism, feudalism, imperialism, committee, and so on. It's no exaggeration to say that as a result no revolutionary political speech is comprehensible to the Afghan peasant even if he happens to possess a solid classical culture. He may know Sa'di's *Rose Garden* by heart and still understand not one syllable of the news given over the Afghan radio. I have actually had the experience of "translating" for peasant listeners—in my very imperfect Persian—the speeches of their cadres, which were gibberish for them but comprehensible to me only because the chief concepts were couched in the "isms" of my native language. I remember a particular evening spent with a teacher from a village in the Petsh Valley during which I tried to explain to him the meaning of the word "subjectivism," which he had come across in a political text in Persian (*Mobarzé zed é soubjektivism*: the struggle against subjectivism). In this same valley, the same teacher often proclaimed: "Proletarians of all

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countries, unite!" An assistant of his asked politely: "What is a proletarian, please?" The teacher answered: "A worker." "Well and good! And what is a worker?" As an article in the *Kabul Times* explained, revolutionary violence can be necessary to drag the peasants from the obscurantism in which they are kept by "the great feudal landowners."

The April 1978 revolution was, for the most part, a revolution in name only. Through the incantatory power of words an unrealizable "reality" should, must, emerge—such as "proletariat," "avant-garde," even "party," when there were only petty-bourgeois functionaries in their shirts and ties worried about promotions and lured by power. For this there are two possible explanations: among the key men, there were some former subscribers to *Tel quel* who had grasped that the revolution must take place in words if it is to take place at all; or, second, Marxism has become the ideology of the upwardly mobile petty bourgeois of the Third World. But why turn to Moscow? Because it was the only exemplar of "modernity" within reach. At first, the Soviet Union underwrote the training of their cadres. And the U.S.S.R. furnished the staff of the Kabul Polytechnic; it also trained the military, especially the air force. Even under the old regime, Soviet advisers outnumbered all others. And since World War II and especially since Daud, Afghanistan has been in the Russian zone of influence. But this is not a question of Russian propaganda. Modernist Afghans found in the U.S.S.R. the model that suited them: a modernity propelled into existence by a bureaucracy. The modernity of the West—of money and of the great bourgeoisie—was inaccessible to them. The West is also a world of tourists, especially hippies who, although they had much more money, still play-acted at being poor; and so they strained the patience of the modernist-oriented Afghans, especially because the hippies loved those very aspects of the country that the progressives despised and sought to flee: its Middle Ages, its nonchalant rejection of progress.

In the U.S.S.R. they found a model of enlightened despotism applicable to the Third World. It was a question of setting in motion—via a strong and omnipresent government—social and economic progress not in order to achieve some sort of socialism but rather to establish industrialism on a vast scale, if necessary even *against* a peasantry.

Not all petty-bourgeois intellectuals followed this movement. One sector opted for a renovated Islam, in the tradition of the Muslim reformers of the 19th century who sought to reconcile religion with economic and social progress. In the armed forces, a number of officers were more Nasserite than socialist. But all these splinter factions were "laminated," as it were, by the April revolution and if they have survived at all, they now find themselves on the side of the rebels though without directing the movement, which, it seems, remains largely in the hands of the religious traditionalists.

Let us return, then, to those who made the revolution. Once in power, they mechanically applied the simplified Marxist programs they had learned. Since they had no foothold in the countryside, and their social base could not have been narrower, they implemented their policy at first by decree and then at gunpoint. A crucial example is the agrarian reform.

Where a majority of the population is rural, the agrarian question is fundamental. This was the one area in which the new regime could have given itself a class base by rallying the landless farm workers. In August 1978, the basic decrees were promulgated (*firman* no. 6). Because the revolutionary leaders were convinced that they were dealing with a "feudal" form of production, their reforms were concentrated on *ownership* of the land: they abolished mortgages (in itself a good thing), dismantled large estates, and limited private property to five hectares (ca. 12 acres). Of course, in a country without a survey registry, it is hard to establish who owns what. Certain large estates existed only on paper and factually corresponded to property owned in common by groups of families under the name of the head of the

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clan. More important, in this country it is useless to partition the land if provision is not made for partitioning water and seed. Peasants found themselves owners of land they could neither sow nor sometimes even irrigate. The previous barter system was unfair but at least it worked.

Faced with these frustrations, some peasants spontaneously returned the expropriated lands to which they had been given title to the previous owners in exchange for seed. Before expropriating anything, the new regime might have thought to set up a distribution system for water, seed, fertilizer, and implements. (The proprietor had supplied tools to sharecroppers who had none: how can land be cultivated without tools or draft animals?) Such crucial oversights are significant revelations of the ineptitude of the administration. When sowing time came around, after some initial hesitation the peasants shifted allegiance to the other camp.

One further example of how this was a revolution in name only. A decree forbade the bride-price; that is to say, the purchase of women. On the face of it, a progressive, commonsensical measure. But, in reality, it was one more instance of ignorance of rural life. When one recognizes that Muslim law permits the husband to repudiate his wife on the spot and that she thereby loses all rights over her children, one sees that the bride-price, which is forfeited in the event of divorce, is a powerful restraint against repudiation, at least for a poor Afghan or for one of modest means. To abolish the bride-price without overhauling all regulations governing matrimony cannot lead to the liberation of women; on the contrary, it deprives them of the only protection they have had.

A third and last example: schooling. Public instruction was abruptly made compulsory for both girls and boys. But there were not enough trained women teachers to go around, which meant that a girl might have a male teacher. For an Afghan, this is tantamount to sending his daughter to a brothel.

How have these reforms been implemented? The local administration, when there is such a thing, is usually not fired with zeal, so, from one day to the next, a cadre arrives in the village. (I saw this happen at Alingar in August 1978.) More often than not, the cadre is a young teacher or university student, dressed in Western clothes, with a red scarf around his neck and his Colt at his side. He bypasses the traditional hierarchy—and not only the *mâlek* but also the "wise men," the elders or teachers of folk tradition whose counsel the villagers habitually seek. He sets himself up as a mini-dictator, whereas traditionally society leaves each man responsible for what goes on under his own roof: for example, an Afghan is not only proud to have guests but he feels totally responsible for them. (In my experience, the first thing the new cadre did upon arriving in Alingar was to come to our host's home and inspect our luggage. He then announced that he was going to take a census of the population, issue identity cards, and establish a register. The state had arrived.)

How does a village topple into rebellion? It starts with an incident: the male teacher wants to compel the girls to go to school; or the cadre wants to check out marriage arrangements, or he forcibly enters a house to take the census. A quarrel ensues; somebody fires;

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the Party man is killed. The police or the army is called in; the feeble local garrison carries no weight—it either fades away or joins the other side. So the air force is convoked: it arrives on a strafing mission and every last soul in the valley promptly joins the resistance. This cycle started in the fall of 1978: the local administration is thrown out, the peasants organize around their traditional leaders, together with a few students or officers who have deserted; a guerrilla group is formed—scattered, uncoordinated, without heavy equipment, striking where- and whenever possible. Word arrives that a convoy is on its way, people mobilize, carry out a daring attack, and then everyone scatters.

However, what threatened the regime in Kabul was not this but its own lack of substance. The army grew on paper but shrank on the ground. Members of the government seemed to relish killing each other off. When you realize that the two Communist factions (*Khalq* and *Parcham*) together numbered no more than 5,000 members, it is clear there wasn't much left when the Russians intervened—not to chase out a tyrant but to fill the void that had imprudently been allowed to develop.

Right now there is no more revolution. There is only a foreign power supported by a few collaborators or by unconvinced administrators; this "government" runs everything. There are two camps in Afghanistan: the occupation and the Afghan people. One must be careful not to create a myth about the resistance: it includes a little bit of everything—religious traditionalists, cadres of the old regime, student deserters, poor peasants, adventurers, and so on. The resistance is united only on paper; it is not the bearer of a new society (as Iranian Islam would like to be) and its victory would mean the reestablishment of traditional Afghanistan.

But those who use this as an argument for opposing a Russian withdrawal forget that the problem is no longer a choice of this or that government—which would, after all, be the Afghans' business, not ours—but the question of the survival of a people. When one is fighting guerrillas, who move among the populace like fish in water, there is only one tactic, whether implemented by the Soviets or the Americans: remove the water. In Afghanistan this is a possibility. In terms of food, the peasantry has always lived on the fringes of mere subsistence. Villages are grouped around sources of water and separated by great stretches of desertlike terrain. Let one canal break or simply be poorly maintained, and a village dies. A few bombing and defoliation missions would do the job. It would be a far cheaper war than the one in Vietnam—no jungles, no big cities. In summer, the rocky terrain is burning hot; in winter, there is snow. Where would people hide, re-form their groups, train? There are no doctors, no reserves: even in peacetime there were none.

Why should the Russians withdraw? If they entered the country with all the calculated risks that move implied (the end of détente, and, especially, loss of good will in the Muslim world), they must have good reasons—related, no doubt, to domestic politics. The occupation was methodical; they knew what they were doing. Certainly, they would have preferred their protégés to have been able to hold power on their own, but now they are there, and they mean to stay. And the one way to stay is to crush the guerrillas. A guerrilla movement is crushed by genocide or by political measures that deprive it of its social base. In Afghanistan, it is too late for the latter: between the occupying power and the people there are no means of communication that could bring about reforms without offending Islam. The Russians aren't even attempting it. What is getting under way is genocide: as in Cambodia, hunger will kill more people than bullets until the survivors accept any solution, simply to survive. □

Translated by ADRIENNE FOULKE

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Barbara Goodwin

England: Dead End of Liberalism?

Modern Britain is, I shall argue here, the victim of orthodox liberalism carried to extremes. I use "liberalism" to connote economic doctrines idealizing laissez-faire and the free market together with political doctrines of maximum freedom under law and minimal government. Self-advancement and pursuit of private interests from a basis of equality of opportunity is the ideal of this liberalism, which has long been the dominant ideology in England—though it denies having the status of ideology and aspires to that of truth. Some 200 years of liberal democracy have created a system of elitist "private politics" bolstered by a bureaucratic system of representation that makes grass-roots participation nearly impossible. The dominance of the two-party system, entrenched by our simple-majority electoral system, makes it difficult for political alternatives to take root.

At the political-economic level, social democratic reforms and the growth of the welfare state have created a one-dimensional "consumer socialism" that *provides* according to need but makes no correlative *demands* on people, thereby forcing them into a passive, recipient role. My purpose is to assess the respective influences of political institutions, the prevalent liberal ideology and state of political culture in producing our present stalemate, and to ask what likelihood there is of a real alternative politics.

Economic Roots

BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC CRISIS began before the world recession with an acute balance-of-payments deficit in 1964. The Conservative government of 1959-64 presided over increasingly precarious prosperity and was succeeded by a Labour government (1964-70) that took severe measures to improve the trade balance, save sterling from speculators, and curtail inflation. Similarly in the Heath's Conservative government (1970-74) engineered a brief period of reflation during which inflation galloped,[1] but global recession, rising commodity prices, and unemployment supervened. Again, a Labour government (1974-79) had to introduce stringent measures against its social democratic conscience, notably a savage incomes policy that caused a fall in *real* standards of living. Prime Minister Thatcher seems determined to repeat the pattern by embarking on a third round of unrestricted wage rises and inflation. This destructive "stop-go" pattern results from our system of adversary, two-party politics with its pendulumlike alternation and consequent moderation within certain limits.

Since the 1960s Britain has had virtually a "no-growth" economy.[2] This deficiency, underlined by the success of such competitors as Japan and Germany, provoked self-criticism among economists and politicians. One popular explanation of the "bad luck" variety is that our heavy industry suffers from structural obsolescence because we industrialized early: rivals benefited later from our advanced technology and thus progressed further and faster. This controversial hypothesis illustrates our recurrent resort to self-pity in the face of adversity. Ironically, even while academics puzzled over our endemic failures in the 1960s, the popular press campaigned to show that our standard of living was superior to that of the EEC countries, thus fostering patriotic complacency.

[1] During this period the retail price index rose from 135 to 201 points (1963 - 100).

[2] The growth rate in the 1960s hovered around, and often fell below, 3 percent. From 1973-79 it was, on average, zero (and in the short run negative). Clearly, however, such statistics depend on what time period is taken.

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One constructive result of this introspection was that Wilson's government followed the economic analysis of Kaldor, who argued that the "tertiary" or service sector had overexpanded and that heavy, "primary" industry must be renewed by a transfer of workers.[3] An employment tax was levied on service industries until 1973, but this had little effect except to increase unemployment. The fate of heavy industry in the 1970s was further decline: the collapse of Rolls Royce, the closure of shipyards, and the contraction of the steel industry. There are identifiable reasons for such failures (costly labor and uncompetitive pricing, an overvalued pound, uncertain delivery dates) but these do not dispel our general suspicion of an anti-British conspiracy. True, world price rises and our membership in the EEC have combined to further depress our economy, but the popular view holds that the causes of inflation and unemployment are exclusively external, which removes the need for self-criticism and a drastic restructuring of the economy: instead, we hope for a world boom to improve our domestic well-being.

The economic situation is crucially important because the attitudes of resignation and self-pity induced by our stagnant economy and falling living standards also pervade the political arena. Disappointed expectations are inevitable when the national product is static, or diminishing in real terms, as it has been since 1973: the government can only *adjust* the proportions allocated to various sections of the population, redistributing hardship, since no new wealth is created. The windfall of oil revenue only prevents living standards falling more rapidly.

Establishment Politics

AT FIRST it appears that politics is less stagnant than the economy, for several major policies were enacted in the 1970s, including reform of the health service, of local government, the devolution bill, and British entry into the EEC. But all these measures misfired, producing disillusionment. For example, the 1974 reform of the health service, the largest employer in the country, benefited administrators financially, multiplied the number of administrative posts, and created a complex bureaucracy that delayed decisions.[4] The new organization is already to be partly dismantled. Local government reform also expanded bureaucracy, and the devolution bill, which gave semi-autonomous parliaments to Wales and Scotland, would merely have created supernumerary administrations without real power; however, this bill failed after a referendum. Membership in the EEC has caused widespread irritation because of the burden of administrative requirements to which we must conform. In short, the major changes of the 1970s all elaborated administrative hierarchies, without improving efficiency or benefiting the public, which has to swallow the unpalatable end products of these reforms. Bureaucratic hypertrophy naturally alienates people and enhances their reluctance to participate in politics.

Apart from these dubious legislative achievements, there is a conviction that politics is in decline, even among admirers of the system, partly because of the apparent deterioration of the two-party system, with small majorities or minority governments detracting from our supposed tradition of "strong government."[5] The decisive majority achieved by Thatcher may reverse this trend, but there are other manifest threats to the parliamentary system—interference by the unions, intervention by the EEC and IMF, and the growth of minority parties (briefly) with bargaining power. Such developments worry supporters of the major parties who fear for the parliamentary system, which promotes their interests and, they say, guarantees stability and fairness. Meanwhile, those who support minority parties criticize the electoral system as intolerably unfair, for it limits or annuls their parliamentary influence.[6]

[3] N. Kaldor, *The Causes of the Slow Rate of Growth of the U.K. Economy* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1966).

[4] See M. Kogan et al., *The Working of the National Health Service* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1978).

[5] The "tradition" of strong government and alternance is mythical, since this century has witnessed endless *ad hoc* formations of coalitions, national governments and minority governments, and unbroken Conservative rule from 1951-64.

[6] In October 1974, for example, the Liberals won 13 seats with 18.3 percent of the vote: cf., Nationalists 11

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Despite this evident injustice, the demand for proportional representation is destined to fail since both major parties have a vested interest in the electoral system.

Thanks to this system, and the development of rigid party structures, we are the prisoners of a tradition of adversary, government-and-loyal-opposition politics that presents every issue in terms of two supposedly dichotomous alternatives,[7] and for many people the idea of more choices is daunting, not liberating. The parties' and voters' lack of ideological commitment also means that electors vote in judgment of the previous government, and this promotes the typical alternation between governments, which often negate each others' achievements, and produces an ultimate sterility.

Ideology — the Invisible Hand

IN THE PAST, THE COMPETITION between the major parties for the support of the centrist majority of voters has led to mutual ideological moderation; the convergence of the parties was most marked from 1950-70, parallel with the "end of ideology" thesis in the U.S.A. Policies such as health, welfare, and support for the mixed economy became almost bipartisan and the Labour party suppressed the socialist aspirations of its left-wing members. When Labour was elected in 1964, the perilous financial situation caused it to pursue nonsocialist policies, despite the presence in the government of such left-wingers as Crossman.[8] Heath's conservative government, by contrast, was even accused of being socialist because of its aid to distressed industries and was moderate until its confrontation with the miners' union. During Callaghan's Labour government there was pressure from left-wingers, but their demands were again subordinated to the exigencies of the economic crisis. Both parties prefer to tread the middle ground of pragmatic consensus to risking ideological self-definition.

One cannot estimate fully the disaster for British socialism of three postwar Labour governments doomed to conduct the policies of economic stringency. An increasingly divided party is the present result. The nondoctrinaire approach of Labour ministers has made them "statesmanlike" for the electorate, but despised by their left-wing colleagues who are now taking revenge by enacting a democratization of the party that would favor the left, and a putative socialist program that horrifies the right-wingers.[9] But the party has always turned to internecine warfare when in opposition, and there is as yet no strong reason to believe that socialism will be reborn in this struggle. In any case, the left wing's socialism is relatively mild and social democratic, as Benn's book *Arguments for Socialism* (1979) demonstrates, and far from common ownership of the means of production. In general, the "doctrinaire" socialists are restrained by the intraparty hierarchy or by the exigencies of power, so the likelihood of socialist policies being implemented under this parliamentary system is remote.

Most significant at present is the re-ideologizing of the Conservative party, a notoriously anti-intellectual and pragmatic party. Promoted by the ideologue Keith Joseph, a coherent monetarist economic policy has been evolved and is being enacted. This is accompanied by strong support of free enterprise and a reassertion of personal economic freedom, though not of "moral" freedoms (the right to abortions, to read pornography, etc.). Much of the new ideology reflects the tenets of orthodox liberalism to which British conservatives have always been sympathetic—they have never manifested the reactionary authoritarianism of some continental conservatives. Before the 1980 election, the right-wing *Daily Telegraph* praised the neoliberal ideology:

> Mrs. Thatcher offers a return . . . to the principles and maxims which once made our nation great . . . freedom, law and order, stick and

seats with 2.9 percent, Conservatives 277 seats with 35.8 percent, and Labour 319 seats with 39.2 percent.

[7] This argument is advanced by Nevil Johnson in *In Search of the Constitution* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1975).

[8] The intraparty ideological struggles are documented in *The Crossman Diaries*, ed. J. Morgan (London: Hamilton/Cape, 1975-77).

[9] All controversy between right and left ultimately centers on the implementation of clause 4 of the Labour party's constitution, and especially the paragraph that recommends common ownership of the means of production and distribution.

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carrot, scope for legitimate ambition, self-reliance and independence . . . patriotism, thrift and hard work.[10]

So far, the government's measures include drastic cuts in public spending and industrial subsidies, a redistribution of income toward the rich, cuts in the civil service, the promotion of competition, and the abolition of price and income controls. Shares in profitable state-owned enterprises are to be sold. In the area of welfare, socialist policies for housing, health, and education are being systematically reversed. The initial result has been a large rise in inflation (to 21.9 percent after one year) for which the strength of sterling abroad is no consolation.

"Thatcherism" is innovatory in tone rather than content. Its substance is a restatement and entrenchment of liberal economic and political orthodoxy: laissez-faire plus individual freedom. The dismantling of the welfare state and the public sector in pursuit of the free market is being gradually effected. This, then, is today's official political menu—a restatement of familiar ideas on both sides. Clearly, no new political alternative will be produced while the two major parties continue to monopolize the political scene ideologically and institutionally, relying on the traditional support (and inertia) of the voters.

Non-Establishment Politics

WHETHER THE TWO PARTIES COMPETE to be paragons of moderation or adopt ideologically oppposed stances, their joint stranglehold on the system means that Establishment politics will not change in the foreseeable future. This dominance is assured by both the electoral and parliamentary systems; their reform would be an enormous undertaking, and would meet staunch opposition from those comfortably placed within them. Can we look to extraparliamentary groups for hope of a new political initiative? An important phenomenon of the 1970s was the sporadic intervention of the unions in politics, especially in 1974 when a miners' strike caused Heath to call an election. Such intervention is in part the automatic corollary of an economic crisis: when governments restrain incomes, every wage demand necessarily becomes a political, as well as an economic, act. But union political activity may be more innocent, or less so. Unions are pluralist organizations; a majority of the members want to protect their incomes from erosion, and a minority of them also have strategic political aims. To call a strike "political" is invariably an oversimplification, but one that the media favor since unions are proven to be unpopular with the public, which suffers from their activities.

Yet the unions do not automatically oppose the government: during the no-growth years of Callaghan's government the unions' voluntary adherence to income limits was invaluable in combating inflation. Only at the beginning of 1979 did strikes occur that constituted an overt confrontation with the government. Although the demands then were economic, left-wingers in the public-sector unions also made explicitly political demands for the restoration of public expenditures. Hence the success of the Conservatives' election promise to curb the unions ("a jumble of medieval guilds"), but their proposed reforms are prudently moderate, and they have restored the "right" to free collective bargaining by eschewing incomes policy. Nevertheless, confrontation soon will be inevitable because of the increase in unemployment and the sabotage of the welfare state. But what Lenin condemned as "economism," a concentration on short-term aims, still prevails in our unions. There is also strong hostility to union politicking among voters and politicians, for this threatens the comfortable and predictable process of elite politics. It follows that the unions are unlikely to promote a political alternative, although they may have veto power; rather, their political interventions are symptomatic of a widening of the political arena, which gives some hope for the transformation of our politics.

There are other forms of conflict politics that challenge the Establishment. Direct action has grown since 1970 in the Irish context,

[10] *Daily Telegraph*, May 3, 1979, p. 18.

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but the IRA does not fit the British political matrix and its actions are directed against the government for *instrumental* reasons, not in order to change the system. Direct action and political violence are also engendered by the racist National Front party, whose demonstrations in black areas are countered by "Anti-Nazi League" demonstrations and usually end in clashes with the police. But although the NF's activities are deliberately provocative at this level, it seeks to work through the parliamentary system primarily.

Traditionally, the British strongly oppose extraparliamentary politics, especially violent protest; so strong is the doctrine (deriving from Locke's liberalism) that parliament, the representative of the people, is the supreme and legitimate locus of power. But, significantly, middle-class direct action also spread in the 1970s. Public inquiries into proposals for motorways, airports, and nuclear power stations were interrupted and obstructed by angry residents. Conservatives find this middle-class activism outside the ballot box indicative of a general decline of moral standards; but, more plausibly, Nevil Johnson argues that it is instinctive self-defense against the encroachment of public authorities.[11] However, this blind, partial, and uncoordinated protest does not rest on a political diagnosis and does not address the relevant roots of the problem, adversary politics and bureaucracy. The role of protest and direct action in Britain today is merely symptomatic or, at most, catalytic: it has ideologically diverse sources and so cannot constitute a real political alternative, although its methods eventually may be adopted by more coherent groups.

Another nonconflictual force that is transforming some Western democracies today is grass-roots participation in political and social life. The idea of "autogestion" has scarcely taken root in Britain because of our emphasis on representation, but there are embryonic attempts at participatory democracy that might point the way. Social workers have tried to institute self-activating groups, ranging from neighborhood or tenants' groups active in local affairs to refuges for battered wives and self-help groups among the claimants of welfare benefits. But radical social workers tend to get dismissed, and self-help groups, without paternalism, tend to collapse. Industrial democracy, another important route toward alternative nonelitist politics, was shelved by the last Labour government. The Bullock Report of 1977 recommended worker directors for the boards of sizable firms, a modest proposal that buttressed the position of union officials (usually moderate men). It met a chorus of opposition from business, despite the Report's claim that it would "tame the unions," *and* from unions. It is unfortunate that the government discreetly abandoned the plan, since worker participation would create an appreciation of people's capacity for self-government and ultimately, maybe, a reconsideration of the representative system. The rejection of this policy shows both the strength of laissez-faire liberalism in private industry and the unions' old-fashioned preference for oppositional relationships with management. Finally, there is still a flourishing but very limited "alternative culture" of communes and alternative schools. The dominant ideal in this can perhaps be described as radical, nondogmatic, socialist, and libertarian. But such groups apparently do not aspire to enter and change politics: they offer new models for personal life but no political alternative, and so remain marginal.

[11] Johnson, *op. cit.*, esp. chap. 8. Johnson argues the need for a *Rechtstaat* to combat growth of the state.

The "Deferential Consumer" Culture

A CLICHÉ USED to explain both our economic crisis and political apathy is that "laziness is the British disease." Our industrial mythology describes nightshift workers playing cards and Ford workers being given a *bonus* for regular attendance. Clearly, the "lazy national character" hypothesis is absurd, but I suggest that our problems of static growth and political inactivity may be rooted in 33 years' enjoyment of an embracing welfare state that provides relative individual security for all.

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We have in effect stumbled on the "to each according to his needs" element of socialism without propagating the corresponding doctrine, "from each according to his ability." The individual citizens are guaranteed a security that leaves each of them free to cultivate their private interests: this is the ultimate individualism cultivated by our welfare state. The social services have become an adjunct to liberalism, enabling "egoistic man" (in Marx's words) to pursue his private goals in isolation from any sense of duty to the community, other than paying his taxes. Admittedly, the conditions for the socialist work ethos are absent from our predominantly capitalist economy even in the public sector, since little creative pleasure can be derived from industrial work and labor does not have the necessary "social" nature that Marx described. Nor, in a liberal democracy and an individualistic society, can the sense of community be created that Marx thought necessary to give meaning to "social labor." We lack the preconditions for creative work, and are left with a lopsided ethic of pure consumption that is inevitably passive.

Economic and political attitudes are closely meshed. Postwar affluence and a motherly welfare state have caused economic passivity; an old-established, unchallenged democratic system, whose representative and elite nature prevents participation, has likewise produced political passivity.

> In Britain the persisting deferential and subject orientations foster the development of strong and effective governments. . . . It is possible that deference to political elites can go too far, and that the strongly hierarchical patterns in British politics . . . result from a balance weighted too heavily in the direction of subject and deferential roles.[12]

Thus Almond and Verba in 1965. In 1975, Johnson concurred with this analysis, demonstrating the overextension of public authority and the power of the elite. In Easton's terminology,[13] the British political system has accumulated such reserves of support, or deference, that even considerable, widespread discontent will not precipitate political change.

Our problem is that of liberal democracy carried to its logical conclusion. The representative system has atrophied the political role of the people—a development against which Rousseau warned England two centuries ago. The isolation of political from social life has fostered the growth of a homogeneous and privileged elite with shared class, education, and interests. (Out of the 22 members of Thatcher's cabinet 17 went to Oxford or Cambridge University.) Liberalism privatizes everything, even political life, which becomes a special profession, destroying old notions of citizenship and obligation. But with the modern necessity for interventionist government, elite politics is disastrous, since *everyone* must be persuaded to cooperate in incomes policy, energy saving, or similar enterprises, to everyone's advantage. When the elite asks the people to "tighten *your* belts" yet again, the response is naturally cynicism and hostility. The rift between the people and the political system, alias the rulers, is thus disadvantageous to both: the people have little sense of belonging to a political community or participating in a common enterprise, and they reject the correlative responsibilities, thanks to the liberal segregation of politics. This in turn reinforces their passivity and the need for paternalistic, elite government. Although I state this in terms of elite and mass, the situation lends itself equally to class analysis.

It is interesting to analyze the values that have governed political debate since the war and that reinforce this passive political culture. The prevalent, bipartisan values (which no government dares to repudiate) have been consumption and security, even if these are now partly forfeited to prevent national bankruptcy. Such values indicate the passive, recipient role allocated to the people. Half the adult population depends directly or indirectly on the government as employer, subsidizer of jobs, dispenser of student grants, and so on, a situation that is invidious because the general population does not con-

[12] G. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965), p. 31.

[13] See D. Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), chap. 8.

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trol the government, which can, as at present, sacrifice jobs or cut benefits more ruthlessly than any private employer. Also operative in recent legislation are the instrumental values of the bureaucracy, which frequently jettisons primary political or moral values for its own convenience and to perpetuate itself. As to the celebrated values of freedom and equality, while receiving lip service in manifestoes, they are often given low priority in policy-making, partly because they are suspiciously "ideological." British governments are notoriously unwilling to adopt positions of moral principle that might be electorally damaging: consequently, liberalizing laws on abortion, capital punishment, and homosexuality all passed through parliament as private members' bills, without government support.

Freedom has always been prominently displayed in our political shopwindow but, by any standards, was certainly eroded in the 1970s. Interventionist government brings a correlative loss of freedom, however desirable the goal. The extension of welfare rights increases the likelihood that the freedom or privacy of claimants will be infringed, a notorious example being the state's right to spy on female benefit claimants suspected of cohabiting. An outstanding instance of encroachment on civil rights was the introduction of internment in Ulster of IRA suspects in July 1971, which contravened one of our few written constitutional principles, Habeas Corpus. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty (once invoked for the people against the monarch, now against the people by the elite) made this violation legally possible, despite considerable protest. People have been unduly slow to draw general lessons from government behavior in Ulster: the army operations there are said to be viewed by the authorities as practice for urban guerrilla warfare in the 1980s. Our myopia is culpable, but British governments are skilled at preserving the form of freedom while undermining its substance.

Equality made some progress under recent Labour governments, with a leveling of incomes and increase of welfare payments, but income differentials still remain high. Legislation attempting to prevent racial and sexual discrimination was passed in 1968 and 1970 —half-measures typical of our formalistic, juridical way of implementing political ideals, which ignores the root cause of a problem in case treating this would involve unacceptable coercion (for instance, imprisoning employers who reject black applicants). Instead, we distribute unenforceable rights to oppressed groups such as blacks and women, trading in what Marx called "bourgeois rights" because the liberal constitution and libertarian culture forbid more radical treatment. The Labour party respects this tradition as much as the Conservatives. In general, progress toward substantive equality is still opposed by rightists and centrists in the name of "equality of opportunity." As this brief survey suggests, British politics continues to avoid important ideological issues and usually seeks consensual policies based on secondary, "nonideological" values such as consumerism or efficiency: where ideological values have to be approached, they are treated formalistically, half-heartedly.

The Balance Sheet

CURRENT OBSERVERS of British politics may not consider that we have reached an impasse since the level of party political activity is high. In espousing neoliberal policies, Thatcher has chosen an ideological battleground, and left-wing socialists will gladly fight. But this cannot herald political innovation, for the alternative formulas remain the same, although their presentation is more dogmatic. More important, this approach is bound to reinforce the system of alternating adversary politics, which makes long-term, large-scale reform impossible and produces pragmatism, compromise, and electoral apathy. The radical changes that could rejuvenate our institutions and revivify the electorate—such as proportional representation, a Bill of Rights, and reform of parliament—are unthinkable because of the consensus and amount of parliamentary time they would require. And any revival of participatory politics would have to be inflicted on the population against its passive inclinations and deferential tradition.

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The greatest threat to a passive political culture is authoritarianism, political or bureaucratic. A written constitution would help us combat this danger. But the efficacy of constitutional reforms from above is limited, and the creation of new political configurations, such as a center party, is fundamentally irrelevant to our real problems. What is urgent is the formation of a participatory political culture (which our liberal institutions prevent) where the people themselves could initiate nontrivial, nonadversary forms of politics entailing activity as well as the receipt of benefits. For this, we must profoundly change our system of education, our media, and especially our pragmatic suspicion of ideology. We should create a politicized, activist, even dogmatic political culture, acknowledge that politics already pervades the whole of social life, and act to control it. Ultimately, Britain needs economic and political modernization: whether this takes a socialist or capitalist form, it cannot be achieved under the present system.

The balance sheet is, however, ambiguous: advanced, welfarist liberal democracy has provided a pleasant or tolerable standard of living for the majority. But the testing economic crisis shows us the cul-de-sac of bureaucracy, elite activity, and mass passivity into which successful liberalism leads. Can socialism find the way out? □

Postscript

In these remarks I use the term "socialist" where, I think, Americans would use "social-democratic," to describe the policies that a social-democratic government might enact.

BRITISH NEWSPAPERS SPECUALTE DAILY, with some relish, on the prospect of a split in the Labour party. The present battle for the leadership makes the divergence of views within the parliamentary party transparent, although it was also manifested at the Blackpool conference in October when the left wing gained various concessions concerning the democratization of the party. Would a left-right (or left-center) split be the tragedy that it is widely supposed to be? Electorally, it would necessarily mean the exclusion of social democrats from power for the foreseeable future: our lack of proportional representation and antipathy to coalitions guarantee this. Adversary majoritarian politics is unkind to disunited parties and factions. The Labour party, or parties, out of power for a decade or more, would soon loose the image of being the "party of government" that Mr. Wilson and Mr. Callaghan created. So every social democrat must hope for a solution *within* the existing party structure.

The present crisis can be analyzed differently, according to whether one's interest is in psephology or ideology. It was clear in the last election that Labour had lost support in the middle ground of the electorate, although some of this may be automatically regained as Mrs. Thatcher's government implements its assertively right-wing policies. Some commentators therefore favor a further deideologizing of the party, pointing, for example, to the success of the German SPD in capturing center voters. They identify the left-wingers' commitment to socialist principles such as nationalization as being at the root of the last electoral failure. There is certainly a significant group of Labour politicians who would prefer to see the party abandon its diminishing connections with socialist doctrine and become a centrist party bearing only the title "social-democratic." To them, outworn ideology is an embarrassment—a point already made in the 1950s by the party "ideologue" C. A. R. Crossland: "in my view, Marx has little or nothing to offer the contemporary socialist." Apparently, such politicians adhere to the view that abandonment of principle is in direct ratio to electoral success. This rule-of-thumb held good in the decades of affluence, but may not apply to the future decades of depression, when electors will crave for *explanation* of our social problems, and for a solution based on *theory*—something that the Conservatives promised in 1979. The psephologist's advice—unite, avoid ideological commitment, and maximize votes—may not, therefore, always lead to electoral popularity, and will certainly not produce decisive government.

Viewed ideologically, the present internal debate is a healthy phenomenon. The Labour party needs to review its relation to socialist

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doctrine after two periods of government when it was frequently forgotten, partly because of external economic factors, partly because of concessions to the right-wing members of the party. The left wing is now very strong in the party's National Executive Committee (which is extraparliamentary) and has support among many, but not all, unions; so they have chosen to fight the battle for socialist principles by trying to democratize their own parliamentary arm, the Parliamentary Labour party. If this were achieved, it would favor the left in the election of leaders, and so, indirectly, lead to socialist policies under a future Labour government.

Something must be said, then, about the proposal for an electoral college, which will be discussed by a special conference in January 1981. Although such an institution would not be ideally democratic because of the bloc votes held by unions, it would give more weight to the opinions of constituency party workers, who are at present excluded from any policy-making, despite their vital support and hard work for MPs. Admittedly, the Labour party, like other British parties, is not a mass party—its individual membership is about 200,000. So the proposed changes would not make it more representative of the majority of voters. (The press regularly asserts that local party branches are being infiltrated by Trotskyists, on scant evidence, and so claims that the reform would aid the "militants." It would certainly enfranchise some left-wing constituency workers, at present frustrated at every turn by the party bureaucracy.) However, this democratization would go some way toward undermining the entrenched position of the PLP, which tends to regard itself as the privileged group exclusively concerned with formulating policy decisions. In the present general climate of elite government, any move toward greater openness and democracy must be an improvement, even if this is achieved by admitting other elites to the inner sanctum, such as the unions and party workers.

As to the indirect consequences of the change, that is, the creation of more socialist policies, my personal view is that this would be desirable. The main body of this article argued that a major cause of Britain's malaise is the existence of socialist fragments in a political culture of individualism and self-interest, which enable people to satisfy their material needs while feeling no obligation to contribute to or participate in the community. More thorough-going egalitarian policies might create a less alienated, more cohesive society, even within the framework of the mixed economy. The press has portrayed Mr. Benn and his supporters as crypto-communist, something not borne out at all by their own speeches. In a culture so stable and antiextremist, this kind of alarmist misrepresentation is easily understood, but if accepted and acted on it would herald death for all but pragmatic, centrist parties. The choice in the Labour party is not between social democracy and crypto-communism but between less and slightly more socialism.

But we are not likely to become significantly more socialist. The Labour party is unlikely to split. Mr. Healey, Mr. Benn, and the "Gang of Three" are politicians first and socialists second, and they know that this would constitute electoral suicide. If the electoral college is established and chooses a left-wing leader, we may see a more left-wing manifesto before the next election, but the leader's need to conciliate powerful right-wing colleagues and the backbenchers will still limit the extent of the shift. Besides, the climate of opinion has moved to the right in Britain, as elsewhere, and this fact is bound to restrain even a doctrinaire socialist. Any new Labour leader must apply himself to the question of how to win back defecting voters. So the situation has a built-in democratic stabilizer if the left wing is victorious. Meanwhile, as the internal wrangle continues, Labour is diverted from the duty of criticizing Mrs. Thatcher, though fortunately the continuing harshness and ineffectiveness of her policies is already condemning her in the eyes of the electorate.

Crises like the present one are not new to the Labour party and are inevitable for a party with strong principles operating in a climate of moderate and pragmatic politics. A united Labour party could win the next election; if it can reunite on the basis of some recognizably socialist policies, so much the better. *November 1980* □

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Vladimir Solovyov & Elena Klepikova

Solzhenitsyn: Prisoner of Chillon

They loved, but God forgive them!
They would not tell their love. . . .
— *Heinrich Heine*

Between you and your land an icy link is born.
— *Osip Mandelstam*

I. The Theory of Horse * Rider, or the Justification of Evil

Goethe once said that if Byron had had an opportunity to give vent in Parliament to all the antagonisms within him, his poetic talent would have been much the purer. One cannot say this of Solzhenitsyn: had he had an opportunity to express himself in a parliament, he might not have been a writer at all.

This is the Russian tradition. Where political life is forbidden, politics is smuggled into other spheres, first and foremost into literature. In no other country do the authorities attribute so much importance to literature as in Russia. For words you are put in prison or into a madhouse. You are killed, as Babel and Mandelstam were. You are hounded to death, as Chaadaev, Lermontov, and Pasternak were. You are exiled, like Herzen and Solzhenitsyn. Words have a value in Russia as nowhere else. But this gives rise to its own pathology, a limit beyond which the writer finally ceases to be a writer and becomes a politician.

This is what has happened to Solzhenitsyn.

The politician cramped the artist in him and in the final analysis suppressed the artist. One would hardly attempt a political study of writers such as John Updike, Saul Bellow, or Kurt Vonnegut—it would be artificial. Quite the opposite is true for Solzhenitsyn, who simply cannot be studied in the framework of literature alone. In his work the preponderance of the political over the "artistic" is obvious. He had produced a good hundred political articles, interviews, open letters; the three weighty volumes on the Soviet camps; the portraits of Stalin, Lenin, Czar Nicholas II, and other Russian political figures; the programmatic anthology *From Under the Rubble*; his historical, actually political novel about World War I; and, finally, his reminiscences, again more political than literary, and even entitled, symbolically, with a Russian proverb, *The Calf Butted the Oak*. Today the author of the *Gulag Archipelago* cannot even remain a historian, for a historian requires objectivity, and Solzhenitsyn is too tendentious for that. For him facts are not decisive, but are subordinated to political concepts, and sometimes even distorted to fit them. This becomes clear when we compare the objective, even confessional first volume of *Gulag* with the latter two, in which he employs an approach contrived in behalf of his political ideas.

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In his novel *The First Circle*, Solzhenitsyn calls a great writer "a second government"; his literary career and even his fame Solzhenitsyn views as a political weapon. A few months before his exile from the Soviet Union, he sent out his "Letter to the Soviet Leaders" with its detailed plan for the reform of Russia. In Lefort Prison, before hearing the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., when Solzhenitsyn was given a new suit, he was convinced that he would be driven at once to the Kremlin to help decide the fate of Russia. More than once we have tried to imagine the conversation: the long table, famous and well-known from many photos, and seated at it Leonid Brezhnev and Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

SOLZHENITSYN'S PRESENT ISOLATION is unnatural, and his regular sorties from his Vermont seclusion—his speech at Harvard University, his talk on the BBC, or his recent flood of articles in the American press—*Time, Foreign Affairs*, the *Washington Post*, and more—have a calculated, almost strategic character. Obviously, he has chosen the time—since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—for a campaign. But, instead of riding the current wave of anti-Soviet feeling, he has chosen a different tack, one almost against the current, and sought to deflect Western anger from Russia solely onto Communism. Thus he developed his theory of the horse and rider—a poor horse (Russia) saddled with a savage rider (Communsim), and the horse itself innocent of any guilt when its hooves trample the soil of foreign lands. Or, in another series of images, his view of a mysterious ailment (again Communism), which all of a sudden has stricken an unfortunate victim (again Russia): "We do not, after all, confuse a man with his illness; we do not refer to him by the name of that illness or curse him for it?"

Can one imagine Thomas Mann or Bertolt Brecht discussing the Nazi attack on Poland in September 1939, and saying, "Germany is innocent; ideology is guilty—a fatal illness, a mysterious rider. . . ."

Solzhenitsyn has another trick of terminology: he insists that we distinguish the two names for the same country—the Soviet Union and Russia. Herzen's famous cry, "One is ashamed to be Russian!," Solzhenitsyn would alter to "One is ashamed to be a Soviet!" But this is not a matter of terminology or even chronology. For Solzhenitsyn all that is good is "Russian," all the bad is "Soviet." Who won the war with the Germans? The Russians. Who created the Gulag Archipelago? The Soviets. Who wrote *The Brothers Karamazov, War and Peace, Three Sisters*? Russians. And who has occupied Czechoslovakia, Poland, Afghanistan? Soviets.

But who occupied Poland during the last century and conducted a bloody suppression of its uprisings in 1831 and 1864? Or who occupied, at the end of the 19th century, the Central Asian khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, which bordered on Afghanistan? The concept of the "Soviet" did not exist then. Solzhenitsyn's work cannot sustain historical criticism, for it consciously ignores well-known facts. He writes, for instance, that "Alexander I had even entered Paris with an army, but he did not annex an inch of European soil." Does he pretend that the Congress of Vienna, which confirmed the partition of Poland and Czar Alexander as King of Poland, was not a result of the victory over Napoleon? And was not Russia the country that received in the 19th century the nickname of the "gendarme of Europe," and did Russian soldiers not have the honor of suppressing European uprisings each time they occured?

Nor was it any better inside Russia. Solzhenitsyn is fond of defending Nicholas I, who upon his accession to the throne had executed the five leaders of the Decembrist uprising (while Brezhnev continues to send dissidents to prison, exiles them, permits them to emigrate, but does not execute them—we say this not in praise, but to set the record straight). Solzhenitsyn praises Prime Minister Stolypin, whose mass executions led Russians to nickname the Russian gallows "Stolypin's necktie." And was it not Russia that preserved the institution of serf-

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dom until 1861, and the Jewish Pale until 1917? Which Russia does the Marquis de Custine describe in his great book of 1839, a book replete with terror, sympathy, and pity—the Soviet or the *Russian* land?

SOLZHENITSYN AND MANY OTHER RUSSIANS fail to see the continuity of Russian history; they fail to see that the Revolution of 1917 was neither an end nor a boundary. For even after the older model of Russian history was destroyed by the young Soviet regime, it came back under Stalin and finally even in the imperialism and chauvinism of the present regime. The division of Russian history into pre-October and post-October is put in doubt, if only by the striking similarity of the monster Ivan the Terrible to the monster Stalin, or that of the imperial reformer Peter the Great to the Bolshevik reformer Lenin, or of the liberal czar Boris Godunov to the liberal prime minister Nikita Khrushchev.

For Solzhenitsyn this dubious boundary of 1917 with its two revolutions is doubly fateful for Russia. For him the socialist ideas of October and the democratic ones of February spring from the same root, and he turns the same disfavor on both. They are equally unacceptable to him, since they come together in a single conception of the "ideological West," something to be set against Russia. This is the point of departure for all his speculations. For Russia's misfortunes he lays the guilt not only on the Communists but also on their immediate predecessors, the prerevolutionary liberals and democrats, Westernizers who had turned Russia away from her old-time, autochthonous way. This is the theme of his 20-volume historical novel, "The Red Wheel," of which so far he has published only *August 1914* and *Lenin in Zurich*. And sometimes Solzhenitsyn, loyal to his ideological perspective, relates Russia's historical catastrophe back to the distant times of the reformer and Westernizer Peter the Great.

For Solzhenitsyn 1917 remains a historical boundary on one side of which lies good, on the other evil. The source, paradoxically, of Solzhenitsyn's notion is the vulgar Soviet view of 1917 as a milestone of good. Just as this antithesis serves Soviet propaganda, so Solzhenitsyn attributes to it another significance: *a justification of Russia in all situations*. Guilt is lifted away once and forever and attributed to supernatural causes: a mysterious rider, an unknown disease, a Communist ideology coming from . . . God knows where. The Russian Revolution thus becomes something like the fall of Eve, following which she (Eve, Russia) was driven out of the primeval Paradise. Hence his patriarchal view of Russia as an ideal: how fair until she fell! Mandelstam called this "the great Slavic dream of how to stop the course of history." A hundred years ago another Russian writer, A. K. Tolstoy, followed the same road but, dissatisfied with those very times Solzhenitsyn now finds so alluring, attributed Russia's fall to a much earlier, indeed legendary period: "When I think of the beauty of our history up to the cursed Mongols, I sometimes feel like throwing myself on the ground and sobbing with grief."

This is an old Russian tradition—to isolate evil and identify it with plots, revolution, foreign incursions, or infiltration. A scapegoat is created, to which you attribute all your negative features. One source of this idea is, perhaps, the gospel belief in demons that can be driven out of a person by liberating an innocent nature from the evil that has somehow become attached to it. Search not within, but without.

Solzhenitsyn goes farther than others in his detective-story analysis of Russian history by placing the Bolshevik seizure of power on the same footing with an occupation by foreigners. This enables him to be less bothered by the real occupation of Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Esthonia, and more, by Russians.

Who then are these mysterious occupiers of the Russian land? To suppose that Russians have subjected other Russians to occupation would be awkward; to stop short with a reference to some mystical ideology would mean to stop short of the full truth.

> Did not the first years of the Revolution show features of a kind of foreign invasion? When in

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> a brigade requisitioning food or meting out punishment come to destroy a peasant district, almost no one would speak Russian, and there were Finns and Austrians among them? When the Central Committee included plenty of Latvians, Poles, Jews, Hungarians, Chinese? . . . They [Russians] had no protective inoculation—they lost their heads—yes, then they submitted—yes, they even liked it! But—they were not the first or the only ones to discover it, from the fifteenth century on!

So the search for the responsible one slips out of history and into ideology and then, necessarily, into ethnicity. For, if only it bears an ethnic character, evil is easily recognized. It would seem that the Russians had nothing to do with it, that the distortion of their history, that "mortal breaking of the spine," has taken place quite against their will, and that the guilty were those who had turned them from their course. "It is not through us that injustice has come into being," Solzhenitsyn declares in *August 1914*. To the Jews, naturally, belongs an honorable place in this xenophobic scale.

IN ITSELF Solzhenitsyn's anti-Semitism would hardly deserve special attention, were it not that his detective-story view of Russian history lies at its base. First of all, anti-Semitism is scarcely original for a Russian writer, and in one degree or another it is characteristic of the majority of Russian classics—Pushkin, Gogol, Turgenev, Dostoevsky (of Tolstoy, it would seem, not). Second, Solzhenitsyn is clever enough that openly anti-Semitic pronouncements (against the Jewish emigration, against Jewish cosmopolitanism, or against Voice of America broadcasts addressing Soviet Jews) are either veiled or balanced by declarations in favor of Israel or Zionism. Third, we believe that he does not hold to any "zoological" anti-Semitism; if he is anti-Semitic, then it is in an ideological sense. Hence he admits of a Jewish identity that is Israelite, Zionist, nationalist, but not of a Jewishness that is assimilated, cosmopolitan, pro-Western. Russian Jews for him, and the politically conscious intelligentsia as well, are the bearers and at the same time the symbol of ideas—socialist, democratic, bourgeois, international—hostile to Russian nationalism. Ideological anti-Semitism is a sign of estrangement from them.

Hence, for instance, in his lampoon of history, *Lenin in Zurich*, ideological bases are replaced by racist ones. Some ten years ago the Soviet writer Marietta Shaginyan, working on a series of novels on Lenin's family, discovered a document in the State Archives from which it appeared that Lenin was one-quarter Jewish. This sensational discovery was nowhere published in the Soviet Union, of course, and six workers of the State Archives were let go for having shown Marietta Shaginyan the fateful document.

But Marietta Shaginyan's discovery agitated Solzhenitsyn no less than it did the Soviet officials—not only the one-quarter Jewish blood (how much!) but the one-quarter Russian (how little!). Analysis of Russian history is replaced by analysis of genes, chromosomes, and blood. The key to Solzhenitsyn's conception is the following internal monologue, attributed to Lenin:

> Why then was he born in that uncouth country? Because one-quarter of your blood is Russian, and for that fate has hitched you up to a large, clumsy Russian rig! A fourth of your blood, but neither in character nor in will nor in inclinations have you ever shown a kinship to that make-do, knock-down, eternally drunken land. . . .

Wishing to emphasize the non-Russian and anti-Russian character of the Russian Revolution, Solzhenitsyn presents in detail the emigré atmosphere in which Lenin lives, where there is not a single Russian (by blood); but where there are Jews. Solzhenitsyn sharply exaggerates the historical role of the insignificant Alexander Parvus, to whom he attributes the secret direction of the Russian Revolution as an assignment from the German General Staff. In relation to Lenin, Parvus appears in the role of Mephistopheles, a devil and tempter. The old story is related about the sealed railway carriage in which Lenin arrived in Petrograd, to supposedly produce the October Revolution at the expense of the Kaiser's government. All is as clear as possible: the Russian Revolution is a

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German provocation, and its secret mover the German spy Alexander Parvus who is, besides, a Jew: Solzhenitsyn gives the real family name of Lenin's Mephistopheles—Helfand—and insistently calls him "Israel Lazarevich," though Parvus, like many other Russian revolutionaries, had exchanged his real name for a pseudonym in the interest of security. . . .

Every writer has his own archetypes and with writers who are not complex, like Solzhenitsyn, it is easy to identify these. If Lenin is only a political marionette in the hands of the German Jew Alexander Parvus, then we should look for some Jew behind Stalin's back as well. This Solzhenitsyn promptly shows, this time not in his fiction, but in *The Gulag Archipelago*. He finds for us Stalin's Mephistopheles, the Turkish Jew Naftali Frenkel, founder, it would seem, of the entire system of the Gulag Archipelago. The problem is not only the complete lack of any documentary evidence, but the undeserved diminution of the role of Stalin. Criminals on his scale scarcely require inspiration.

So the theory of the horse and the rider passes into the theory of the scapegoat, and the scapegoat unexpectedly manifests sharply national characteristics. Paraphrasing Voltaire's famous dictum about God, we could say, "if there were no Jews, one would have had to invent them."

II. The Liberals' Reply, and the Reply to the Liberals

BUT LET US TRY to avoid the temptation that leads liberals to criticize Solzhenitsyn from too easy a position. They say, "Of course, freedom is better than no freedom, democracy better than authoritarianism, the political West better than the political East, and so forth. These things are too obvious to employ as arguments." In the light of such criticism, Solzhenitsyn can only appear to be something of an *enfant terrible*, an eccentric, but still a reactionary, a chauvinist, an anti-Semite. It is strange, in fact, that Solzhenitsyn does not understand he has thrown his critics such an easy bone of polemic contention. But the bone is already picked too clean. There are bright flare-ups from these polemics: the interchanges between Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov; the accusation made by his former fellow prisoner Dmitri Panin (the real-life model of the character of Sologdin in *The First Circle*), as well as several verbal reworkings of the title of Solzhenitsyn's memoirs, *The Calf Butted the Oak*. The writer Viktor Nekrasov renamed it "The Pig Under the Oak" (a reference to Krylov's fable, in which a pig that has eaten its fill of acorns proceeds to dig up the oak tree's roots out of ingratitude). Nekrasov is thinking of the Moscow liberals, who in fact helped the former *zek* to get on his feet. To Sinyavsky (Tertz) is attributed an even coarser paraphrase: not *The Calf Butted the Oak*, but "The Calf Screwed the Oak."

Of course, in any such enterprise Solzhenitsyn only failed. His most extreme attempt was his "Letter to the Soviet Leaders." It never was published in the Soviet Union. This meant the destruction of all his political ambitions. No prophet is honored in his own land; his fate is to be stoned, or sent into exile as Solzhenitsyn was.

To this theme we will return, and meanwhile remark only that Solzhenitsyn's break with the government was at the government's initiative, while his break with the liberals was at his own initiative. This is important, even though it is true that his impatience with them is not much greater than their impatience with him. In a totalitarian land the opposition comes to be something of a union of false friends, who unite in the face of the common enemy. But in the final analysis the common enemy may seem to some as preferable to their unnatural friends. And Solzhenitsyn and the liberals now consider each other more dangerous for Russia than their former common enemy, the Soviet authorities. As for patience—this is not a Russian trait, especially not in politics.

Solzhenitsyn was one of the first Russian dissidents and one of the first to leave the movement, and his quarrel with it is perhaps of greater existential importance to him than his older quarrel with the Soviet authorities. It is quite natural that this rejection of liberalism has brought him closer to the authorities—

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it could not be any different in view of the sharp polarization of ideology in Russia. His political memoirs are devoted to a struggle on two fronts: first, with the authorities, then with his fundamental opponents, the liberals, at one and the same time with both, and at one and the same time in alliance with both.

This paradoxical transformation of Solzhenitsyn from a Saul to a Paul (democratic to authoritarian, progressive to reactionary, anti-Stalinist to neo-Stalinist, and so on) does not require condemnation so much as it requires discussion and analysis.

Solzhenitsyn's political evolution is the result of a crisis in the dissident movement itself, and his break with the liberals (tactical as well as ideological) is a sign of its weakness. So is his shift to the Russian nationalist movement and his pretense to be its leader—a true index of the revival of nationalism in Russia today and its changes of political success. Solzhenitsyn is calculating on a real Russia, not an ideal democratic one. His pragmatism is one reason for abandoning liberalism.

It is curious that, just as Solzhenitsyn's reactionary views cannot stand *liberal* criticism, liberal criticism of him will not stand up to a *realistic* critique once it is taken out of the liberal context of the West and presented in the quite different, unliberal Russian context. This applies not only to intellectuals, but to members of the government, the Party, the bureaucracy, the military, and the people—the Russia that, as Gogol correctly observed, has spread itself over half the world and that just now, without special effort and by its own mere weight, has taken Afghanistan. In his quarrel with the dissidents, Solzhenitsyn might well have relied on Stalin, who once inquired how many divisions the Pope had. The Soviet dissidents had not a single soldier—they were commanders without troops.

James Reston has called attention to an aspect of Solzhenitsyn's Harvard speech: in calling for moral resistance to evil, at the same time he placed his only hope on the armed forces of the United States and was annoyed by its limited actions in foreign policy. Such is his traditional, Russian, imperial view. If in the first half of the 19th century it was Russia that fulfilled the role of an international gendarme, now it is America that must take up this role.

SOLZHENITSYN'S CRITICISM of the West for its weakness and his prophesies of its impending doom are deeply Russian: many leading Russians, such as Herzen, arriving in the West, joined the ranks of its gravediggers. This Russian sense of Western weakness has its origin in the power of authority in Russia. Russians can be passionate revolutionaries, and still their prolonged and unsuccessful struggle with that power compels them to respect it, and only it. "Magnanimity is considered a weakness among peoples accustomed to force," the Marquis de Custine wrote in his Russian diary.

Let us then finally admit that Solzhenitsyn's negative traits are traits of Russia, and that his liberal opponents' quarrel is not with him but with Russia itself, which in fact is undemocratic, illiberal, without freedom, and not very open to precise analysis through application of the customary categories of logical reasoning. And this is why so much attention has been paid in the West to the handful of Russian dissidents, since for the West the very existence of an opposition in a totalitarian country seems to make that country comprehensible. But alas, this is only an illusion.

We have already written that democracy has limits to its understanding, that it has trouble realizing what "undemocracy" is. To understand "undemocracy," democracy must itself become undemocratic, and this may be too high a price to pay for understanding.

Yet the Russians themselves have already recognized the impotence of the mind to comprehend Russia. The poet Tyutchev wrote a quatrain that for a century now has been quoted with pride by Russian nationalists, though its meaning is in fact highly ambiguous:

> The mind may not comprehend Russia,
> The yardstick cannot measure her:
> She has her own character —
> We can only believe in her.

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And here is where the line is drawn that separates Solzhenitsyn from his former partisans and fellow crusaders, against whom he is now in open battle, considering them the worst foes of that Russia in which he *believes* (while they believe only in *reason*). He knows that Russia, historical and contemporary, is irrational; they suppose that with the aid of reason they can understand and change Russia.

If Solzhenitsyn's earlier views arose as a reaction against Stalinism and had a liberal tinge, his present, reactionary ones arose as an allergic reaction to Western "reformism" extending from the Kadet minister Milyukov to the Bolshevik Lenin, from the democratic and eclectic Sakharov to those Russian Eurocommunists, the twin brothers Medvedev. Russian history in fact refutes the self-deceptions of the Western mind, which supposes so many of its institutions, including political ones, to be universal and obligatory for everyone, apart from indigenous traditions and inclinations. To the Soviet dissidents we can apply the characterization the historian Klyuchevski gave to the Russian Decembrists: they hoped to achieve results before the causes that would produce them. The dissidents were people who cast no shadows, so without effect was their noisy passage across the stage of Russian politics. They were Westernizers not only in the sense of their political preferences or their political origins, but in their final departure from Russia with their ideological baggage—like the Jews' exodus from Egypt. Their physical emigration was preceded and facilitated by their earlier inner, ideological emigration. Their presence in Russia was short-lived, transitory, privileged, and in view of the great interest the West paid them even honorable. Alas, the effect of their activity within the country was deeply negative: thanks to the exaggerated accounts given by foreign radio stations broadcasting to the U.S.S.R., their listeners became infected with an illusion of optimism and lost their grasp of that real-life milieu that continues to surround the average Soviet citizen. Solzhenitsyn wrote his "Letter to the Soviet Leaders" when he finally comprehended that it was futile to discuss Russia's fate with the liberals because of their estrangement from Russian reality, their utopianism, rationalism, and political heedlessness.

We do not take sides in this quarrel: unlike Solzhenitsyn, our views are democratic, but unlike the Russian democrats, we see no application for them in Russia. Nor has the Russian dissident movement died because Solzhenitsyn lacked faith in it! It did not even die from the repressions of the KGB, though these were more effective. It died from within itself, since it could not support the weight of Russian history. And, though their numbers were very small, the defeat of the Russian dissidents has been the defeat of the whole Russian liberal intelligentsia, and it has ended with the intelligentsia's exclusion from all political life.

Solzhenitsyn has made his choice: between the truth and his fatherland he has chosen the fatherland, the link with which has not been broken—rather it has been strengthened—by exile, just as the parts of a crushed worm, writhing, strive to unite again.

III. The Lone Wolf: In Search of a Pack

WE JUDGE a person by his friends, or by his enemies, or by both at the same time. A solitary man cannot be judged; turning his back on people he sloughs off any associations; and what cannot be compared obviously cannot really exist.

Solzhenitsyn is as solitary as a wolf who has left the pack and does not recognize its laws. He knows that any ideological pack, even one that belongs to the opposition, even one that is willing to be sacrificed, inevitably turns into a Mafia: he broke with the dissidents partly for psychological reasons. Even his break with *Novy Mir*, the journal that first published him in the Soviet Union, was more than ideological. It was an instinct for literary and political self-preservation. In the period of its liberalism, and especially in those final years of disfavor and persecution, *Novy Mir* succeeded in preserving a political and esthetic monopoly, succeeded in dictating its own

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taste and views for the entire Russian liberal intelligentsia. Solzhenitsyn necessarily had to break this artificial tie for the sake of his own survival as a writer, and he preferred the way of the lone wolf to that sacrificial path on which the herd of *Novy Mir* went down to their political slaughter. It is quite natural that neither then, in that time of heroism and sacrifice, nor even now could his criticism of *Novy Mir* be understood as anything else but a betrayal.

In 1969, in the heat of the official campaign against *Novy Mir*, not long before the final destruction of its liberal editorial board, the already fated journal resolved on a final, mortal struggle against the gang that, under the cover of the official ideology, preached chauvinist, neo-Stalinist, and anti-Semitic views. The chauvinists, their positions strengthened by the recent decision to occupy Czechoslovakia, at once made a reply to *Novy Mir* in the form of a denunciatory article, the notorious "Letter of the Eleven." And Alexander Solzhenitsyn (a writer contributing to *Novy Mir*) made common cause with these cursed enemies. From calculation? More probably from conviction. But from calculation as well, since he was already betting on the success of the reaction with its imperialist chauvinism, betting on it to win the ideological and political leadership in Russia. Tvardovski, the editor of *Novy Mir*, made a bitter jest at Solzhenitsyn's expense: "He is the twelfth of the eleven signers: the one who hadn't time to sign."

But he did have time to write and sign his "Letter to the Soviet Leaders," his most decisive attempt to achieve a political alliance with the authorities. In it he writes of the imperialist triumphs of the Soviet Union, greater than ever before. He writes about the cul-de-sac of our civilization, but emphasizes that in the West things are worse than with "us," and calls on the Soviet leaders "not to destroy Russia in the crisis of Western civilization" but to renounce ideological, scientific, commercial, and industrial cooperation with the West and enclose Russia in a healthy isolation with an emphasis on patriotism. He opposes Western democracy with political stability and authoritarian order: "Russia has lived a thousand years with an authoritarian regime—and up to the beginning of the twentieth century she has preserved both the physical and spiritual health of her people." He calls for limited freedom for artistic creation, but not for "political books, proclamations, political pamphlets—God forbid?" Even in his attitude toward Communist ideology Solzhenitsyn is breaking down doors that are already open: he proposes that we discard an ideology that the Soviet rulers have already discarded, quietly replacing the Communist empire with a bureaucratic one and preparing to exchange the latter for a nationalist and chauvinistic one—a realization of Solzhenitsyn's own chief dream.

We recall how Anna Akhmatova called Solzhenitsyn a "Soviet man." There are points where the concepts of "Soviet" and "anti-Soviet" coincide. Varlam Shalamov, author of the well-known *Kolyma Tales*, told one of the authors of the present article, "Why do our leaders hate Sasha [Solzhenitsyn] so? They're cut from the same cloth. They come from the same school; only the signs are reversed: plus and minus. Family squabbles are the noisiest." This was said while Solzhenitsyn was still in Russia.

Solzhenitsyn graduated from that frightful school, the Gulag Archipelago. Its graduates not only bear hatred for it, they have also acquired its traditions, ideas, methods, even its style of thought. Sacrifice is learned from the torturer—not willingly, but from necessity, in order to survive. And habit turns into character and dies only with the person.

"Blessings on you, prison!" Solzhenitsyn exclaims, and he is correct in that his character was in fact completely formed by prison life. In the preface to *Gulag*, Solzhenitsyn declares: "The eleven years I spent there I bore not as a mark of shame, nor as a cursed dream, but almost with love of that monstrous world. . . ." And in his memoirs, which form a unique key to his psychology, he writes of his "irreversibly camp-style brain," and adds, "My habits are those of a prisoner, of a camp inmate. Without posing I may say tht I belong to and owe to Russian literature

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no less than I belong to and owe to Russian imprisonment—my character was shaped there, and that forever."

The negative experience of the Gulag seems to Solzhenitsyn to be positive, indeed, essential for all mankind. "It is an indubitable fact," Solzhenitsyn said at Harvard, "that the human character has weakened in the West and gained strength in the East. The complex and deadly crushing life has produced characters which are stronger, deeper and more interesting than the beneficent and regulated life of the West." So what are we to do? Design a Gulag Archipelago in the West in order to breed heroic, courageous characters?

IN ALL his fulminations against the West one can detect the nostalgia of the crippled citizen for the land that is as crippled as he, the land where he suffered and was tortured, but which has been imprinted in his soul forever. It is the nostalgia for prison of a man set at liberty, a feeling described by Byron in "The Prisoner of Chillon."

Is it any wonder, then, that Solzhenitsyn has surrounded his house in Vermont with a guard fence, and has installed closed-circuit television by the gate, as in a guard tower? Is it any wonder that Solzhenitsyn, who himself has suffered from the Soviet censorship, nonetheless has attacked freedom of the press with an angry diatribe? Is it any wonder that from his negative picture of Western society Solzhenitsyn made three exceptions: Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal, and Pinochet's Chile? Or, finally, that he now uses Stalin as an example for other Russian leaders? Solzhenitsyn writes in his "Letter to the Russian Leaders":

> From the first days of the War Stalin did not count on the rotten support of ideology, but discarded it quite sensibly, even almost ceased to comprehend it, while he unfurled the old Russian flag, at times even the banner of Orthodoxy—and we won! . . . When they look forward to war with China the national leaders of Russia will necessarily have to rely on patriotism, and only on it.

And Solzhenitsyn's changing attitude toward Stalin only anticipates changing attitudes of his countrymen, although this foresight was the first reason for driving him out of Russia.

The second reason was that the Soviet authorities do not wish to be defended in a language they themselves do not understand.

And the third reason: Solzhenitsyn is a political extremist while the Soviet leaders are political pragmatists.

We can understand the anxiety of the Russian liberals who suppose a Solzhenitsyn in power to be a more dangerous variation on the present Soviet regime. Solzhenitsyn and the Soviet regime are no longer enemies, but rivals, ready at some point for cooperation with one another. Indeed, as time goes on they have more and more in common: from fear of China to fear of liberty, from neo-Stalinism to chauvinism.

And hence Solzhenitsyn's political position is by no means so hopeless, if we consider the changeable fates of political emigrés (Lenin, Peron, Khomeini) and contemporary technological means of bridging space, of which Solzhenitsyn makes clever use (his Russian speeches on foreign broadcasting stations). This is the reason he varies his words to suit those who are listening. . . . Solzhenitsyn, writing in *Foreign Affairs* to defend Russia from the charge of aggression, sharply distinguishes the rank-and-file Russian from the ruling Politburo. But, when addressing Russia on the BBC, he unites the people and its rulers:

> In our country, I count on the degree of enlightment which has already developed in our people and must inevitably extend also to the spheres of the military and the administration. A people, after all, is not just a throng of millions down below, but also its individual representatives occupying key posts. There are sons of Russia up there, too, and Russia expects that they will fulfill their filial duty.

This resembles a call to a military coup, and a coup not in a liberal direction, but quite the opposite, in accord with the views Solzhenitsyn developed in his "Letter to the Soviet Leaders." Or, as he explained in his speech on the BBC, he "was trying to map out

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a path which could be taken by other leaders—not the current ones—who might suddenly come to replace them."

Solzhenitsyn reflects his country like a looking-glass, not only in the subjects of his books, but in himself: his character, his contradictions, his ideas and passions. Not only Stalin's Russia, which he cursed in his *Gulag* but later took as a model; not only Krushchev's, whose drive toward liberalism he shared, but then rejected; and not only Brezhnev's, which by persecuting him brought him world fame, but also the same Russia that he himself has foretold and that will come the closest to his ideal model, though probably more slowly than he would like.

In the West, Solzhenitsyn appears a Utopian prophet or a religious moralist, but in his political views he is no less a realist than in his fiction. He expresses Russia as it in fact is, and not as it would become according to the reformist ideas of those who wish it well. Solzhenitsyn's readers may like him or not like him, but this is the same as liking or not liking his country.

By this tragic link with Russia, he is strengthened and fortified. He is not the greatest Russian writer, even among those now living, but he is the most Russian of all who have ever lived. Not only in birth and in blood, but in spirit; not only Russian as a common man, but as a ruler.

One Soviet official, in conversation with us, prophesied Solzhenitsyn's early return to Russia, "on a white horse, as a victor. . . ." Living or dead, he is destined to return, alas, not only through his books, but through his ideas as well.

Translated from the Russian by WILLIAM E. HARKINS □

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Joseph Clark

Marx and the Jews: Another View

The Image of Karl Marx towers so high above all other socialist thinkers that it has encouraged iconolatry. In no other area is this more prevalent than in considering the problem of Marx and the Jews. This is hardly conducive to advancing "scientific method" in the study of history.

Many socialists and Marxists, understandably, have evaded or rationalized the anti-Semitic strand in the work of Marx. Before me lies the 1903 edition of Frederick [Friedrich] Engels's *Feuerbach: The Roots of Socialist Philosophy*, translated and edited by Austin Lewis, published by Charles H. Kerr & Co. The appendix contains Marx's "Theses" on Feuerbach. How valuable these theses were to young socialists seeking both theoretical understanding and practical activity for the liberation of the working class! The American socialists of that day must have been aware of how many Jewish adherents there were in the socialist movement. In any case, being both Jewish and a youngster of fifteen when I first read the "Theses" in the Kerr edition, I was impressed by Marx's criticism of Feuerbach, reading here that he considered "only theoretical activity as generally human, while 'praxis' is conceived and fixed only in its disgusting form." I did not know then that the editors were being sensitive to what I was—young, Jewish, and a socialist.

A few years later, I read an accurate translation of that famous thesis. Marx, of course, had written that Feuerbach "regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance." How amazing that the same description of Jews I heard on the block where I was growing up and joined the Young Communist League was current in the times and in the writing of Karl Marx. Some of the gentile boys and girls in Brooklyn grew up thinking that "dirty Jew" was one word. There is so much continuity in the symbolism of anti-Semitism that the association by Marx of Jews and huckstering, Jews and money-grubbing, Jews and loan-mongering, Jews and capital, has been a standard of all anti-Semitic propaganda. A friend of mine who became a Marxist, even though he grew up in North Carolina, recalls that he must have been fifteen years old before he learned that the word Jew was a noun, not a verb.

When I read the accurate translation of the Marx thesis it did not shock me as much as it might have in the first instance. By that time I was hooked. After all, I had learned what Marx termed the ultimate aim of his work, "to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society." What a heady discovery for a young person: to know not only the past and present but the future! We had, in the words of Marx, discovered the "natural laws" of society's development. Marx explained that society "can neither clear by bold leaps, nor remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered by the successive phases of its normal development." It was thrilling to learn that society "can shorten and lessen the birth-pangs" of inexorable development.

Once having discovered "a process of natural history" one did not become unduly disturbed that even in *Capital* Marx wrote about Jews, not as people, but as capitalist

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symbols and categories, dirty ones. One became so enthralled by the discovery of the secret of surplus value, the general law of capitalist accumulation, the inexorable law of the growing misery of the working class (this seemed so cogent in the 1930s) that one ignored Marx's references to Jews. One didn't question Marx for describing Jews, not as a people divided, as a Marxist divided other people, into classes, or into rich and poor or into good and bad. Jews in *Capital* were a symbol, and not a very inspiring one. Thus, even a young possessor of the secret of society's "natural law" experienced a slight twinge when reading in *Capital*: "The sum of the values in circulation can clearly not be augmented by any change in their distribution, any more than the quantity of the precious metals in a country by a Jew selling a Queen Anne's farthing for a Guinea." None of the gentile boys and girls on my block used such elegant metaphors, but their descriptions of Jews often were remarkably similar to that. By the time one came to the end of the third volume of *Capital* one read, with the usual twinge, Marx citing favorably a quotation that: "Jews, Lombards, usurers and bloodsuckers were our first bankers, our original bank sharks, their characters being such as to be called almost infamous. . . . On the whole . . . our original bankers . . . were a very bad crowd, they were greedy usurers, stony-hearted vampires." Earlier one had experienced two other twinges in the first volume. The first was a reference to history. "Trading nations," Marx wrote, "properly so-called, exist in the ancient world only in its interstices, like the Gods of Epicurus in the Intermundia, or like Jews in the pores of Polish society." True, that bore a relation to the role of many Jews as traders in Poland. But one had already learned in a Jewish socialist school that the Polish Jews and those in the Pale of Russia numbered millions; that the greatest mass was dirt poor and that many thousands were workers and handicraftsmen. The most painful twinge came when Marx was at his wittiest in *Capital*, in discussing commodities as money: "The capitalist knows that all commodities, however scurvy they may look, or however badly they may smell, are in faith and in truth money, inwardly circumcised Jews, and what is more, a wonderful means whereby out of money to make more money."

One discovered the correspondence of Marx and Engels, not just the letters to Kugelman and other Marxist correspondence. One was introduced to the private mind of Marx. Now the Marx correspondence is being published in large editions and read by many who lack the comfort of a knowledge of the "natural law" of society's development. In the voluminous correspondence there are Marx's brilliant insights into the American Civil War, the peasant rebellion in Russia, the failed revolution in Gemany, the heroism of the Paris communards, and his marvelous tribute to Abraham Lincoln, as a "good man" above everything else. Recently, however, *New York Times* book reviewer John Leonard gleaned from the letters of Marx, selected and translated by Saul K. Padover, that Marx's "vocabulary of abuse is wearisome." Worse than that, Marx's "dozens of anti-Semitic remarks are disgusting. They would be disgusting even if they weren't made by someone descended from a long line of rabbis on both sides of the family."

How else can one react to the use of racist slurs about an opponent of Marx who had the "misfortune" (shared by Marx) of being born of Jewish ancestry? Here is the index reference to Ferdinand Lassalle, in the Marx-Engels *Gesamtausgabe* in a single volume published in Berlin in 1930: "Lassalle—Jüdel Braun; Ephraim Gescheit; Itzik." The name was Lassalle, but to identify the references by Marx to him in the correspondence from 1854 to 1860, one had to know that "little Jew Braun" was an anti-Semitic sneer by Marx about the original Lassalle family name (Marx here is not at all self-conscious about the fact that if the original Lassalle family name was Braun, the Marx family name was Levi); the reference to Ephraim "the clever" was another anti-Jewish gibe, while Itzik was the favorite Marx designation for Lassalle, as it was among many anti-Semites about almost any Jew.

At a time when American Communists

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were far more concerned about white chauvinism than about anti-Semitism, it was truly shocking for a young Communist to read a letter by Marx, dated July 30, 1862 addressed to Engels, describing the "Jewish Nigger Lassalle." Marx continues about Lassalle: "As the shape of his head and the texture of his hair suggest, he is descended from the negroes who joined Moses in his exodus from Egypt (unless his mother or paternal grandmother were crossed with a nigger). This union of Jew and German with its negro sources was bound to produce a strange hybrid. The fellow's importunity is also negro."

Henry Pachter, in his article, "Marx and the Jews," in the Fall 1979 issue of *Dissent*, argues that Marx and Engels do not aim "to sow anti-Semitism but to exploit an existing anti-Semitism and make a point." Pachter concedes that this is bad enough, "but to judge such outbursts, one must compare them with similar invective against other races. . . ." Indeed, it is true that Marx and Engels leveled virulent abuse upon many other races and nationalities. For example, one year after the *Communist Manifesto* called upon the workers of all lands to unite, Engels issued a wrathful warnings to the Czechs, the Slovaks, and other Slavs in an article published in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*:

> With the first successful revolt of the French proletariat . . . the Austrian Germans and Magyars will be free and exact a bloody revenge from the Slavic barbarians. The general war that will break out will break this Slavic union and annihilate all these small pigheaded nations right down to their very names. The next world war will cause to vanish from the face of the earth not only reactionary classes and dynasties but also whole reactionary peoples. And that, too, is progress.

The above is quoted in David McLellan's *Karl Marx: His Life and Thought* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973). In a footnote to Engels's dire anathema pronounced upon the Slavs, McLellan informs us:

> The *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* also contained a fair amount of anti-Semitism whose generally anti-capitalist tone it facilely considered to be of a progressive nature. Many of these articles [as also some of those in the vein of Engels's quoted above] came from Müller-Tellering (the paper's Vienna correspondent) whose contribution Marx considered to be "the best we have had, absolutely in keeping with our line."

But soon "our line," as it pertains to Müller-Tellering, was changed. Sadly, it was changed not in recognition of how dangerous it is to use anti-Semitism for anticapitalist purposes or how self-destructive it is to incite the annihilation of "small pigheaded nations." As long as Müller-Tellering was using anti-Semitism to attack capitalism, that was "fine." But soon Müller-Tellering was attacking Karl Marx—as a Jew! The first such use of anti-Semitism against Marx by Müller-Tellering appeared in 1850. The following year Müller-Tellering was an ecstatic supporter of the Cologne Communist trial in which the Prussian government was trying to establish a conspiracy against the state, organized by Marx. That erstwhile "progressive" Müller-Tellering, who just happened to be a racist, wrote: "The Jew hunt naturally increases the enthusiasm and interest."

Between 1853 and 1856 Marx wrote extensively for the *New York Daily Tribune* about the Crimean War. One of the many accomplishments of Eleanor Marx, daughter of Karl Marx—that extraordinary socialist, feminist, actress, translator, editor, trade union organizer, and fighter for the rights of the Jewish people—was that she, in collaboration with Edward Aveling, her philandering, reprobate husband, assembled many of the articles written by Marx for the *Tribune* in a book entitled *The Eastern Question*, published in London in 1897.

In his *Dissent* article, Henry Pachter points out that Marx "used anti-Semitic invective when it suited a propagandistic purpose. To discredit a loan that the hated Czar tried to place at the London stock exchange, he denounced the involvement of the Jewish bankers who expected to profit from the

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transaction." Pachter referred to two *Tribune* dispatches by Marx along those lines, "The Standing of the European Houses," November 9, 1855 and "The Loanmongers of Europe," November 22, 1885. The volume edited by Eleanor and Edward Aveling has two other articles about Jews—one entitled "The Russian Loan," the other "War Declared—Mussulman-Christian." The latter is distinctive because it is the only item in many thousands of articles, pamphlets, books, essays, and letters, written by Marx over a span of about 45 years, which contains some sympathetic comments about Jews. This extraordinary "statistic" is of passing interest for many obvious reasons—Marx was of Jewish descent; the first major essays he wrote were "On the Jewish Question"; he was attacked viciously as a Jew by Bakunin, Proudhon, and many others, both socialists and nonsocialists; furthermore, not until well into his later years did the Jews of Germany acquire formal civil rights; anti-Semitism was ubiquitous and anti-Jewish pogroms and riots took place on various occasions during his lifetime. In all that time there was just this small portion of a short, but fascinating, article on the Jews of Jerusalem written with compassion about Jews. (The contrast between Marx and his friend Heinrich Heine is striking. Although the poet also used anti-Jewish fleers on occasion, he spoke proudly of his Jewish origins and throughout his lifetime stood up in defense of Jews who were under attack.)

In his article on Jerusalem in the *Tribune* issue of April 15, 1854, Marx pointed out that the Jews comprised the majority of the permanent population of that city; about 8,000 inhabitants were Jews, some 4,000 were Muslims. Marx wrote:

> Nothing equals the misery and sufferings of the Jews at Jerusalem, inhabiting the most filthy quarter of the town, called hareth-el-yahoud, in the quarter of dirt between the Zion and the Moriah, where their synagogues are situated—the constant object of Mussulman oppression and intolerance, insulted by the Greeks, persecuted by the Latins, and living upon the scanty alms transmitted by their European brethren. . . .
>
> To make these Jews more miserable, England and Prussia appointed, in 1840, an Anglican bishop at Jerusalem, whose avowed object is their conversion. He was dreadfully thrashed in 1845, and sneered at alike by Jews, Christians and Turks. He may, in fact, be stated to have been the first and only cause of a union between all the religions at Jerusalem.

A stark contrast is offered by the other article, "The Russian Loan," which appeared as the Tribune's leader, or editorial, on January 4, 1856. It is viciously anti-Semitic and a question has been raised as to whether Marx was the author of the piece in its entirety. In their introduction to the volume the Avelings explain, "as to unsigned letters and leading articles, the exercise of careful investigation and discretion has been necessary." Though vouching for Marx's authorship of all the articles they include, the Avelings note: "In several cases where his correspondence has been turned into leaders, a few words of addition and interpolation have been written in by the American editors, to keep up journalistic appearances." Furthermore, the Marx-Engels Institute of Moscow did not include this article in either the *Gesamtausgabe* or the *Marx-Engels Werke*. However, Edmund Silberner, whose studies of the anti-Semitic tradition in modern socialism have become classics on the subject, quotes this article as the work of Marx. The subject of the editorial on the Russian loan was the Czar's effort to bolster his finances for the conduct of the Crimean War. In it we read: "Thus we find every tyrant backed by a Jew, as is every Pope by a Jesuit. In truth, the cravings of oppressors would be hopeless, and the practicability of war out of the question, if there were not an army of Jesuits to smother thought and a handful of Jews to ransack pockets."

Marx apparently conducted extensive research for this article to trace the Jewish bankers and brokers who participated in the sale of securities for the loan. The St. Petersburg House of Stieglitz is credited as the major operator in this endeavor and we are informed that

> Stieglitz . . . is a German Jew intimately

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connected with all his coreligionists in the loan-mongering trade, [and that he is] one of the free masonry of Jews, which has existed in all ages. . . . Here and there and everywhere that a little capital courts investment, there is one of these little Jews ready to make a little suggestion or place a little bit of a loan. The smartest highwayman in the Abruzzi is not better posted up about the locale of the hard cash in a traveller's valise or pocket than these Jews about any loose capital in the hands of a trader.

Particularly vivid is the description of the scene near the Amstel in Amsterdam where the House of Moses Montefiore is located:

> Crowds of these Jewish agents assemble there every day, together with numerous Jewish theologians and . . . all sorts and manner of Armenian, Jerusalem, Barbaresque, and Polish beggars, in long robes and oriental turbans. The language spoken smells strongly of Babel, and the perfume which otherwise pervades the place is by no means of a choice kind. Thus do these loans, which are a curse to the people, a ruin to the holders, and a danger to the governments, become a blessing to the houses of the children of Judah. This Jew organization of loan mongers is as dangerous to the people as the organization of landowners. Loan mongering Jews derive much of their strength from these family relations, as these, in addition to lucre affinities, give a compactness and unity to their operations which insure their success.

It seems highly probable that the *Tribune* editors altered and embellished Marx's original. But it also seems certain that Marx conducted research for this article and that in at least two other articles, indubitably written by him, he considered it proper to attack the villainy of the Russian loan and the Czar's regime on the basis of Jewish participation, along with respectable Christian bankers, in raising the loan. An odd aspect of the whole matter is that this book—*The Eastern Question*, by Karl Marx—has been in circulation for more than 80 years, and it is available at major libraries; yet, generations of Marx scholars have not bothered to pause, examine the article, and stigmatize this exercise in egregious racism.

After demonstrating how Marx "used anti-Semitic invective when it served a propagandistic purpose," Henry Pachter argues that "what matters is whether private sentiments are converted into racist philosophies." The question arises, at what point does private sentiment become converted into a racist philosophy? If Marx is the author of "The Russian Loan," in its entirety, the conversion is complete. But the authorship is in question. What is one to say, however, about how Marx characterized a Jewish target of opportunity in his work entitled *Herr Vogt*? Marx wrote every word of that book, and Engels thought it was "the finest polemical work Marx had ever written."

Herr Karl Vogt does not concern us here. But in this book Marx belabors the publisher of the London *Daily Telegraph*, and I quote from this at length because it seems to me that private sentiment has indeed been converted into a very public racist attitude. The paper's publisher was Joseph Moses Levy. Marx wrote:

> All London's toilets discharge their physical ordure into the Thames through an ingenious system of underground sewer pipes. In the same way, through a system of goose quills, the world metropolis daily spits all its social ordure into a big paper-made-central-sewer—the *Daily Telegraph*. . . . On the gate leading into the paper-made-central-sewer are inscribed the words . . . *hiç* . . . *quisquam faxit oletum* [here a stink is made] or, as Byron has translated into fine poetry: "Wanderer, stop and—piss!"
>
> The *Telegraph* a preacher of decency for female stage costumes! Holy Jupiter, what will happen next? . . . Decency! "I thank thee, Jew, for teaching me that word." *The Players* [a London theater journal] advises Levy, as Hamlet did Ophelia, to be gone to a monastery, and particularly a nunnery. . . . Levy in a nunnery! Perhaps nunnery is a misprint for *nonoria*. . . .
>
> Among the 22,000 Levis whom Moses counted in his march through the wilderness, there was not a single Levi who spelled it with a y. . . . Levy wants to be an Anglo-Saxon. Hence at least once a month he attacks the un-British policies of Disraeli. . . . But of what use is it for Levy to attack Mr. Disraeli. . . . so long as Mother Nature has inscribed, with the wildest black letters, his family tree in the middle of his face? The nose of the mysterious stranger of

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Slawkenbergius (see *Tristram Shandy*), who fetched himself the finest nose from the promontory of noses, was merely a week's talk in Strassbourg, whereas Levy's nose constitutes a year's talk in the City of London. . . . The great art of Levy's nose in reality consists of cozying up to foul odor, to smell it out hundreds of miles away and to bring it forth. Thus Levy's nose serves the *Daily Telegraph* as an elephant snout, insect palp, lighthouse, and telegraph. One can therefore say without exaggeration that Levy writes his newspaper with his nose." [Quoted from: Saul K. Padover, "The Baptism of Karl Marx's Family," *Midstream*, June/July 1978.]

I am entirely in agreement with Henry Pachter that history has suffered from "the virus of psychoanalysis," which "has invaded history departments," and that "peephole information is not historical explanation." We will never know what part carbuncles, his mother, or self-hatred played in fashioning the character and the attitudes of Karl Marx. But how can one resist speculation about psychological influences, since the family name of Karl Marx had been Levi, spelled with an "i" as it usually is in German?

We go backward in the life of Marx, to his essays "On the Jewish Question." They were written in 1843 when Marx was only twenty-five years old and, more important, had not yet fully developed his theory of historical materialism. George Lichtheim, in his valuable essay "Socialism and the Jews" (*Dissent*, July-August 1968), refers to these essays as part of Marx's "juvenilia," thus dismissing them; he also devotes scant attention to Marx's references and treatment of Jews when he was no longer a "juvenile." Lichtheim's essay is, in other respects, a most incisive dissection of the long history of "socialist anti-Semitism," with special reference to France. I am citing here the early essays "On the Jewish Question" with full knowledge that Marx rewrote them, in effect, in his work *The Holy Family*, and even though the early essays do not fully reflect the mature Marx and his full-grown theory of historical materialism. I do so because the early essays present conclusions about the Jews, Judaism, Jewish history that are reflected and built upon in all of his later life and work. That is why I began with the treatment of Jews in *Capital*.

It is significant that the young Marx, who had not yet completely set Hegel on his head, developed and reiterated in "On the Jewish Question" the stereotyped Jew, the Jew of haggling, usury, shady dealings in commerce and money, the same Jew that appears in *Capital* and even in more virulent form in *Herr Vogt*. The fully fashioned stereotype is set down in the second Marx essay, entitled, "Bruno Bauer: 'Die Fähigkeit der Heutigen Juden und Christen, Frei zu Werden.'" (The capacity of the present-day Jews and Christians to become free.) There we read:

> Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his religion, but let us seek the secret of the religion in the real Jew. What is the profane basis of Judaism? *Practical* need, *self-interest*. What is the worldly cult of the Jew? *Huckstering*. What is his worldly god? *Money*. Very well: then in emancipating itself from *huckstering* and *money*, and thus from real and practical Judaism, our age would emancipate itself. An organization of society which would abolish the preconditions and thus the very possibility of huckstering would make the Jew impossible. . . .
>
> We discern in Judaism, therefore, a universal *antisocial* element of the *present time*, whose historical development, zealously aided in its harmful aspects by the Jews, has not attained its culminating point, a point at which it must necessarily begin to disintegrate. In the final analysis, the *emancipation* of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism." [Marx's italics]

It is of more than passing interest that Marx's early writings have been cited as the source of the humanist Marx, the Marx who dissected the alienation bred by capitalism. T. D. Bottomore, editor and translator of Marx's early writings, including the essays "On the Jewish Question" from which I am quoting, ardently propounds this view. Curiously, he explains the stereotyping of Jews by Marx as a fault of the dictionary of that time. Bottomore notes that the German word *Judentum* [Judaism] "had in the

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language of the time, the secondary meaning of 'commerce' and in this and other passages Marx exploits the two senses of the word." Just like my North Carolina friend who thought "Jew" was a verb, not a noun. How this "exploitation" of the word *Judentum* by Marx contributes to the elimination of alienation and to the triumph of humanism, Bottomore does not tell us. But his translation is adequate, so we go on with Marx:

> Money is the jealous god of Israel, beside which no other god may exist. Money abases all the gods of mankind and changes them into commodities. Money is the universal and self-sufficient *value* of all things. . . . That which is contained in an abstract form in the Jewish religion—contempt for theory, for art, for history, and for man as an end in himself—is the real conscious standpoint and the virtue of the man of money. Even the species-relation itself, the relation between men and women, becomes an object of commerce. Woman is bartered away. . . . The tenacity of the Jew is to be explained, not by his religion but rather by the human basis of his religion—practical need and egoism. . . .

Having absorbed this analysis of the "Jewish Question" we are struck by the stern admonition of Erich Fromm, in his foreword to the book, that to designate this as anti-Semitism is "cold-war propaganda." Fromm explains that while Marx "in this paper . . . said some harsh (and in my opinion not always correct) words about what he thought was the Jewish religion, he said equally harsh words about the British shopkeepers, the German philosophers, and the Russians." Apart from the question whether racism applied to many nationalities is better than exclusive anti-Semitism, there is an astounding lack of symmetry that eludes Fromm. For it wasn't the Jews of medieval times who drove the British out of their island kingdom; nor did the Jews exterminate the Germans; and the Russians were not deprived of their language, their culture, their national existence by the Jews.

The least that can be said about Marx's version of Judaism and Jewish history is that it required no references or notes since it included no data and no empirical investigation. What it did, overwhelmingly, is to convey the stereotypes that have pursued the Jews throughout their history. Julius Carlebach, whose *Karl Marx and the Radical Critique of Judaism* (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978) is by far the best book on the subject, points out that Marx had the necessary personal experience of Jewish communal structure and knew of the stratifications that existed among the Jews. "His insistence on treating 'the Jews' as a uniform entity, therefore, seriously weakens the credibility of his analysis," Carlebach writes, with customary understatement. To people educated in the Marxist tradition, seekers after class analysis and adherents of solidarity, the lack of such attitudes toward the Jews by Marx raises a number of other questions. Not least of these is, Why is historical materialism inapplicable when dealing with the Jews? Not without irony, Carlebach suggests, "Perhaps the most original contribution of Marx in relation to the Jewish question was his attempt to convert flesh-and-blood people into a socioeconomic category." Carlebach cites Jean-Paul Sartre who had described as "lazy Marxism the attempt to turn real men into the symbols of its myths." And perhaps even energetic Marxists might reflect whether historical materialism at its least dogmatic may still be a generator of myths.

By way of contrast, the Jews of Prussia and of Europe come alive in Carlebach's book. We discover there were 4.5 million Jews in 1840 of which 3.95 million lived in Europe; there were 206,000 Jews in Prussia in 1843, out of a total population of 15 million. Nor were the nearly 4 million European Jews all moneylenders or loan-mongers. The great majority was terribly poor and almost all were victims of discrimination. In 1869 they won *de jure* civil rights in Prussia, not *de facto*. For the span of the lives of Marx and Engels, anti-Semitism was widespread, sometimes exploding in anti-Jewish riots. Those in Germany were called Hep Hep riots, taking their name from the cry of the youthful marchers against the Jews. Baptism became a road to "freedom" for some and at one point Prussian officials began to fret about the decline in Jewish taxation.

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Emigration was another way to escape discrimination; between 1840 and 1850, 35,000 German Jews came to America; by 1880 the number was a quarter of a million. Carlebach describes "the democratic tradition of Jewish communal life, manifested as it was in secret ballots for communal government, publicly financed education and social welfare and the use of the synagogue service as a forum for complaints and protests." One can read detailed descriptions of Jewish community life also in the work of the noted 19th-century German Jewish historian Heinrich Graetz. Marx met the latter and gave him copies of *Capital* and *The Civil War in France*, inscribed with an "expression of admiration and friendship." (One wonders whether Marx might have treated the Jews differently if he had read Graetz's 11-volume history.)

In 1840, a blood libel case against the Jews in distant Damascus shook up the civilized world. Marx's friends Moses Hess, who preceded Marx as a founder of German communism (and later was a pioneer of Zionism), and Heinrich Heine were deeply influenced by the Damascus affair. Graetz's massive *History of the Jews* has a vivid account of the Damascus events. The libel was concocted in the ancient tradition: Father Tomaso (Thomas), a superior of the Capuchin (Franciscan) order, and his servant disappeared. The cry was raised, "The Jews have murdered Tomaso and his servant in order to use their blood for the Passover celebration." Several Jews were seized and brought before the French consul Ratti-Menton, an unsavory Jew-hater. Ratti-Menton then turned them over to an even more ferocious foe of the Jews, Sherif Pasha, the governor of Damascus. Seven prominent Jews were "implicated" and tortured, but they refused to "confess." Thereupon more than 60 Jewish children were torn from their mothers, locked in a room and refused food, to make their mothers "confess." Christians and Moslems alike fed the fires with agitation against the Jews.

Protests against the Damascus affair spread through Germany, France, Italy, faraway America, and even Russia, as Jews of all persuasions joined in solidarity. Meanwhile, in March of that same year, a Jew in the town of Jülich in Rhenish Prussia was charged with ritual murder, in seeming imitation of the Damascus case, but the innocence of the accused was quickly established. The case in Damascus, however, dragged on. Moses Hess, in his book *Rome and Jerusalem*, written almost 20 years later, recalls the impact the Damascus blood libel had upon him while, at that time, his thoughts and activities centered on the organization of a proletarian-communist movement in Germany:

> Twenty years ago, when an absurd and false accusation against the Jews was imported into Europe from Damascus, it evoked in the hearts of the Jews a bitter feeling of agony. Then it dawned on me for the first time in the midst of my socialist activities that I belonged to my unfortunate, slandered, despised and dispersed people. And already then, though I was greatly estranged from Judaism, I wanted to express my Jewish patriotic sentiment in a cry of anguish, but it was unfortunately stifled in my heart by a greater pain, which the suffering of the European proletariat evoked in me.

Marx at 22 was not yet a socialist and the greater pain that Hess felt because of the suffering of the proletariat was not yet a problem for Marx. How then did he react to the Damascus blood libel and its importation into Prussia? He couldn't help but be aware of it, because the European newspapers were filled with it. But unlike his friends—Heine and Hess—Marx left no evidence of any reaction except for what Carlebach calls a "Freudian slip." Here's how it happened. Two prominent European Jews, Moses Montefiore of England and Adolphe Crémieux of France went on a widely publicized mission to Cairo and Damascus seeking release of the captive Jews. The trip was financed by Jewish communities all over the world. Protests rose to a crescendo and the Damascus victims finally won their freedom, that is, those who had not died under torture.

Meanwhile, in December of the same year,

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1840, there was a debate in the French Chamber of Deputies on the question of Sabbath laws. Among the participants was a prominent French politician, who happened to be Jewish, Benoit Fould. Writing nearly four years later about that debate, Marx says in his book, *The Holy Family: Or Critique of Critical Criticism*: "Monsieur Crémieux declared on behalf of the French Jews." But Crémieux was not even a member of the Chamber at the time; he was completing a triumphal tour of Europe following his success in Damascus. The headlines and stories in the press were about Crémieux and the Damascus blood libel case. Marx unwittingly substituted Crémieux's name for Fould's, in what was evidently a Freudian slip.

Heinrich Heine cried out against the Damascus blood libel. Radical as he was, supportive of the early socialist movement, and even though he was a convert to Christianity, he was critical of Marx and others for failing to come to the support of persecuted Jews and also for their distortions of Jewish history and Judaism. Carlebach points out that Heine, in his *Confessions* written in 1854, criticized Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, and "his obdurate friend" Marx for their misconceived analyses of Judaism. Heine criticized them for diverting their hatred of the rich into hatred of the Jews, pointing to some obvious facts of history, that the Jews "were excluded from all ownership of land and from all manual trades, being relegated to trading and finance, activities which the church spurned as too low for true believers." Much of what Heine was writing would seem to be more in consonance with socialist attitudes than the stereotyping of Jews as capitalists and Judaism as the religion of the huckster and money-monger.

Most of Marx's biographers have been overwhelmed by their subject. The "classical" Marx biography is Franz Mehring's *Karl Marx: The Story of His Life*, first published in 1918 (I use here the English translation, London: Allen & Unwin, 1936). Mehring has little difficulty with Marx and the Jewish problem because Marx's views on the subject are congenial to him. Most revealing in this respect is Mehring's interpretation of the reasons for the conversion of Marx's father Heinrich to Christianity. The actual reason is clearly outlined by the historical record. At the time of Marx's birth his father was counsellor-at-law to the high court of appeal in Trier. Heinrich Marx also practiced in the Trier county court and held the title of *Justizrat*—positions he could only have held by renouncing Judaism. "Marx was forced to change his religion to avoid becoming, as von Sethe put it, 'breadless.'" The von Sethe here was president of the Provincial Supreme Court, and all this is meticulously documented in David McLelland's *Karl Marx: His Life and Thought* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973).

Mehring, however, argues that at that time, "the renunciation of Judaism was not merely an act of religious emancipation but also, and even more so, an act of social emancipation." According to Mehring the Jewish community had taken "no part whatsoever in the great intellectual labours of the German thinkers and poets." He adds that the only Jews who could make contributions, like Eduard Gans and Heinrich Heine, were those who became Christians. Warming to the theme, Mehring writes that

> for many a decade the adoption of Christianity was an act of civilized progress for the freer spirits of Judaism. . . . The breaking up of estates and farms by Jewish usurers took place on a growing scale during the agricultural crisis in the twenties and as a result it produced a violent wave of anti-Semitism in the Rhineland. . . . There can be no doubt that Heinrich Marx had attained that humanistic culture which freed him entirely from all Jewish prejudices, and he handed on this freedom to his son Karl as a valuable heritage.

Mehring enters the discussion of Marx's essays "On the Jewish Question" with obvious relish. "The Jews were delighted," he writes, "when enlightened criticism took the Christian religion to task, for they themselves always cursed it, but when the same criticism turned its attention to the Jewish religion they

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howled aloud as though humanity were being betrayed." Mehring applauds Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, and other Young Hegelian critics of the Jews, but he finds the ultimate in Marx's dramatic questions and answers proving that money is the god of the Jews. Mehring concludes that Marx "showed the development of Judaism not in religious theory, but in industrial and commercial practice, which found a fantastic reflection in the Jewish religion."

Before becoming a Marxist, when Mehring was simply a humanitarian, he fought against anti-Semitism. After he donned the armor of historical materialism, he enthusiastically adopted anti-Semitic attitudes and arguments. The leading German anti-Semitic agitator in the last decade of Marx's life was Adolf Stöcker. The pre-Marxist Mehring assailed Stöcker mercilessly, pointing out how "this miserable demagogue" poisoned and inflamed "our public life." The reborn Mehring, the Marxist, writing in the *Neue Zeit* in 1892, turns 180 degrees and attacks the "campaign of vilification" against Stöcker. Admitting that Stöcker often asserted and then retracted statements, Mehring writes: "It was this aspect of his character that was exploited to the utmost by the hired scribblers of moneyed Jewry to present Stöcker as a scarecrow of untruthfulness."

There was calculated method to the tactic of supporting anti-Semitic agitation, as Mehring explains in his *Neue Zeit* article:

> He [Stöcker] reveals one more flash of his proletarian origins when he proclaims Social Democracy the true heir of the Anti-Semitic agitation. The *Kölnische Zeitung* sees in this a "curious agreement" between Herr Stocker and the *Neue Zeit*. Why curious? A bad conscience is a powerful pair of glasses through which even Herr Stöcker may come to see what we have long since recognized in the light of socialist knowledge.

In a recent biography (Princeton University Press, 1978), *Marx's Fate: Shape of a Life*, Jerrold Seigel writes:

> Toward Jews and Jewishness Marx always retained many positive ties. Among his closest friends were the Jews Heinrich Heine and Ludwig Kugelman; for a time he was close to Moses Hess, and he helped the former Cologne communist Abraham Jacoby emigrate to America (where he became an influential physician). Moreover, Marx was recognized as a Jew. His dark complexion and his physical appearance, recognized in the nickname Moor, were often described as Jewish. . . .

True, Marx had many Jewish acquaintances; it's hard to conceive of socialist movements without Jews, and Marx would have been hard put to avoid them. But the claim that Marx retained many positive ties to Jews and "Jewishness" is extraordinary; not true if the *Gesamtausgabe* or the *Werke* is any guide. The most curious aspect of this defense of Marx's attitude is the assertion that Marx found a unique way of proclaiming his Jewish identity—by his dark complexion and his physical appearance! Marx was attacked throughout his life for being a Jew by socialists and antisocialists alike, but never once, publicly or privately, did he proclaim, admit, state, defend, or just refer to himself as a Jew. Only once, as a young man, by the signing of one petition supporting civil rights for the Jews of Cologne, did he ever remonstrate with the anti-Semites all around him. As for his dark complexion and physical appearance, surely his genes, not his mind, should get the credit. This very aspect of Marx's life and work is pointed up by his daughter Eleanor who declared publicly that she was the only member of the Marx family who said she was Jewish. (And by orthodox criteria she wasn't Jewish because her mother was gentile.)

In the second volume of Yvonne Kapp's excellent biography, *Eleanor Marx* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), there is fascinating data illustrating the pride with which Eleanor Marx proclaimed that she was Jewish. She was an active organizer of Jewish workers in London's East End and she learned Yiddish, the better to spread the message of unionism and socialism among the Jewish workers. In the Kapp book we read:

> "I am a Jewess," announced Eleanor Marx at the time of the Dreyfus affair, undoing in four

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words her paternal grandfather's year of cogitation and eventual baptism. It is already known that she told Max Beer she was the only member of her family to be "drawn to the Jewish people. . . ."

Eleanor told a Russian friend, Zinaida Vengerova: "My latest linguistic acquisition is Yiddish," in order to spread the socialist message among the immigrant Jews from Eastern Europe. "Besides, the Jewish language is akin to my blood," she told her Russian friend.

Eleanor was closely associated with an outstanding Jewish socialist leader, Morris Vinchevsky, who had emigrated to London in 1879. In August 1893, they traveled together to the international labor congress in Zurich. At the congress Vinchevsky told Eleanor he was having difficulty conveying information to the delegates, that he was there representing a number of unions whose members were Jewish. Vinchevsky later reported:

> You know what, Vinchevsky," Eleanor said to me, "you write down what you have just told me, the names of your unions and the number of workers, and as translator I will somehow smuggle this into the congress." An hour later, at the congress session, she announced in three languages (German, French, and English) that real Jewish workers, organized in eight different unions, had their representative present. . . . This information was received with tumultuous applause. Eleanor's face was radiant with pride.

In his valuable research, Edmund Silberner disclosed that late in his life Friedrich Engels, then working closely with the Avelings, departed from the shibboleths of Jews as money men, hucksters, and capitalists. He went further, and delivered a slashing attack against anti-Semitism. Writing on April 19, 1890 to someone who felt, as Mehring did, that anti-Semitism could be turned into anticapitalism, Engels argued:

> . . . However, I must ask you to consider whether you will not do more harm than good through anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism is a characteristic feature of a backward culture and can be found therefore only in Prussia, Austria, and Russia. . . . In Prussia it is the low nobility, the *Junkers*, who earn 10,000 marks and spend 20,000 and therefore fall prey to the usurers, who go in for anti-Semitism; and in Prussia and Austria it is the petty bourgeois, doomed to extinction by the competition of big capital, the craftsman and small businessman, who join the chorus. However, insofar as capital ruins *these* classes of society, which are reactionary through and through, it fulfills its mission and is useful, whether it be Semitic or Aryan, circumsized or baptized; it helps the backward Prussians and Austrians advance to the modern point of view where all old social differentiations dissolve in the one great conflict between capitalists and workers. . . .
>
> In all North America with its millionaires whose wealth can be hardly expressed in our shabby marks, florins or francs, there is *not a single Jew* among those millionaires, and the Rothschilds are real beggars compared to those Americans. And even here in England Rothschild is a man of modest means compared, for instance with the Duke of Westminister. Even on the Rhine, where, 95 years ago, with the assistance of the French we chased the aristocrats out of the country and have created a modern industry, where are the Jews?
>
> Thus, anti-Semitism is nothing but a reactionary movement of decaying, medieval, social groups against modern society, which is essentially composed of capitalists and workers, and therefore anti-Semitism serves only reactionary purposes underneath its socialistic disguise; it is a variety of feudal socialism, from which we must stay away. If it can thrive at all in a country it is only proof that not enough capitalism exists in that country. Today capitalism and labor are inseparable. As capitalism grows stronger so does labor. Therefore, I wish us Germans—and I count the Viennese among them—a rapid development of capitalism, and certainly not its stagnation.
>
> Moreover, anti-Semitism distorts the entire picture. The anti-Semites do not even know the Jews against whom they howl; otherwise they would know that here in England and in America—thanks to the anti-Semites from Eastern Europe—and in Turkey—thanks to the Spanish Inquisition—there are thousands and thousands of *Jewish proletarians*; and as a matter of fact, these Jewish workers are the most exploited and the most miserable ones. Here in England we have had *three* strikes of Jewish workers during the last twelve months,

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and then we are supposed to practice anti-Semitism in the struggle against capital?

In addition, we owe a great deal to Jews. Not to mention Heine and Borne, Marx was of purely Jewish origin; Lassalle was a Jew. Many of our best people are Jews. My friend Victor Adler, who is now paying in a prison in Vienna for his devotion to the cause of the proletariat; Eduard Bernstein, the editor of the London *Sozialdemokrat*; Paul Singer, one of our best men in the Reichstag—people of whose friendship I am proud, and all of them Jews! I myself was made a Jew by the [conservative weekly] *Gartenlaube*. To be sure, if I had to choose, then rather a Jew than *Herr von*! . . .

—*Friedrich Engels*

Nothing in the recorded utterances of Karl Marx resembles this letter in philosophy, style, or political uses, in regard to his analysis of Jews, Judaism, and the Jewish question. The contrast between this statement by Engels and everything written by Marx on the subject is accentuated by an almost plaintive effort to equate Marx's position on the Jews with that of Engels (in later years). The attempt is made in the biography *Karl Marx: Man and Fighter*, by Boris Nicolaevsky and Otto Maenchen-Helfen (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976). Expressing annoyance that various authors have taken an interest in Marx's antecedents and the contents of his writings about Jews and Judaism, the authors write, in an appendix, that the "core of the problem" is expressed in Engels's statement quoted above. This, of course, *is* the real core of the matter, and nothing written by Marx even approximates what Engels wrote here. Sadly, all evidence is to the contrary.

In the summation of his article, *Marx and the Jews*, Pachter writes: "The anti-Semitism that Marx knew in the middle of the last century was largely social; it was not yet an organized political force with a philosophy and program. These exist only since the Dreyfus Affair and have taken their toll in this century." Any sourcebook on the subject informs us of organized, political, ideological anti-Semitism during the last ten years of Marx's life. My favorite edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, the 11th, published in 1911, designates 1873 as the key turning point in Germany toward just that type of organized political anti-Semitism.

Here we can read that for a time "the voice of the old Jew hatred [was] shamed into silence in much of western Europe, though it was being heard all too loud and clear in Russia and Rumania and in the medieval ambiance of northern Africa and Persia. . . . The signal for change came in 1873." That year William Marr, who had written an anti-Semitic tract, *Judenspiegel* ("Jew's Mirror") in 1862, and who later coined the phrase anti-Semitism, wrote *Der Sieg des Judentums Über das Germanentum* ("The Victory of Judaism over Germanism"). Marr proclaimed the "new anti-Semitism" whose emphasis was ideological, the financial role of the Jews. His book fell on fruitful soil, says the *Britanniça*, for 1873 was a year of financial scandals. Elements such as the Jews who "could not be reduced to the national type should be eliminated," Marr wrote. The political emphasis of this anti-Semitism is noted by the encyclopedia because "it was . . . in the passions of party politics that the new crusade found its chief source of vitality." Furthermore, the clericals, smarting under the blows of the *Kulturkampf*, "joined eagerly in the new cry." Ironically, the sharpest exposé of the financial scandals of the 1870s was conducted by the Liberal political leader Edward Lasker, a Jew.

In 1879, four years before Marx's death, the anti-Semitic hysteria "spread with sudden fury over the whole of Germany," the encyclopedia records. And it suggests, "It is impossible to doubt, however, that the secret springs of the new agitation were more or less directly supplied by Prince Bismarck himself." This followed the split between the Chancellor and the Liberals, among whom were many German-Jewish figures. It was then, too, that the German historian Heinrich von Treitschke "gave the sanction of his great name to the [anti-Semitic] movement." In 1879, the Anti-Semitic League was founded in Berlin and Dresden.

The leader of the political anti-Semitic agitation was Adolf Stöcker, whose "philosophical" thrusts were all too familiar. At political rallies the theme of his oratory

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was that "the Jewish spirit of Mammon corrupts our nation."

It has been widely noted that an outstanding weakness of the analysis of the political scene of Europe and elsewhere fashioned by Marx and Engels was their failure to fully apprehend the role of nations, the growth of nationalism and national liberation movements, including the problem of a "potential" Jewish nation.

In his article on socialism and the Jews, George Lichtheim goes beyond historical dissection of how the anti-Semitic strain grew and flourished within the socialist movement (*Dissent*, July-August 1968). This strain was so strong, as Lichtheim points out, that it took four years after the Dreyfus case had startled the world for the French socialists to decide to oppose the frameup. And when they did, it was "only to the extent of declaring that the Jewish aspect of the *Affaire* was irrelevant." Lichtheim goes on to describe an important development that helped offset, in more recent times, the anti-Semitic strain in the socialist movement:

> . . . the revelations that the Jews—or some Jews—were after all capable of founding a state, and even of defending themselves unaided or practically unaided; . . . the discovery by Frenchmen of the Right and the Left that the longed for fusion of patriotism with socialism had actually been effected in, of all places, Israel.

It is timely to recall, in this connection, the extraordinary prescience of Moses Hess—not only the founder of the German communist movement, but also the precursor of Zionism. Hess wrote in 1862:

> . . . if Germany were to conquer France and Italy . . . it would result in placing the entire German people under police law and in depriving the Jews of their civil rights. [Hess went further:] With the Jews, more than with other nations, which, though oppressed, yet live on their own soil, all political and social progress must necessarily be preceded by national independence. A common, native soil is a primary condition, if there [are] to be introduced among Jews better and more progressive relations between capital and labour. . . .

Hess suggested the establishment of the Jewish state "in the land of the Fathers." His predictions stand up rather well, compared with those of that famous Manifesto of 1848.

A comment on this article by Henry Pachter will appear in our next issue. — EDS. □

The Piracy of *Telos*

> Across the seas pirates once did roam,
> Now they study Marxist tomes at home,
> Filching foreign articles for *Telos*,
> Chortling, "Watcha gonna do about it, fellas?"

Telos is a quarterly published in St. Louis and devoted to the more scholastic departments of left-wing thought. At least in part it survives through the pirating of articles from European journals.

Some time back we asked the French writer Claude Lanzman for permission to reprint from the journal *Les Temps Modernes* an article he had written on the Holocaust. Both author and journal granted permission. Next thing, we saw the article in *Telos*—without permission. We wrote to *Telos* in protest; no answer came.

A few months ago, just before his death, Jean-Paul Sartre gave a lengthy interview that appeared in the French weekly *Le Nouvel Observateur*. One of our editors, in Paris at the time, made a written agreement with *Le Nouvel Observateur* granting *Dissent* permission to translate and reprint; Sartre, on his deathbed, approved; a fee was agreed upon and paid. As the fall 1980 *Dissent* came out with our translation of this interview, we found another translation of the Sartre interview in *Telos*—again, without permission.

This time we refuse to tolerate such piracy. We have written *Telos* that it has violated copyright; we have been in touch with *Le Nouvel Observateur* regarding further steps; and we have turned the case over to our attorney. The rights of authors and magazines must be protected.

Meanwhile, we would advise editors of intellectual journals in the United States: If you are planning to translate and reprint something from a European journal, after gaining permission in the customary ways, perhaps you had better check first with *Telos* (Box 3111, St. Louis, Missouri, 63130, no phone number listed). Ask for the editor in charge of piracy.

— I. H.

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Albert O. Hirschman

The Welfare State in Trouble

Systemic Crisis or Growing Pains?

We all know about persons who are *complacent*: they gloss over an important flaw in the functioning of something—a human body, a marriage, an economic policy, or a society—and try hard to convince themselves and others that nothing is really wrong. If they advocate any action, once the symptoms of trouble can no longer be ignored, they, typically, will prescribe aspirin when radical surgery is required. What about a term for the opposite fault—that is, a term that would designate a person who forever diagnoses fundamental disorder and prescribes radical cures when the difficulty at hand may well take care of itself in time or only calls for mild intervention? I propose, for want of a more compact term, the "structuralist (or fundamentalist) fallacy," since those who are affected by this trait always speak of structural problems and the need for fundamental remedies.

Economists have long arrayed themselves into the two camps that are implicit in the two opposite faults just noted: those who are convinced that every departure from equilibrium is likely to be temporary and requires only a bit of clever management (if anything) have long been battling it out with those who are just as certain that such a departure signals a deep malady and perhaps the final crisis of the system. Naturally enough, the former turn out, from time to time, to be complacent, while the latter will on occasion be found to commit the structuralist fallacy. Being rather bored by both ideological camps, I tend to shift from one to the other depending on whom I am talking to. Given the complexity and ambiguity of the real world, a useful function may actually be served by such contrary behavior as I now hope to show by looking at the so-called "crisis of the welfare state."

That the welfare state is in trouble can hardly be contested. Considerable difficulties now are experienced in the West in extending or even maintaining the social accomplishments of recent decades. Hostility toward some of the services provided is widespread, even among the beneficiaries. A political reaction has already ocurred in some of the countries (Sweden, the United Kingdom) that have gone farthest along the welfare-state road. In the United States, Proposition 13 and assorted phenomena have generally come under the label of "tax revolt." To an important extent, this revolt is not a purely self-serving act on the part of the taxpayer but arises from a growing lack of confidence in the state's abilities to "solve" social problems. This lack of confidence can in turn be traced to recent experiences in social engineering (for example, the War on Poverty) and to their alleged failure.

A number of explanations are being offered for the difficulties the welfare state is running into, and most of them are of the structuralist kind. Long ago, Colin Clark alleged that in the nature of the capitalist system a fairly rigid limit was set on the ability to divert factor income for purposes of expanding social services and other public expenditures: the system would stop working (that is, capitalists would no longer invest, workers' productivity would fall off, and so on) if that level were exceeded. The system's inability to stand more than a certain level of transfer payments was thereby declared to be one of its structural properties. Widely espoused at first by conservatives, this structuralist thesis was given a Marxist tinge in James O'Connor's book *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*, which explained this crisis in terms of the underlying clash between two basic functions of the capitalist state—that is, between the need to assure continuing capital accumulation, on the

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one hand, and the imperatives of legitimation through some redistribution of income, on the other.

Subsequently, Jürgen Habermas worked the O'Connor thesis into a more general argument in his book *Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus* (published in English under the escalated title *Legitimation Crisis*). From there the argument passed back to the conservative or neoconservative camp, which stirred up, in the mid-1970s, a considerable debate around issues of "governability of the democracies" and "governmental overload." Once again, the absolute and relative expansion of public expenditures for health, education, and welfare, termed the "welfare shift" by Samuel Huntington, was viewed as an important ingredient of a widely proclaimed "crisis of democracy" (see Michel Crozier et al.).

A very different explanation why the welfare state is in disrepute if not in crisis is implicit in the argument of the late Fred Hirsch in his book *The Social Limits to Growth*. According to this work, the difficulty about increasing social spending beyond a certain point does not originate only among those who are made to pay for it; to an important extent, it arises from the unhappiness of those whom the spending was supposed to benefit. The reasoning is based on the concept of "positional goods," which are desired less for their own sake than for the social rank and distinction they are expected to confer. Recently governments have been getting into the business of supplying such goods on a mass basis. In education, for example, certain diplomas have become more widely available, but for that reason their possession no longer leads to a better paying job or higher social position. As a result, the recipients of the publicly provided services are likely to be disgruntled and cannot be counted on to support the expansion of public spending and social services.

Once again we have here an argument of a structural kind. It is now the frustration of its very clients that explains the crisis of the welfare state, whereas the earlier conservative and neo-Marxist theories stressed the adverse reactions of the suppliers of investment capital. Both arguments see the expansion of the welfare state as creating a contradiction with basic characteristics of economy and society: the ensuing crisis is of a "fundamental" nature and requires "radical" remedies, if it can be solved at all.

I SHALL NOW SUGGEST an alternative explanation. Like the Fred Hirsch thesis, it concentrates on the experience of those to whom the new government-supplied goods and services are made available. But their disgruntled reaction is not necessarily a consequence of disappointment over the inability of these goods to satisfy their social ambitions. It can be argued more simply that a rapid expansion of the supply of certain goods and services is likely to bring with it a *deterioration in their quality* in relation to expectations, and that this quality decline produces disaffection with the performance of the public sector. If this argument has merit, the problem is not all that fundamental, for the quality decline may well be temporary.

The idea that an expansion in output will be detrimental to product quality is a priori plausible, but has not, as far as I know, been subjected to a great deal of economic analysis, in contrast to the enormous attention that has been lavished on the effect of increasing output on unit cost. It is the old story of the neglect of the qualitative. An obviously interesting question is: when will an expansion of output caused by increasing demand be accompanied by a significant decline in quality? In line with this question one might define an *output elasticity of quality* that would measure the response of quality to an increase in output within some stated time interval. Like the price elasticity of demand, this elasticity would normally have a negative sign with a limit of zero for those goods whose quality is totally unaffected by output increase. The output elasticity of quality is likely to be strongly related to the substitutability of inputs. If all input coefficients are rigidly fixed, an identical article, be it an umbrella or an airplane, is always being produced, and quality cannot deteriorate as output is expanded. The possibility of deterioration opens up when one input or factor can be substituted for another. The smooth isoquant of the textbook is of course drawn on the assumption that an increase in the use of one factor makes up *totally*, insofar as quality of the product is concerned, for the decreased use (in relative terms) of another. It actually happens all the time that some factor or input substitution that is carried out to satisfy an expanding demand (one factor or input being inelastic supply) results in a product that is not up to the traditional standards. Factor and input substitutability thus open the door to quality deterioration, where as fixed coefficients make for invariant quality. Since substitutability is the rule in the world of neoclassical economics, it may be surprising that changes in the quality of output have not been given more attention. The reason is another pervasive assumption—that is, perfect information or instant learning in a competitive market on the part of consumers who

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immediately adjust their demand upon being faced with an inferior product and enforce an appropriate relative price reduction for it.

In the real world, of course, input shifts and the resulting quality deterioration are often combined with noncompetitive markets, consumers' ignorance, and slow learning about the changed characteristics of the product. It is my contention that this combination of circumstances is precisely characteristic of certain social services whose expansion in response to widespread demands has been considerable in recent decades.

Education is a pertinent example. On the production side, this "article" has a particularly high tolerance for quality decline and low-level performance, as expanded educational services can be and often are offered in spite of various unresolved bottlenecks—that is, with unprepared teachers, impossibly crowded classrooms, inadequate library and laboratory facilities, and so on. Educational services are in fact an extreme illustration of the possibility of quality decline that originates in a lopsided increase in inputs: it would be quite unthinkable to market similarly defective refrigerators or airplane services.

The latitude for quality decline is also related to the demand or consumption side. Consumers are poorly informed about the quality of the expanded services of an educational system, and they have few alternatives to choose from. Nevertheless, if the newly offered services are defective, the result will eventually be widespread disappointment and discontent. The damage inflicted by having received a poor education is not easily undone: unlike apples, education is not bought recurrently in small quantities. The result is a kind of disappointment that cannot easily be extinguished by doing the right thing next time in the market and therefore will lead a life of its own—with some possibly serious social and political consequences.

The welfare state may thus face a wave of hostile public opinion and as a result may well pass through a difficult phase, with the need for consolidation and even retrenchment. However, if the reasons suggested here for the change in the climate of opinion are correct, the trouble could be temporary. The loss of popularity is connected with the decline in quality, which in turn is caused by such temporary factors as the rapid increase in supply. Once the new services can count on an adequately expanded base of inputs, the quality decline, which is here seen as the basis for public disenchantment with the welfare state, should be duly reversed and the social advances consolidated in fact as well as in public opinion. Over the long term, in other words, our output elasticity of quality is likely to be closer to zero than over the short term.

This "nonfundamental" diagnosis of the present difficulties of the welfare state is reinforced by some further observations. In the first place, when certain social services, such as education are expanded so as to cater to newly emerging groups, it may not be appropriate to offer exactly the same services as have previously been supplied to the traditional "educated class." Hence, even without quality decline and precisely because there has been no change or adaptation, the services might be ineffective and meet with criticism and resistance. Again a period of learning and mutual adjustment will be needed.

Second, there has been a tendency in recent years for the demand for certain services to arise before anyone had the real knowledge how to satisfy it; examples are day-care facilities and psychotherapeutic services. What happens in these situations is that suppliers only begin to learn on the job, in the process of rendering these newly popular services as best they can. A great deal has been written by Kenneth Arrow, George Akerlof, and others about consumer ignorance and the resulting asymmetrical situation of consumer and producer. In the present case, producers and suppliers of services are just as ignorant as consumers, at least during the earlier stages of their operation, and this accounts for the poor quality of services rendered and for the consequent disappointment of the consumer. Here, also, a learning process will take place, eventually leading to better-quality service and to more correct consumer expectations.

IN SUM, the difficulties of the welfare state can be interpreted, in part at least, as growing pains rather than as signs of systemic crisis.

To conclude, I wish to raise a question in the sociology of knowledge: why have the various conceivable nonstructural arguments not been coherently put forward so far, with the result that we could only choose between various kinds of structuralist explanations? The reason, I think, lies in a rather odd ideological asymmetry. In explaining it briefly, I return to my introductory remarks on structuralist vs. nonstructuralist approaches to problem-solving. Structuralist thinking about a problem or crisis comes easily to those who dislike the institution that experiences the problem or finds itself in crisis. For example, right-wing and conservative people dislike the welfare state and oppose its expansion: they are naturally prone to interpret any difficulties it encounters as symp-

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toms of a deep-seated malady and as signals that radical retrenchment is in order. For similar reasons, left-wing and liberal opinion has traditionally opted for structuralist explanations when it came to account for difficulties experienced by capitalism. But with the debate about capitalism and the market economy having stood in the center of public discussion for so long, this tradition appears to have created on the left something of an unthinking *structuralist reflex*: left-liberal people are automatically partial to structuralist explanations, even though ideological self-interest ought to make them diagnose some difficulties—those that affect structures they themselves have promoted—as self-correcting or temporary. As a result of this strange ideological trap into which the left has been falling, there has been a marked lack of balance in the analysis of the current difficulties of the welfare state.

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Jean L. Cohen

The Legacy of Herbert Marcuse

Throughout his life, Herbert Marcuse endeavored to develop a theoretical analysis of the dynamics of contemporary capitalist society that would have practical relevance as well as explanatory value. Indeed, he was not entirely unsuccessful in this regard. The mutual attraction, in the 1960s, between politically active radicals searching for the means to comprehend their society and Marcuse's penetrating analyses of the structure, ideology, and dangers of late capitalism created a powerful synthesis that gave the New Left many of its distinguishing characteristics. Now that Marcuse has died, it is well worth the effort to take another look at what he wrote, and to ask: in what way does Marcuse's mode of theorizing remain pertinent to the analysis of American society by a left that intends to be both democratic and socialist?

The theory of one-dimensional society is the core of Marcuse's work. But Marcuse's peculiar combination of a Marxist orthodoxy with an unfortunate reading of Weber's concept of rationalization produces a version of neo-Marxism that, although initially attractive, is no longer fruitful. The theory of one-dimensional society postulates the emergence of an authoritarian technological rationality that has freed itself from the particular interests of capital and has become a political force capable of suppressing social contradictions, critical discourse, and radical needs. It corresponds to the idea that the successes of the mixed economy of the welfare state have resulted in a "happy consciousness" (material satisfaction without freedom), a series of "repressive desublimations" (permissiveness without satisfaction), and the dissolution of the boundaries between the private, the public, and the social, which were once the crucial loci of critical consciousness. This is unpalatable to many Marxists. So is the convergence theory and technocracy thesis (similar to those of Galbraith and Bell) implicit in the analysis of advanced industrial society in *Soviet Marxism* and *One-Dimensional Man*. To be sure, Marcuse's personal discomfort with the current state of affairs distinguished his work from all apologies for either late capitalist or state socialist societies. But his insistence that all the conditions necessary for emancipation are somehow all there (in both West and East), the stance of "the Great Refusal," remained only an abstract utopian promise unrelated to any identifiable dynamics of the societies in question.

The typical Marxist critique of Marcuse's one-dimensionality thesis has concerned itself with arguing either, (a) that he overestimated the abilities of American capitalism to smooth over contradictions or, (b) that he underestimated the radical potential of the American working class. There is a half-truth in both assertions. Certainly, American capitalism is beset with significant contradictions and conflicts. But these critics miss the mark, to the extent that Marcuse's theory of one-dimensionality must be seen precisely as a *response*

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both to the "failure" of the proletariat to accomplish the mission appointed to it by Marxism, and to the undeniable continuing success of capitalism in reproducing itself. It is futile to find refuge from the cul-de-sac of "Marcusianism" in a revived orthodox Marxism. Perhaps it would be more fruitful for the left to question both in terms of their interrelation rather than their opposition.

I INTEND TO SHOW, indeed, that there is a connection between Marcuse's seemingly romantic critique of industrialism (albeit a future-directed one) and Marxism. The orthodox Marxist premises underlying Marcuse's vision and, in part, accounting for its failure, or limits, are the following:

1. *The Class Theory.* The bourgeoisie and the proletariat remain the fundamental classes of modern society for Marcuse, although the bourgeoisie loses its preeminent control of the economy and the state to the "technostructure" (Galbraith's term), while the proletariat cannot carry out its revolutionary mission because its class consciousness is blocked by mass culture. Thus, rather than questioning the premises of the class theory, Marcuse preferred to blame a derailed history for the failure of the Marxist project in the West.

2. *The Theory of Revolution.* To Marcuse, the proletariat *was* the revolutionary class par excellence, because it embodied the absolute negation of bourgeois society. Its total misery, alienation, and exclusion from society pointed toward the radical revolution demanded by Marxist theory. Once Marcuse realized that the working class was integrated into society and into the political (electoral) system, he searched for a substitute able to spark a proletariat gone "reformist." His turn to the underclass—blacks, students, women, the Third World, and so forth—and his effort to derive radical needs from psychological and anthropological (instead of economic) factors was consistent with a theory of revolution that requires a revolutionary subject to represent a complete refusal of capitalist society and a radically new mode of being. I would say that the most significant, new, non-Marxist element here—Marcuse's ability to positively validate the needs of non-working-class strata and to recognize their potential—is vitiated by his retention of the notion of a unified, revolutionary subject.

3. *The Primacy of Labor and the Economy.* One could argue that from the beginning, and without change, the entire thrust of Marcuse's antipathy toward capitalism sprang from his emphasis on the concept of labor and the critique of alienated labor. This provides the key to his attack on both Soviet Marxism and Western capitalism. It also explains his affinity with one version of Marx's own model of communism: the model of the *Grundrisse*, according to which automation abolishes the need for alienated labor, and in which freedom is conceived in the nonpolitical terms of the extension of free time. Marcuse's idea of happiness as a free play of faculties, reconciliation of man with nature, subject with object—to the exclusion of a concern with institutional forms and *political* freedom—derives from his concept of alienated labor. Insofar as alienated labor is the crucial issue, political alienation and political domination seem to be derivative phenomena.

4. *The Critique of Civil Society.* What is most fateful in the continuity between Marx and Marcuse is their dislike of the institutions of modern civil society and their reduction of these institutions to mere bourgeois culture and capitalist relations. To be sure, from the standpoint of administered mass democracy, Marcuse displayed a preference for an often idealized model of liberal capitalism, with its intact private sphere, family form, individuality, and autonomous culture. He concurred with Marx in embracing the underlying universalistic values of modernity (freedom, equality, and so forth). However, like Marx, he tended to dismiss liberal political and economic institutions as mere bourgeois ideology—as structures that prevented the full realization of these values for everyone. Marcuse even spoke of liberal tolerance as repressive, and (like Horkheimer and Adorno) located the seeds of fascism and the one-dimensional universe in liberal capitalist civil society, and in the dialectic of "instrumental reason" it fostered.

To this orthodox Marxist view of modernity, Marcuse added Weber's notion of the "iron cage":

> . . . the modern economic order . . . is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which today determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force . . . of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: "Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart, this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved."[1]

Weber's concept of rationalization and bureaucracy was then overinterpreted as a smooth con-

[1] Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Scribners, 1979), pp. 181-82.

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flict-free extension of technical reason to all of society, and this was supposed to account for the failure of the Marxist project. Marcuse adopted Weber's cynical assessment of representative democracy and interpreted his concept of legitimation along the lines of the historical materialist conception of ideology. This generated a completely one-sided analysis that implied that total emancipation required the abolition of civil society—of its economic, political, juridical institutions.

The overinterpretation of Weber's "iron cage" tends to underestimate and even conceal the structural and historical differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. Ironcially, the vision of the abolition of both civil society and the state, and the idea of the transformation of politics (seen solely as the domination of man by man) into the administration of things, generates an ideology (Soviet Marxism), which, against all of Marcuse's intentions, legitimates those statist societies that exercise the most total domination over alienated labor.

Both Marcuse and orthodox Marxists are blinded by their insistence on seeing the institutions of modern civil society—representative democracy, formal law, pluralist forms of association, publics, civil liberties, and the market—as merely efficient modes of legitimizing the repressive state, the manipulative mass media, and capitalist domination. Neither can perceive the specific potentials of, for example, the American capitalist system or the real connection between authoritarianism and modern institutions. One can get out of this theoretical morass only by taking seriously the original (but undeveloped) Marxian insights into the contradictory nature of all the institutions of modern civil society. In other words, the positive and negative aspects of liberal bourgeois society must be distinguished from each other before any thoughtful investigation of the practical developmental possibilities of the former can be examined.

Some contemporary critical theorists, by making the institutions and norms of the public sphere, civil society, and politics the focus of their investigations of late capitalism, have made a decisive first step in this direction.[2] They have begun to develop a theory of how *political* crisis in a welfare state both continues and replaces traditional economic crises, by analyzing the new structural contradictions inherent in state interventionism and the problem of legitimation that it creates. But we must take the next step, and analyze some of the political and cultural traditions (antistatism, pluralism, regionalism, religion, modes of individualism, and for forth), which inform American life and activate social protest, on the right as well as the left, against the state and corporate-capitalist control. We must also proceed with a theoretical framework that allows one to ask whether it is possible to abolish the structures of domination, exclusion, and injustice of late capitalism while preserving the political and social freedoms of particular civil societies in a new and expanded form. In short, the fine line between apology and "the great refusal" must be carefully drawn, and the ridiculous cries of "reformism" by the ultraleft and the orthodox Marxists must be ignored.

SOME OF THE QUESTIONS to be considered, then, are:

1. Is the dynamism of the economy in modern civil society located in the capitalist form of private ownership or in market mechanisms that can be distinguished from it? Could production and distribution be organized so as to retain the articulation of needs through markets, without the system of domination over labor typical both of corporate capitalism and centrally planned societies? What would be the ideal combination of democratic self-management at the enterprise level, markets, and long-range planning of goals?

2. Could one embed formal law, or legality and due process, in a new system of political relations that would sever their historical connection with both capitalist private property and state bureaucracy?

3. Is political domination inherent in the existence of political power, or in its monopolization by the state apparatus? Instead of responding to statism with the myth of the abolition of power through direct democracy (a myth on which domination feeds), how about a multiplication of counter powers within a plurality of participatory frameworks—and a multifaceted representative structure, to compliment a combination of self-management, markets, and planning in the economic sphere? In short, isn't the demand for the participation in power in all areas of society the only sensible way of combating the disciplinary structures of domination in both civil society and the state?

4. Finally, does the authoritarian threat to civil

[2] Cf. the works of Claus Offe, "Political Authority and Class Structures: An Analysis of Late Capitalist Societies," *International Journal of Sociology* 2: 73-107, and Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston; Beacon, 1975).

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society, with its voluntary associations, private law, publics, liberties, and markets stem only from immanent tendencies of the capitalist form of this society? Might it not be that attempts to suppress civil society altogether, in the name of revolutionary justice (Jacobinist communism) or national tradition (fascism) represent a new kind of 20th-century authoritarianism?

These questions cannot be handled by a theory that envisions an apocalyptic revolution that sweeps everything before its path and creates a totally new, transparent, conflict-free society. From a philosophical standpoint, Marcuse certainly understood what has been the most precious "gain" of modern civil society—the principle of individual autonomy. He also realized if only at times, that the truth of political liberalism lay in the double notion that at least some aspects of society must remain independent of state penetration, and that the autonomy of individuals (and, for that matter, groups), and their so-called rights or civil liberties do not derive from the state and therefore cannot legitimately be abrogated by it. All the 20th-century revolts against civil society, from above and below, indicate that only an institutional continuity with what is best in its heritage can allow us to raise the question of emancipation in a way that does not turn into its opposite. This posing of the question certainly agrees with the spirit of Marcuse, if not with the letter and logic of his work. □

Edgar Litt

British Tories Slash Public Education

The stern taskmasters of Mrs. Thatcher's government have now translated the ideology of monetarism into chilling cutbacks throughout the social services of the United Kingdom. The Conservatives' goal of reducing public-sector spending by 1 percent of the Gross National Product is a reality. Both in the White Paper on Public Expenditures, setting forth the government's five-year budget, and in actual cutbacks, the dismantling of the welfare state proceeds apace. It is merely gallows humor to observe that education is less decimated than public housing.

The cold fact is that the cutbacks in education are substantial. A nation now suffering 20 percent inflation rates will spend 9 percent less in current dollars on education, from primary school to university. Below the university level the primary schools, adult education, the humanities and social studies have been particularly hard hit. The impact on the local educational councils translates into both cutbacks in schooling *and* higher local property taxes to make up the shortfall from the Department of Education and Science in London. Local property taxes are being increased from 20 to 40 percent and a standstill budget is the best that the major cities (Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds) can hope to achieve under the sledgehammer of Tory cutbacks.

The cumulative impact of school cuts, reinforced in higher education, will be to roll back the two cornerstones of British higher education policy, namely the Robbins and Binary principles. Responding to the increased demand for higher education in the 1960s, Lord Robbins's Commission set forth the framework of university expansion guided by the principle that no qualified British student should be denied advanced education because of lack of places or family income. The expansion of places was achieved by the rapid expansion of the "cathedral town" universities (such as York and Exeter). Fiscal support came forth in a generous student grant system, based on parental ability to pay, in which more than half the university student body received full tuition, and more than 80 percent of all university students received some government subsidy.

The Binary Policy followed in the early 1970s with its commitment to upgrading and expanding a second, so-called public sector, principally the polytechnics, which had long languished in the shadows of the ancient and red-brick universities. Both the Labour and Tory governments not only accepted this principle but redistributed resources from the universities to the public higher education sphere throughout the decade. For example, staff salaries and student grants achieved parity in the polytechnics; capital investments went disproportionately to the second sector. In 1970-80 university places increased by 60 percent, compared to a 190 percent increase in provisions for polytechnic students. Debate on the consequences of the Robbins and the Binary principles continues, but their objective of providing more higher educational opportunity in Britain, particularly for working-class students, was clear.

All this changed. In the primary schools 10,000 teachers are being sacked. The polytechnics are to suffer an 11 percent cutback over five years, one of

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the largest reductions of any educational program in the United Kingdom. Lecturers who perform the yeoman work of part-time instruction at polytechnics and their companion colleges of education (teacher training) are being laid off. Social studies and the humanities fare worse than do the sciences and mathematics—a pattern that holds from the secondary schools to the differential treatment of the Royal Society of Engineering and the Social Science Research Council at the university level.

THE LADDER OF SOCIAL MOBILITY has been chopped down for bright working-class youngsters. While cutting the polytechnics and adult education, the Thatcher budget expends more pounds on terminal, secondary-school vocational education. The student grant system is indexed for 6 percent less than the rate of inflation, while resident fees at polytechnics and universities rise to the full rate of inflation. Meanwhile, in recognition of inflation's impact on the middle class, student grants have been reindexed, thus qualifying about 10,000 more university students whose parental income would have been too high to qualify for government aid under the old calculations.

The universities, with their aging, tenured faculties, are treated less severely than the public sector. However, the long tradition of welcoming and supporting overseas students from the West Indies and from the Indian subcontinent has ended; all overseas students will have to pay prevailing tuitions and fees. This global prime rate is modified only for students from other European Economic Community (EEC) countries. Henceforth, overseas student fees will count about one-sixth of a university's recurrent grant from the government. Universities that do not attract enough cash-paying new customers from the Persian Gulf, the United States, or wherever will simply have their budgets reduced proportionately.

Clearly, anticipation of fees from overseas students, ranging from $5,000 to $8,000, motivates the apparent generosity with Britain's ancient and modern citadels of scholarship and research. Universities are thus presented a standstill total budget at best. Shortfalls in revenues from overseas students will confront university chancellors with the choice of either admitting fewer qualified British students, in contradiction to the bipartisan Robbins policy, or extracting larger fees from British students at a time when the real purchasing power of British student grants is at its lowest point in 20 years.

Either development profoundly influences the social class distribution of advanced educational opportunity. In *US and UK Educational Policy: A Decade of Reform* (New York: Praeger, 1979), Michael Parkinson and I drew attention to the leveling of higher educational quality in British universities and polytechnics during the 1970s. We criticized the extent to which university resources were diverted to bolster a patchwork public sector composed of education and vocational colleges, and polytechnics. Now the heavy hand of Thatcher has made things worse. Not only is limited opportunity in the public sector to be curtailed, but considerable numbers of qualified university applicants are being priced out.

This curtailment of British higher education touches the lower-middle and working classes most severely. The ladder of opportunity, constructed under both Tory and Labour regimes, has been kicked from under the newest aspirants. Beneath the concern for the universities by a scholarship girl (Mrs. Thatcher read Chemistry at Cambridge) is the budget reality expressing a belief in "the two nations"—one university-educated and predominantly middle-class, the other made up of the masses for whom comprehensive or vocational school will suffice before they take their places in factories and offices.

THE MASSIVE DETERIORATION of one of Britain's finest social arrangements can be appreciated only in the context of the economic disaster Thatcher's government has brought. Neither a 20 percent inflation rate (treble the amount prevailing when the government took office), an unemployment aggregate approaching 2.5 million, nor the declining productivity and export trade deters the true believers guiding the fiscal state of the United Kingdom. Britain's economy now has fallen to its lowest state in a decade. This deteriorating situation is significantly due to the dogmatic belief that reducing the money supply is the *sine qua non* of the new economics. Under such inflexible leaders as Geoffrey Howe and Sir Keith Josephs, the statecraft of the British Conservatives has been replaced by worship at the Shrine of Milton Friedman and his gurus. This can only mean the continued dismemberment of social, health, and educational services that are most vital to the population.

Dismay extends far beyond the Labour party, the trade unions, and the educational authorities. Back-bench Conservative MPs almost revolted over the cuts in child benefits and educational services. The business community holds the government directly responsible for the decline of foreign export and of commerce at home. Meanwhile, the government has created the single largest increase in defense spending in 30 years. □

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Irving Weinstein

Market Socialism

A Program for American Socialists

Among American socialists, "market socialism" (a publicly owned economy relying mainly on the market mechanism for its allocative decisions) has commonly been considered a misnomer—when it has been considered at all. But in France a faction of the Socialist party, supported by close to 40 percent of the membership, advocates a form of socialism in which market forces would play a major role. It's an old story that in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe it is considered "progressive and even radical to advocate greater reliance on markets."

Now at last there are signs of interest in the U.S. From May 1978 on, for over a year, *In These Times* held an extended discussion on market socialism, beginning with three articles by Leland Stauber and continuing with readers' responses.[1] And in a recent *Dissent*, Michael Harrington came close to investing the market with a primary role, in his "What Socialists Would Do in America—If They Could" (*Dissent*, Fall 1978).

Harrington writes that "a transitional socialist society would make full use of the virtues of the market mechanism. . . ." It is true that he speaks of the market almost exclusively in relation to consumer goods. On the other hand, nowhere does he indicate any substitute mechanism for allocating the factors that go into the making of consumer goods. He expressly rules out a system of "centralized command planning with the bureaucracy setting thousands of prices and production targets."

Harrington would combine the techniques of French-style "indicative planning" with a wide extension of democracy.[2] National priorities are to be determined through input by nongovernmental groups, which are guaranteed free access to professional research facilities and to the mass media, as well as by public and worker representatives at all levels of corporate decision-making. This combination is taken to be a way of overcoming the tendencies of a market economy to respond primarily to profit considerations, and to get it to respond to social priorities. The techniques of indicative planning include: collection and analysis of data, wide publicity, discussion among the various sectors with representatives of owners, managers, technicians, labor and government and, finally, projection of the goals and targets of a "Plan." But these goals and targets are not production quotas; nor is it mandatory that they be aimed at. Hence, Harrington is able to characterize this kind of planning as "a publicly subsidized system of market research."

But if the "planning" agency, either centrally or in concert with the owners, does not carry the main responsibility for making allocative decisions, what mechanism other than the market is there? Harrington's discussion of this question is unclear. Although he sometimes looks like a market socialist, he really isn't one. In order to understand his position, we need to begin with his ambivalent feelings (fully justified) toward publicly owned enterprises and the decision that follows from these feelings to focus above all on structures of democratic control.

"In and of itself," Harrington writes, "nationalization is neither good nor bad."[3] The purposes it is put to, and the social interests that are served, will determine our judgment. Given the current social and political context, the odds favor the "bad." Experience teaches us that a piecemeal nationalization compels the minority sector to operate within a sea of capitalist enterprises where it constantly faces the danger of co-optation. On the other hand, it is impossible and undesirable to nationalize the entire economy overnight in a way that democratic socialists could support. Even were the nationalization to be the work of a left-labor-liberal coalition, neither the knowledgeable socialist cadres nor the democratic structures of worker and popular control are available to make it work. And given the immense power that nationalization would confer on state bureaucrats, to attempt it without such cadres and controls would be an irresponsible risk.[4]

Because of all these inhibiting factors, Harrington is led to his insistence on the structuring of democratic safeguards *prior* to nationalization. To appreciate this insistence, consider an overnight "total" nationalization that at its inception was expected to fit the concept of "social property." Consider the questions that must be answered: How is production to be carried out? Are the old managers fired? If new people are expected to replace them, where do they come from? Or is the old structure of authority simply replaced in its entirety by workers' control? Is production planned, and if so, how? What is the structure of the organization for planning? How much authority will reside in individual plants? How much in an all-industry committee? And so forth.

If chaos is to be avoided, the answers to these questions had better be in place *before* any such nationalization occurs. But where will the answers come from? They must emerge through trial and error, through testing. It is to this central question that Harrington's program is directed: the experience will be acquired right here in the political economy of

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democratic capitalist America. We will take the principles and practices of democracy, as they already exist, and deepen and extend them until they encompass democratic planning and democratic control.

In the meantime, the only responsible action that socialists can advocate and support is the kind exemplified by Harrington's stance when the idea of nationalizing the oil industry, lock, stock, and barrel arose among trade unionists and liberals as an aftermath of the 1973 gasoline shortage. After explaining why he considered the nationalization of the entire industry to be wrong—for instance, the undoubted retention of the present managers who now would have gained "a public-interest license to carry out their private-interest policies"[5]—Harrington went on to say:

> This reasoning has led me to favor Senator Stevenson's much more modest suggestion: the creation of one federal oil and gas corporation. . . . I had no illusions that . . . it would change much of the energy power structure. But it would provide an arena—a single company—in which the fight for democratic and social control would not have been lost before it began, as in the case of an entire industry. . . . It could provide a training school for those forces that could eventually participate in a democratic socialization of the entire industry. . . .

It is this idea that Harrington later expanded and elaborated to become a major strategy in his socialist program for America. He posits a structure of democratic planning and control that would eventually make it possible for socialists to support fuller nationalization, ". . . a move that is as necessary in the long run as it is premature in the short run." It is an imaginative and serious attempt to come to grips with a profound socialist problem. Nevertheless, Harrington's position is seriously deficient. He proposes a program for American socialism that *excludes* public ownership as a current practical option.

II

AT THIS POINT, the contribution of the market socialist, particularly Leland Stauber's, seems relevant. By calling for a transfer to a decentralized system of public ownership on the basis of an existing market economy, the dilemmas that have driven Harrington into an impasse are overcome. Based on the market, Stauber's proposals obviate the need for the kind of major reorganization of the economy that could spell dislocation and chaos, or that involve recourse to authoritarian planning and control. They resolve the "double-bind" of the "impossible" wholesale nationalization versus the co-opted piecemeal variety.

In bare outline, Stauber proposes legislation that would terminate private ownership of equity stock in American corporations and vest public ownership in these stocks in a network of investment banks owned by local governments.[6] The income earned would accrue to the respective local municipalities who could use this "social dividend" as they saw fit. In pursuit of the greatest gain the banks could buy and sell stock on a stock market restricted to trading solely by the investment banks. In this way a publicly owned, decentralized capital market would be brought into existence.

While the investment banks, as shareholders, would hire and fire top management, they would not run the enterprises; this would remain the function of management. Disruption of the presently existing technostructure would be kept to a minimum since, operating in a market economy, corporate personnel would do pretty much what they had been doing all along. The main leverage of the banks, aside from the power to hire and fire top management, would be exerted through their ability to buy and sell stock. Since there would be thousands of semiautonomous investment banks throughout the country, their decisions would reflect a radical decentralization of economic power. The use of a market process for allocating publicly owned investment funds would avoid reliance on some powerful central administration.

The companies financed by these banks would be organized along the lines of the presently existing American private corporation, rather than as a "public corporation" in which the government presence is more direct. This, too, would allow for a good deal of independence, and would make it feasible for private promoters to start new firms in the market-socialist sector. Aside from the important social and economic advantages of tapping personal initiative, the ability of individuals to start new (corporate) enterprises, assuming they can convince the banks to loan them money, will further decentralize economic and political power.

Moreover, the decentralized market process for financing these firms means that government intervention or assistance to such firms would be highly visible and so would be the continual subject of political debate and decision. This would serve to counteract the potential abuse of power involved in a fully nationalized economy, where important economic decisions can be more effectively disguised and hidden from public view.

Stauber also sees market socialism as allowing a more effective antitrust policy. He calls for the "disaggregation" of those corporations where the existing size or combination of operations adds little or nothing to economies of scale but reduces effective competition and adds to the ability to undermine public regulation. This could be accomplished through special legislation applying to particular

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industries; through legislation prohibiting conglomerate firms altogether; or:

> the federal government, after acquiring the securities of the firm to be broken up, could distribute to the local government investment funds, not the securities of the old firm, but the new securities of the new, successor, firms created out of the old firm.

It is important to understand that Stauber's concern with the decentralization of economic and political power is not a "cover" to allow the "market" full play, free of any interference. He writes:

> Whether the resulting pattern of investment is optimum from some social point of view is irrelevant; the purpose of this part of the economic system is solely to provide such a market process. If the results of this process diverge from what is deemed socially desirable, then separate government measures can be used to promote the results desired.

In discussing the need for government to share in or assume the full risk for projects that serve certain national purposes, Stauber states categorically: "There is nothing about the market-socialist arrangements proposed here that would in the slightest reduce this recourse."

As part of the campaign to minimize inequality and to increase the amount of money available for the social dividend, he combines his call for public ownership with a program of personal taxation on property and nonproperty incomes designed to eliminate disproportionate individual and family wealth.[7]

A number of advantages should result from the adoption of these proposals: The maintenance of a market economy, already in existence, would avoid drastic change and upheaval and promise at least the same degree of economic efficiency. The threat to democracy posed by a concentration of political and economic power in the public ownership of the basic means of production would be lessened through the decentralization of ownership and control of the capital market. The distribution of a social dividend based on the earnings of the investment banks would be a significant step toward income equality.

III

DOES STAUBER'S VERSION of a market-socialist system provide an argument for overcoming Harrington's reluctance to adopt public ownership as part of a socialist program for the coming period? I think so.

Instead of viewing public ownership solely in its typical nationalized form, where government bureaucrats, or the old managements now employed by the government, manage the nationalized industry, Stauber's proposals demonstrate that a *decentralized* form of social ownership is possible. This makes the matter of "democratic control" less urgent, and changes the "rules" for defining "social property."

These proposals have a direct bearing on the attitude to be taken toward the existing technostructure. It was the need to have a socialist cadre in place before public ownership could be attempted that forced Harrington to postpone the attempt. Now those cadres are no longer absolutely required; nor is it required that the current managers and engineers undergo a transformation of "values," that they "go over to the people." So long as they remain on the job and work efficiently enough to avoid major dislocation this would be sufficient. This expectation seems quite reasonable given the already existing tendency referred to by Harrington: the ". . . emergence of a Galbraithian 'technostructure' that, except at the very summit, will hire out to anybody as long as the pay is relatively good."[8]

In general, the entire ground is shifted under the democratic controls strategy. Harrington's insistence that the structure of democratic controls be in place prior to any wholesale nationalization means, in practical terms, that the development of democratic controls and direct worker participation can proceed more securely on the basis of a privately owned corporate sector than a state-owned and state-controlled sector. A rough analogy is the democratic socialist preference for capitalist democracy over bureaucratic collectivism—and for the same reasons. But the comparison is no longer valid if it is to be made between a privately owned corporate sector and a genuinely decentralized, publicly owned sector. Then public ownership provides an infinitely more secure foundation for democratic controls.

The decentralized publicly owned economy, at the very least, would make it unnecessary to counterpose the development of democratic controls to the establishment of a publicly owned economy. In fact, the struggle for both ought to go on simultaneously. While they can be considered as separate, it will take the same kind of groundswell to effectuate either; or one may "take off" while the other hardly gets off the ground. There is no way to tell in advance. Who, for instance, could have foretold that the building trades unions would be talking about nationalization?

IV

TO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE, Harrington's strategic proposals spring from his ambiguous attitude toward the market. He can't live with it, he can't live without it. He advocates the market solely in relation to consumer wants. But there is a consumer market even in Soviet-style economies. The key question involves the factors that go into the production of items for the consumer. Does the market reach back into the pipeline and draw in materials, and the production of capital goods, on the basis of its demands? Harrington does not commit himself.

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How does this relate to his views on public ownership? We know now that nationalization per se is not "progressive." In fact, it can be reactionary and worse. Democratic control and planning is decisive; their achievement supersedes all questions of ownership. But there is a problem: What is the mechanism for running the economic machinery in an emerging socialist society? The productive system is not large enough to provide completely free goods and services. Therefore, a system of commodity exchange, call it by whatever name, is still necessary. The urgent question remains: What is the society's allocative mechanism?

Socialists want neither the market nor central control. The market emphasizes competition with all its ramifications. Central control, while appearing to open the way for rational planning, involves the risk of totalitarianism. The answer is democratic control, structured to prevent the threat of totalitarian takeover, and to provide the arena for free cooperation. But no one knows how to make democratic control work! It remains only a concept. There is no "plan," no "schema," no "blueprint," or any description spelling out its implementation. Not in Marx. Not in Kautsky. Not among the Bolsheviks, before or after the Revolution. It can be categorically stated that this kind of planning is not being accomplished and at the present historical moment cannot be accomplished.

Harrington must sense this, because he acknowledges a role for the market in any transitional socialist society. But his heart belongs to planning. This insistently raises the specter of the centralized state—without a key role for the market. So he brings in an antidote, *democratic* planning, and puts off public ownership until the antidote (which requires a good deal of workup and "on the job" preparation) is in place. But democratic planning by itself, in its "pure" form, can't work: it requires the assistance of the market. This is Harrington's dilemma. More, it is the socialist dilemma.[9]

That Harrington is not yet ready to admit that planning by itself cannot do the job, and that this requires a major role for the market, is revealed in an aside where he discusses the famous debate over the question: In the absence of capitalist-factor markets—that is, under socialism—can society rationally compute efficient prices? He comes down on the side of those who hold that it could. The significant point is that the authorities Harrington relies on posit the existence of a *central* agency setting prices. But still, Harrington cannot let go—otherwise he would end up a "market socialist"!

This brings us full circle. In the U.S., private ownership of the economy is the *basis* for the private control of the economy. It makes no sense not to attack that foundation if public ownership can be instituted in such a way that (1) it does not get submerged in a surrounding capitalist sea, and (2) wholesale nationalization does not mean centralized control. To insist on more at this time is to approach the matter of public ownership in a doctrinaire fashion.

If the means exist within a democratic context to render the owners of corporate America functionless—isn't that enough for one day?

Notes

[1] *In these Times* will provide Stauber's articles and the responses for a reasonable price.

[2] "However, in rejecting indicative planning within a late-capitalist society . . . one is not ruling out indicative planning in an utterly different milieu," *Dissent*, Fall 1978, p. 445.

[3] *Dissent*, Fall 1978, p. 447. I also rely on Harrington's "Economic Planning: Promises & Pitfalls," *Dissent*, Fall 1975, and his "Socialism and Economic Democracy," *Socialist Affairs*, the bulletin of the Socialist International, November-December 1979.

[4] "It is obvious that if nationalization . . . is not to be merely a bureaucratic act that might inadvertently lay the basis for corporate collectivism, there must be structural safeguards built into the public enterprise itself" (*Dissent*, Fall 1975, p. 317).

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] In addition to Stauber's articles in *In These Times*, I am relying on his "A Proposal for a Democratic Market Economy,'" the *Journal of Comparative Economics*, September 1977. Responses in the March 1978 issue, and Stauber's reply in the December 1978 issue. See also his article "The Implications of Market Socialism in the United States," *Polity*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1975.

[7] These tax proposals, however, are not an inherent part of Stauber's market socialist structure—as is, for instance, the establishment of publicly owned investment banks—and would require separate legislation. Both Stauber and Harrington depend, perhaps crucially, on a policy tending toward income equalization through steeply graduated taxes. But it is the experience of social democracies and welfare states that this policy will meet greater political resistance the deeper it cuts. This sets real limits on how far the policy can be carried out.

[8] *Dissent*, Fall 1978, p. 448. Harrington, however, hastened to add: "But precisely that summit is the controlling factor in today's economic world." Would he apply this to the publicly owned economy?

[9] "Market socialists" differ among themselves on the ability of market socialism to resolve the "dilemma." Some see the market as a necessary transitional device, others as a neutral mechanism that can be utilized to achieve socialist justice and equality. For a discussion of various points of view see Neil Jumonville, "Market Socialism: The Theory and Its Critics," unpublished thesis, May 1977, Reed College library. For a "positive" view of market socialism see Arthur DiQuattro, "Alienation and Justice In the Market," *American Political Science Review*, September 1978, and his "Market Socialism and Socialist Values," *Review of Radical Political Economics*, Winter 1975. □

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John P. Diggins

Liberalism and Its Critics

THE EDUCATION OF CAREY MCWILLIAMS, by Carey McWilliams. New York: Simon & Schuster. 363 pp. $11.95.

BELIEVING SKEPTICS: AMERICAN POLITICAL INTELLECTUALS, 1945-1964, by Robert Booth Fowler. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 317 pp. $19.95.

When Thomas Jefferson declared that each generation must water the tree of liberty with the "blood" of rebellion, and then later defined the life-span of the "will" of a generation as lasting 19 years, James Madison reminded him that members of each generation are not born on the same day of the same year. Perhaps this is all that needs to be said of ideology's attempt to defy reality.

The differences between Jefferson and Madison could well describe the two tendencies of American liberalism that continue down to our time in what might be regarded as a dialogue between the heart and the head. On the one side stands the liberal as democratic moralist, convinced that the problems of freedom and justice can be resolved once the forces of oppression are exposed by mind and pen; on the other side stands the liberal as skeptical humanist, convinced that the forces of oppression are so rooted in the nature of social existence that citizens can at best only control them through politics and law. The two books under review embody almost perfectly these two tendencies. Carey McWilliams's autobiography reads as though political thought and action need demonstrate little more than a spontaneous response to social injustice wherever it rears up; Robert Fowler's account of academic intellectuals in the post-World War II period leaves us with the impression that a study of political skepticism must not only be reflective and somber but also take the shape of a telephone directory—pages and pages of names, many busy signals, a few unlisted numbers, and special rates for long distance calls by ex-radicals bent on saving liberalism from itself.

MCWILLIAMS'S REMARKABLE CAREER clearly warrants an autobiography, and the former editor of the *Nation* has provided a gracefully written recollection of an active life that spans a half-century of American history. The reader will appreciate knowing the background of McWilliams's important early books, such as *Factories in the Field* (1939), *Brothers Under The Skin* (1943), *Prejudice* (1944), and *North From Mexico* (1949). Yet one would think that a writer who courageously spoke out against the implications of prejudice would courageously face up to the deeper implications of power. Convinced that the evils of prejudice could be overcome once the evils of power were renounced, McWilliams responded to World War II with the Jeffersonian conviction that power will collapse in the face of superior virtue. After telling readers it was clear that Hitler was "determined to dominate" Eastern Europe, and that "it is now conceded" that "any significant show of force" would have compelled the Nazis to withdraw from the Rhineland in 1936, McWilliams cites with pride a letter he wrote to the *New Republic* on September 1, 1941, opposing America's entry into the war on the grounds that the best way "to drive the Nazis crazy" was not to employ force but to keep them guessing about America's intention. McWilliams's answer to Hitler was to find a peaceful way to make a madman madder still.

McWilliams's answer to Stalin was to deny Stalinism. The refusal to face this issue squarely makes McWilliams a poor guide to the meaning of the Cold War and McCarthyism, subjects one could gladly pass over if only McWilliams did not devote the greater part of his book to them. Here, too, McWilliams represents that Jeffersonian tendency to see all revolutions abroad as "progressive" and all opposition to revolution as "reactionary" almost by definition. Thus anti-Stalinism remains as confusing to McWilliams as anti-

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Jacobinism was to Jefferson, and in the 1950s the *Nation* provided the major vehicle through which intellectuals could express opposition to the Cold War and still reach a relatively large liberal audience.

The arguments McWilliams cites by revisionist historians such as Gabriel Kolko and William A. Williams are too familiar to rehash here, and the same might be said for the *Nation*'s attempt to interpret McCarthyism as a "counter revolutionary ideology" exploited by the right and implemented by the CIA to infiltrate and subvert radical movements at home and abroad. Yet the connection between Stalinism and McCarthyism seems more than coincidental. Why was there no McCarthyism in the 1960s when the New Left made it appear as though revolution—"all power to the alienated"—was rising out of the tear-gassed streets at Telegraph Avenue and Morningside Heights? Contrary to the expectations of many, neither the activities of the left nor even the withdrawal from Vietnam produced an organized anti-Communist movement similar to the Birch Society of the 1950s. Could it be that American Stalinist sympathizers helped to make American anticommunism possible by their practice of taking the Fifth, a tactic that not only played into the hands of HUAC but generated the worst of fears in a confused public? McWilliams is happy to report that the Hollywood Ten are now regarded as "folk heroes." Yet one need only compare the behavior of the Hollywood Ten to that of the Chicago Seven, or indeed to the behavior of almost any New Leftist or black activist on political trial in the '60s, to see what difference the strategy of self-protective silence made in the long run.

McWilliams performed at his best as a journalistic sleuth detecting the machinations of government in the dark corridors of power. Perhaps his greatest coup as editor of the *Nation* involved gathering information about the preparations then being made in Guatemala for the Bay of Pigs invasion. Had the national press followed up the *Nation*'s lead, America might have been saved from what President Kennedy himself called a "colossal mistake," and the Cold War might have taken a positive turn at least in the Western hemisphere. While one applauds such courageous activities, one also recoils from the simplicity of a mind that cannot make vital distinctions. "We could distinguish good Nazis from bad, but all Communists were alike, all were evil." Knowing good from evil, McWilliams himself still cannot distinguish between the different modes of Communist operation that make it possible—indeed imperative—for the anti-Communist writers to oppose Stalinism in Eastern Europe and support socialism in Allende's Chile. When one reads McWilliams still boasting of the *Nation*'s "independent stance" on the European Cold War one feels the need to update Eliot: after Gulag, what forgiveness?

THE INTELLECTUALS DEALT WITH in Robert Fowler's *Believing Skeptics*—Daniel Bell, Daniel Boorstin, Robert Dahl, Peter Gay, Richard Hofstadter, Sidney Hook, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Judith Shklar—represent the opposite tendency in American liberalism, and one that is, ironically, closer to the tradition of historical skepticism in *The Education of Henry Adams*. Fowler's useful study of postwar intellectuals leads one to reconsider the claim, made by literary essayists from Henry James to Lionel Trilling, that the liberal mind has no imagination for disaster. On the contrary, memories of the bomb and the camps seemed to hover above almost everything American intellectuals wrote in the decade following World War II. The encounter with European totalitarianism goes far toward explaining the American intellectuals' hatred of ideology and rejection of anything that smacked of the messianic arrogance of utopian abstractions and systems of thought based on the "logicality" of metaphysical systems. Fowler traces this anti-ideological mood in the works of sociologists Bell and Lipset, historians Boorstin, Gay, Hofstadter, and Schlesinger, philosophers Hook and Morton White, political theorists Dahl, Shklar, and Michael Oakeshott, and the theologian Niebuhr. Such writers called for either a pragmatic realism in political thought that would reject deduction and formalism; for a redefinition of democracy as a method rather than as an end, and as a polyarchy of interest groups rather than a mere expression of popular majorities; for an exploration of the new philosophies of existentialism, linguistic analysis, and logical positivism; or for a recovery of older natural law theories and classical traditions that would restore a normative dimension to political philosophy.

Fowler's catalogue of the writings of many scholars in a variety of disciplines provides a useful map of postwar intellectual history. But one suspects that he also wanted to put American liberalism on trial for its habits of mind, and this means that one must be skeptical of skepticism as a political stance. "American thinkers were skeptical of Marxism and a host of European ideologies, cer-

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tainly, but were they skeptical of liberalism and liberal democratic values?" One wonders how they could be, when liberalism no longer invoked substantive values but instead became pretty much an affair of procedure and methodology, a matter of means rather than ends. Redefined simply as a "process," liberalism no longer constituted a body of knowledge or a definition of justice but merely a way of settling disputes over knowledge and justice. The postwar intellectuals leave behind entirely the Jeffersonian strand of liberalism, with its "sacred" and "undeniable" self-evident truths, and embrace the Madisonian version, with its preoccupation with the movement of "interests" and "power," economic and political phenomena that require no legitimating beliefs or ultimate principles.

What troubles Fowler is the spectacle of liberals taking pride in their own skepticism but refusing to turn it upon existing institutions and ideas. He quotes the late Richard Hofstadter as providing a typical expression of the mood of resignation: "What appeals to me . . . is simply the old liberalism, chastened by adversity, tempered by time, and modulated by a growing sense of reality." Apparently it is the confidence with which liberals claim to know truth and reality that upsets Fowler. "To be so sure is not to be skeptical," he complains of their stance. Perhaps. Or it may be that the liberal mind is so unsure of itself that it cannot even find its own first principles in order to doubt them. The theoretical aim of modern liberalism, after all, is to question conventional beliefs, not establish indubitable truths, and who can say that the liberals were not correct in questioning the claims of socialism and Marxism and in their own defense of pluralism and pragmatism?

IN THE '60s liberalism became the nemesis of both the left and right, a historic fact perhaps suggesting that skepticism, not dogmatism, may be the real enemy of the modern mind. Indeed, how does one challenge liberalism? How does one take on a political philosophy that can turn all answers into questions and even assert, as do Niebuhr, Schlesinger, and Isaiah Berlin, that there are insoluble dilemmas in all human affairs insofar as the rational mind cannot even coherently conceptualize the nature of the problem? One way to do so is to remain innocent. Thus Carey McWilliams tells us that his early liberal idealism "survived some punishing and bitter experience" by virtue of a "fusion with a radical view" of history and politics. The lesson seems to be that the liberal mind is limited and political survival demands going beyond it. To what? Can any modern ideology claim to have successfully interpreted, not to say predicted, the course of history in the last 50 years? The wisdom of liberalism proved disastrous when John Dewey drew upon it to understand European fascism, and the insights of Marxism proved useless to Trotsky when he tried to interpret Stalinism as a "Soviet Thermidor" and hence a transitory phenomenon. As to conservatism, for the past 20 years the *National Review* has been predicting the "suicide" of the West, a record in cataclysmic thinking surpassed perhaps only by the response of the American press to the Bolshevik Revolution, when, in 1919, its imminent collapse had been forecast in 91 different editorials.

Although history seems to have discredited all sides of the political spectrum, the relationship between knowledge and politics is seldom recognized as a problem, providing one keeps the faith. Thus the left and the right are fond of constructing a liberal "mentality" in order to demolish it, but the philosophies of both radicalism and conservatism depend upon a faith in the capacity of men and women to know and understand the world that can scarcely survive the acids of skepticism. The conviction, first enunciated by David Hume, that one cannot draw lessons from historical experience based on causal understanding found its most powerful expression in America in the writings of Henry Adams, the quintessential figure of post-Enlightenment skepticism. Adams understood that William James's "The Will To Believe" was based on nothing more than the subjective desire of human need, and he also recognized the futility of challenging a liberal philosophy that tells us it is better to pursue truth than to possess it. Today the futility of that challenge is rejected by both the left and the right in their common opposition to "the Vital Center" that seems not only to "hold" in America but to prevail. What do the left and right have in common that separates them from the skepticism of Adams and his modern heirs?

Consider the issue of tolerance. Fowler compares Herbert Marcuse's *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* to William Buckley's earlier *God and Man at Yale*, a comparison presumably intended to bolster the author's argument that liberal pluralism cannot countenance ideas and movements that pose a threat to the premises of liberal consensus itself. Why not? Actually, American liberalism survived the assaults of the left and the right in the post-World War II era, and it did so without

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experiencing a failure of nerve because its ideology had roots deep in American history and society. If *One-Dimensional Man* and *Up From Liberalism* informed Americans of their intellectual imprisonment, neither could move Americans to throw off their ideological chains. Clearly, the dilemma facing the left and the right in their confrontation with liberalism involves more than the absence of countervailing ideas, those deeper truths, conceptions, and visions that presumably cannot be tolerated by liberals for fear they may extirpate the "false consciousness" of their ideological consensus. The popularity of Buckley and the late Herbert Marcuse might indicate that the seeming impotence of the right and left has more to do with social and economic history than the intellectual climate, more with the absence in America of clearly defined class relations rather than with the presence of clearly defined ideas. That the reputation of an affirming Catholic and a negating Marxist could flourish in liberal America may only indicate that the right and left talk about ideas and think about power. And though the one wants to convert America and the other to transform it, the one wants to save us from the curse of "permissiveness" and the other to liberate us from "repressive desublimination," both suffer the same political frustration in their isolation from "The Vital Center," frustrations that cannot be eased by the philosophical consolations of the divine or the dialectic. Convinced that the truth is one and errors are many, Buckley and Marcuse also share another common dilemma: neither could tolerate the norm of tolerance or accept Sidney Hook's intolerance of the intolerant.

MEANWHILE, BOTH CONSERVATISM AND RADICALISM continue to endure, precisely because the hegemony of liberalism continues to prevail in America. A recent case in point is Garry Wills, a latter-day scholastic who apparently can satisfy both Lillian Hellman and William Buckley by demonstrating in *Inventing America* that Jefferson was a Scottish moral philosopher, not, God help us, an English political liberal. To rewrite American intellectual history is one strategy a conservative-turned-radical can use to deny America its liberal heritage and to affirm communal as opposed to individualist values. But *Inventing America* provides merely the latest evidence that the right and left refuse to accept the enduring liberal nature of an American political tradition characterized by, to paraphrase Hofstadter, property and cupidity rather than fraternity and morality. Alienated from the main currents of American history, the disparate minds of Buckley, Marcuse, and Wills are haunted by a common specter—the political philosophy of John Locke.

A political scientist who came of political age in the '60s, Fowler is less interested in the historical significance of American liberalism than in its contemporary relevance, or irrelevance. Thus in addition to registering his impatience with the alleged complacency of contemporary liberal skepticism, he set out mainly to trace the Vietnam War back to the liberal mind, one aspect of which he calls "the metaphysics of tough-mindedness." Criticizing this mentality for its "conservative overtones," Fowler observes that "tough-mindedness may have succeeded in the Cuban missile crisis, but it was to fail in Vietnam." What failed in Vietnam was not so much tough-mindedness as a liberal sentimentalism that led Lyndon Johnson and others to announce that they could make democracy flower in the Mekong Delta as though it were the Perdanales River. After Vietnam, it is difficult to see how intellectuals can ever again tout the superiority of America's "pragmatic" wisdom over the alleged ideological rigidity of European political culture. If pragmatism means that ideas and theories are revised in the light of immediate experience, Vietnam showed that the light at the end of the tunnel could compel American officials to redouble their efforts and dig in deeper when they had lost all understanding of what the fading light meant—Isaiah Berlin's definition of a "hedgehog" and Santayana's of a "fanatic."

No ideology, no worry. Such was the message American liberal intellectuals gave in the postwar period to explain why the new world would not succumb to the curses of the old. When France pulled out of Indochina and America later moved in, the roles now seemed reversed as though Dewey, not Descartes, had whispered to de Gaulle while John Foster Dulles and Dean Rusk, ignoring Dewey's advice that future events are contingent rather than necessary, confused their experiences in the '30s with the realities of the '50s and '60s and saw in Dienbienphu the analogue to Munich. Bewitched by the image of "dominoes" collapsing in succession as though history were a chessboard of predictable power moves, the cold warriors became the "inevitablists" of our time. Where was the pragmatic "genius" of America in Vietnam, where one heard no whisper of skepticism about the mind's ability to understand what is happening?

Fowler and others are convinced that Vietnam

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and the Cold War must be comprehended as intellectual history, the product of a mentality or mode of reasoning. Yet to demonstrate whether it was liberal or conservative thinking, or pragmatic or ideological or positivist or humanist thinking that led to Vietnam is difficult insofar as political positions seldom follow philosophical dispositions. Niebuhr and Hook had nothing in common philosophically, even though they came to share a similar position on Stalinism. Marcuse and Noam Chomsky opposed Vietnam for reasons that had little to do with their metaphysics or linguistics. Others, such as Ellsberg and Schlesinger, changed their minds and either leaked information or exposed the fallacies of the Munich parallel and the collapsing domino metaphor; and still others, such as Morgenthau and Walter Lippmann, opposed the war from the beginning in the name of *Realpolitik*. How does one evaluate political ideas in terms of the real world of events? Who can say that "events" prove a certain position correct when history, as the recent bloodbath in Cambodia demonstrates, does not pause to render a final judgment? "Mind," Trotsky reminded us, "limps after reality."

Fowler's frustrations with American liberalism reveal much about the sensibilities of the '60s. Those brought up to believe in older political ideals now find their colleges and indeed the country itself run by *apparatchiks* who seem so interchangeable they could function in any political system devoted to perfecting the procedures of bureaucracy. Fowler criticizes liberalism for a mushy ethical and political relativism that extolls diversity, pluralism, stability, and moderation, and he reaches to writers on both the left and right to make the point that liberalism cannot provide "authoritative" answers. Neither Jefferson nor Dewey would be troubled by this accusation; both saw philosophical thought as an intellectual prophylactic, an exercise that aimed to scrutinize the diseases of error and not to assert the virtues of truth. But the intellectual dilemmas of American liberalism, one needs to remind readers of Fowler's book, did not spring from the postwar cultural scene or even from the Cold War itself. The crisis of modern liberalism can be traced to the late 19th-century crisis of knowledge in general. When Henry Adams resigned from Harvard's history department in 1877, he concluded that he had no answers to give his students and could not continue to teach when there are no truths to be learned. Although the philosophy of pragmatism could not resolve many of the issues regarding authority that Adams had raised, William James's response to Adams's resignation still bears pondering, even by critics of liberal skepticism: to the extent that there are no final truths, nothing can be determined and thus man remains free to determine for himself what it is he wants to determine. This is a perspective that both liberals and Marxists might share in view of their common criterion of "praxis" as the test of ideas. If Fowler is asking for "authoritative answers," he is not asking the right questions of liberalism.

FOWLER CONCLUDES his work with a discussion of Louis Hartz's *The Liberal Tradition in America*, which he describes as a "brilliant essay that fit the spirit of the age almost exactly." Hartz's book appeared in 1955, the year McWilliams became editor of the *Nation* and Buckley began publishing the *National Review*—so much for the "exact" spirit of the age. Indeed, Hartz's book must be read quite differently. One needs to consider it along with Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* as a statement on the limitations of the American mind. Unfortunately, most American historians have dismissed Hartz as praising the "uniqueness" of American liberalism and the "autonomy of American history." Nothing could be more distorting than to classify Hartz among the American celebrators of consensus. Like Marcuse, Hartz all but despaired at the spectacle of an "irrational" and "absolutist" liberal ideology that had so consensualized America's consciousness that its mind could not critically reflect upon itself. Drawing upon de Tocqueville, Hartz's work not only transcended the '50s but enabled its author to achieve what has always been the great dream of Marxist scholarship: to combine an analysis of ideology with an analysis of social structure. By exploring the far-reaching implications of the presence of Lockeanism and the absence of feudalism in American history, Hartz could explain how liberalism absorbed America and precluded the development of an aristocracy on the right and a radical working class and socialist movement on the left. Thus Hartz's thesis does much to help us understand the two problems that have troubled McWilliams and other contemporary liberals—McCarthyism and the Cold War.

The anticommunism of the '50s was made possible not only by prior international events but also by the historical absence of a substantial and enduring indigenous radicalism whose established political legitimacy might have eased public fears of foreign treason and subversion. Even more sig-

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nificantly, the Lockean nature of the Declaration of Independence and the Tocquevillian nature of American society deprived America of a truly revolutionary heritage that would enable Americans to sympathize with others who must struggle to overcome the remnants of feudalism. The ideals of 1776 cannot automatically be transported to the underdeveloped world, for the simple reason that political liberalism cannot be translated into class struggle. "Can a people 'born free' ever understand peoples elsewhere that have to become so? Can it even understand itself?" asks Hartz.

Hartz's great book is a *cri de coeur*, a plea for America's liberal imagination to extend itself to the world abroad. It may be difficult for liberals to uphold their own principles and still align themselves with the cause of social revolution abroad, and it may be difficult for Marxists to see anything worth salvaging in America's liberal tradition. Yet the apparent incompatibility of these two ideologies need not preclude one from supporting the human needs and aspirations that give rise to both Marxism and liberalism—justice and freedom. "The test of a first-rate intelligence," observed F. Scott Fitzgerald, "is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function." In its relations with peoples elsewhere struggling to overcome the burdens of history to "become" free, American liberalism must be nothing less than first-rate. □

Barnard Gage

Mean Things

MEAN THINGS HAPPENING IN THIS LAND: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF H. L. MITCHELL, by H. L. Mitchell. Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun & Co. 358 pp. $10.95.

For years, H. L. Mitchell worked at the center of the farm labor movement. In the early 1930s Mitchell earned a local reputation by collaborating with the Tennessee Socialist party in an investigation of sharecroppers and by organizing a union of unemployed workers in his native Arkansas. When local sharecroppers decided to form a union they turned to him for assistance, and Mitchell became the executive secretary of the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union (STFU), an organization soon to be nationally influential. Union activity petered out during World War II, but after 1945 Mitchell continued to serve the union, now renamed the National Farm Laborers' Union (NFLU), and in 1952 he helped organize a famous strike against the DiGiorgio Corporation. He was also instrumental in organizing fishermen in Louisiana and dairy farmers in New York and Wisconsin. Before the union merged with the Amalgamated Meat Cutters in 1964 Mitchell successfully lobbied for the AFL farm labor organizing drive that became the United Farm Workers of America.

Now Mitchell is a working-class activist who has also become a self-conscious informant to historians. Throughout his life Mitchell has kept every scrap of printed paper, and the resulting archives are so full of letters that sharecroppers, however illiterate, are no longer inarticulate. Mitchell's autobiography *Mean Things Happening in This Land* reflects this preoccupation: even the family history at the beginning of the book is as valuable for its insights into Southern society as for any light shed on Mitchell's life.

The STFU-NFLU had its share of successes. In 1936 the STFU filed a minority report with the President's Committee on Farm Tenancy that demanded a guarantee of the farm laborers' right to organize unions, "housing for working farm families, and a massive rehabilitation loan project [that] later became the basic program of the Farm Security Administration." By publicizing the terror directed against its members the union also sparked the La Follette Committee's investigation into abuses of workers' civil rights. Over the years, the union's long struggle kept alive the interest in farm labor of such unionists as Walter Reuther who gave the United Farm Workers much needed financial support.

Nevertheless, both the STFU and the NFLU suffered considerable setbacks. The STFU's major historian, Donald Grubbs, insists that the union collapsed in 1939; Mitchell contends, however, that the union persisted for well into the 1950s. Neither offers any statistics, so it is difficult to judge. The union's papers do make it clear that most of the locals outside Arkansas subsided into inactivity and confusion in 1939. The reasons Mitchell gives for the union's failure are even more controversial. One theory blames internecine warfare between Socialists and Communists: by 1939 the CP had effectively organized farm labor in California and, through skillful diplomacy, had obtained permission to organize the sole CIO international union in the field. After joining the international, the STFU leaders found themselves in disagreement with its

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officers and appealed to the CIO; when John Lewis proved reluctant to act, the STFU quit the CIO, and this led to disenchantment in all the farm unions. A second theory claims that, as the sharecroppers were among the lowest paid workers, they could not meet the high dues set by the CIO, and their union was crushed by the weight. A third theory, which Mitchell prefers, explains the change in the union through the increasing disenfranchisement of the sharecroppers and the increasing number of farm workers in the field.

The NFLU also failed to maintain its size. Some observers claim that the union was simply a victim of the McCarthy scare. Mitchell, however, argues that the red-baiting the union suffered, from the likes of Congressman Richard Nixon, was inconsequential and that, if the AFL had supported its affiliate, the union would have been securely established. Instead, because the union's supporters within the Federation were weak and because a farm labor union could not initially survive on its membership dues, the leaders of the labor movement gave it little support. Cesar Chavez, who was picket captain in the DiGiorgio strike, has suggested yet another cause: since it was organized through mass meetings rather than on a more intimate basis, he argues, the union had a high turnover in membership.

Mitchell occasionally lets his prejudice get the better of him. He dislikes religion and belittles its influence on the union, a difficult feat considering the number of preachers in the membership rolls. For example, two organizers reported having visitations before beginning their union work, and many organizers felt that they had a mission to the members of their local. Perhaps this dependence on charisma of those who endeavored to unite the locals helps explain the ease with which a part of the STFU fell away.

Despite stories about former KKK members urging their union to integrate their locals and similar anecdotal evidence, Mark Naison, a young historian, has charged the union with implicitly racist conduct—a claim based on the slight preponderance of segregated over integrated locals. Not so, says Mitchell. Segregated locals existed only in all-black or all-white districts. (A few statistics comparing the union membership to the surrounding population would be helpful.) In fact, all union meetings were open to both races, and when black children on a union-run cooperative farm were sent to segregated public schools the union established classes to supplement their education.

MITCHELL LEARNED his civil rights from his experiences in the Socialist party. Both Mitchell and other leaders of the union maintained this party allegiance, and one NFLU organizer from the 1950s credited their socialist beliefs with their success in organizing. Yet, Mitchell fails to explore the extent to which this penetrated the rank and file. There are suggestive papers in the archives, including a 1936 poster equating European fascists and Southern planters, as well as letters showing union support for Norman Thomas's Keep-America-Out-of-the-War Committee; but the leads have yet to be pursued.

These shortcomings should be taken as an invitation to historians to get to work. In the mean time we should thank Mitchell for an important job well done, for telling the entire history of the union for the first time, and for suggesting that the most interesting and convincing interpretation of the union's history is yet to be written. □

Fred Siegel

Yalta and Poland

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1932-1945, by Robert Dallek. New York: Oxford University Press. 670 pp. $25.00.

The dramatic shift of American public opinion set off by the Iranian dilemma recalls the comparably dramatic shift set off 35 years ago, when the Yalta euphoria gave way to the Polish dilemma. Robert Dallek's magisterial book is a recreation and cautious defense of FDR's road to and from Yalta. Dallek has mined the English-language sources to argue that Roosevelt was not the seat-of-the-pants improviser of so many accounts. Rather, while conceding Roosevelt's errors of remaining "neutral" in the Spanish Civil War, in the internment of the Japanese Americans, and in the misuse of the FBI, Dallek presents FDR as a diplomatist of vision and skill.

The thrust of Dallek's dense narrative is to describe how Roosevelt had a consistently surer

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grasp of foreign policy than his opponents. While America's isolationists were misreading European events in a vain attempt to retroactively prevent the outbreak of World War I, FDR was trying to detail a forceful diplomatic response to German expansionism. Ironically, the isolationist restrictions on presidential actions led FDR to employ the secret diplomacy and public propaganda the non-interventionists justifiably feared. But even as he expanded his diplomatic tools Roosevelt continued to move cautiously. With American entry into the War, Dallek tries to show how two goals—first, the maintenance of a public consensus for his internationalist policies and second, the use of all available means to end the war as quickly as possible with as few American casualties as possible—guided FDR from the deal with Darlan on French North Africa to the deal with Stalin regarding Poland and China at Yalta.

For more than 500 pages Dallek makes his understated case by demonstration rather than assertion, but then there is an interesting and possibly false denouement. He asserts that ". . . had he lived, Roosevelt would have probably moved more quickly than Truman to confront the Russians. His greater prestige and reputation as an advocate of Soviet-American friendship would have made it easier for him than Truman to muster" what is crucial for Dallek: "public support for a hard line." The nub is the interpretation of Yalta.

FDR genuinely thought he could square the circle of the Polish question, according to Dallek. Roosevelt assumed, Dallek tells us, that through personal diplomacy and a web of mutually interlocking relationships, culminating in a Big Five condominium at the U.N., he could both satisfy the public demand for a modicum of Polish freedom and guarantee Soviet security. FDR made it clear as early as 1943 that, given the military realities of Eastern Europe and the Soviet demands for security, he would not oppose Soviet domination of Poland. The President told Polish nationalists and their American supporters that he had no intention whatsoever of going to war over Poland. FDR assumed, on the basis of some gestures of good will by the Russians and extensive conversations with Stalin, that Russia's recognition of the need for good relations with the U.S. would lead to granting Poland a degree of freedom sufficient to satisfy American public opinion. Toward that end, at Yalta, Roosevelt proposed and Stalin acceded to the formula of a Polish government whose core would be attached to Moscow but that would also include representatives of the Polish government, which was in exile in London during the War. This agreement gave FDR some breathing space at home, cleared the way for sorely needed Russian aid in the war against Japan (this was before the bomb), and secured Russian support for creating the U.N. The American delegation left Yalta elated.

The problem for FDR was how to tell a public that thought it had been fighting the war for an Atlantic Charter promising freedom to oppressed peoples that now Polish freedom was to be at Stalin's sufferance. When FDR explained to Stalin his likely difficulties in getting these policies across at home, Stalin replied that "some propaganda work should be done"—easy for Stalin to say. Roosevelt was returning from Yalta to face such men as Congressman John Dingell of Michigan, who was representing a large Polish American constituency and who warned FDR that "we Americans are not sacrificing, fighting, and dying to . . . make Joseph Stalin a dictator over the liberated countries of Europe."

With the memory of Woodrow Wilson's humiliation to goad him, Roosevelt made an extraordinary effort to forestall the growth of isolationist sentiment in Congress. Forgoing the dignity and reserve afforded a speaker at the podium, he had himself wheeled into the well of the Senate chamber. "There," as columnist TRB described it in the *New Republic*, "for the first time in living history, a President sat literally on the same level with Congress . . . and for the first time he [FDR] referred publicly to his paralyzed legs," as he tried to calm and cajole Congress with his anecdotal account of how Yalta would turn out all right.

STICKING CLOSE to the diplomatic stage, Dallek chronicles FDR's growing worries about the Russian unwillingness to make even the cosmetic changes agreed upon at Yalta. In late March 1945, less than two weeks before his death, President Roosevelt plaintively cabled Stalin that the Polish question had "aroused the greatest popular interest so that it was urgently necessary for the Russians to provide for something more than a 'thinly disguised continuation of the Warsaw regime' or America would come to regard the Yalta agreement as having failed. . . ." Roosevelt concluded, ". . . I wish I could convey to you how important it is for the successful development of our program of international collaboration that this Polish question be settled fairly and speedily." Stalin's response was to accuse FDR of trying to rewrite Yalta while steadfastly refusing to put an accep-

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table face on the composition of the Polish government.

Roosevelt, convinced that Russian help was of vital importance in limiting American casualties in the Far East, drew back from breaking with Stalin. For Dallek it is Stalin who bears the chief responsibility for bringing down the wartime alliance. He is supported here by the Russian diplomat Maxim Litvinov, a proponent of collective security, who lamented that the Kremlin had thrown away a chance to cooperate with the Americans and instead was trying to grab "all they could while the going was good."

The difficulty with this interpretation is that it is hard to reconcile Dallek's picture of Roosevelt, the perceptive diplomat, with a decision to confront the Russians over Poland. For if Roosevelt was the statesman Dallek thinks he was, surely he would have known that in the wake of the Katyn massacre, the Warsaw uprising, and the Russian assassination of Polish resistance leaders, it was impossible to reconcile Polish national sentiment with the Russian desire to dominate Poland's borders. To be sure, Roosevelt tried to nudge Stalin into allowing Poland a measure of latitude but, as he made clear time and again, the issue of postwar cooperation, and not Polish independence, was at the heart of his concerns. In this light the deals struck at Yalta were designed to buy time for the United Nations and placate Polish sentiment in America. It was not the issue on which FDR was likely to break with Stalin, at least not while the wartime alliance still had widespread support. On the last day of his life Roosevelt wrote to Churchill: "I would minimize the general Russian problem as much as possible . . . our course thus far is correct."

Roosevelt's death was to spare him the hard choices that lay ahead. As FDR told Stalin, "Genuine popular support in the U.S. is required to carry out a government policy, foreign or domestic." But in the wake of the intense Catholic and isolationist response to Yalta it would have no longer been possible to reconcile a concern for maintaining his political coalition with the need to come to an understanding with Russia.

The Polish question aside, the great value of Dallek is that, unlike most revisionist historians but much like FDR himself, he is acutely sensitive to the impact of popular opinion on foreign policy. Dallek's book should make us realize that the powerful hostility to Yalta, which contributed so mightily to McCarthyism, was, in part, an unavoidable consequence of living in a democratic society, where foreign policy isn't solely the affair of diplomats and commissars. □

Robert Leiter

Impediments to Justice

CRIMINALS AND VICTIMS: A TRIAL JUDGE REFLECTS ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, by Lois Forer. New York: W. W. Norton. 333 pp. $14.95.

Lois Forer's *Criminals and Victims* is a triumph of clear thinking. The author is a judge in Philadelphia's Court of Common Pleas, and she discusses law and order, the rights of defendants, the rights of victims—topics dear to the hearts of liberals and conservatives alike—managing through it all to eschew the cant common to both political factions.

Judge Forer is concerned with how present judicial practices fail the participants in criminal cases. Her book's thesis has two basic components. Where some may say that defendants have too many rights, Judge Forer contends that this has not been so in her experience.

> On the contrary, I find that the poor and ignorant rarely exercise their legal and constitutional rights. . . . Most accused persons—rich and powerful as well as poor and ignorant—plead guilty. For those who stand trial, the elaborate panoply of the law and the rights of the accused which occupy the attention of the public, the appellate courts, and the media is largely irrelevant. To lawyers and appellate courts, a trial is of great importance. To the defendant the sentence is really all that matters.

But this is only half of the picture. Judge Forer believes that the victim in criminal cases is, in the words of Ralph Ellison, an "invisible man."

> In civil cases, the plaintiff may be poor and illiterate and the defendant may be a billion-dollar corporation or vice-versa. Both parties are represented by counsel. In criminal cases . . . the rules are similar. . . . [But] there is one significant difference: the plaintiff's seat is empty. The victim of the crime is not in the courtroom seated beside counsel. . . . He is only a witness, no different from the bystander who happens to see a holdup or an automobile accident. In the conduct of the trial, the victim is a non-person.

These are weaknesses built into the system and, according to Judge Forer, they are impediments to justice.

Criminals and Victims is unique not just because of the scope of its argument but because it addresses itself to the problems facing judges on a day-to-day basis. As Lois Forer herself admits,

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". . . books dealing with crime and punishment have been written by philosophers and sociologists. . . . From . . . data they seek to discern abstract properties and to establish relationships in quantitative form. . . . They are engaged in treating the ill, not in enforcing the law.

[A judge must, by necessity, look at] specific cases and individuals, one at a time. . . . The judge must be concerned with the rights of the accused, protection of society, and promotion of the rule of law. None of these other professionals has ever been faced with the necessity of imposing a penalty upon a single individual.

IN THIS BOOK, Judge Forer gives us theories and statistics but balances them with examples she has collected from her years on the bench. It is inevitable, however, that her argument is bolstered most forcefully by her examples.

In one such example, the defendant's name is Reginald and he pleads guilty to having robbed and assaulted an old man named Archie Jones. He had not meant to harm Mr. Jones but he did. This leads the trial judge to two basic questions: What are we to do with Reginald? And what is to be done for Archie Jones? Reginald, having pleaded guilty, is responsible for his actions. After testing, he was not found to be psychotic.

In imposing a penalty, should the judge simply ignore Reginald's background? Are there no degrees of responsibility? Does not childhood deprivation affect the adult? The judge can only wonder what hurts have scarred Reginald. He is physically unattractive. He should have had orthodentia. He spits a little when he speaks. Who knows what slights an ugly, unloved, not very bright child must have suffered? He is not in touch with the mother of his child. He does not see his own child or support him. Is the terrible cycle of anomie and solipsism already being repeated?

But there still remains the problem of Archie Jones. Before he was attacked by Reginald—and on the day of the crime he had only $5 and some change in his pocket—Mr. Jones was self-sufficient. He appeared in court hobbling on two canes. Mr. Jones could not longer do his grocery shopping or care for his single room without being in pain.

The judge faced with sentencing Reginald has only two choices: the defendant can either go to jail or he can be placed on probation. Judge Forer, in light of the meager alternatives, has devised another form of "punishment." For Reginald, and others of his type, she would recommend probation but with the stipulation that the defendant, if not presently employed, find employment and then begin making "monetary restitution or reparation" to the victim.

Judge Forer admits that this is at best "rough justice." To pay $25 in restitution per week, even if it were for the remainder of the victim's natural life, could never compensate for blindness or the pain of crippling injuries. But neither can Judge Forer ignore the fact that—

every penalty must provide for the needs of the victim, society, and the offender. A penalty which requires restitution or reparation is, I believe, congruent with a humanistic and democratic concept of society and with decent treatment of criminals. It would provide a feasible alternative to prison and probation for many offenders.

This is the book's most challenging concept and it is presented in the opening chapter. The rest of the book is thorough, discussing rehabilitation, theories of sentencing, and the different types of crime, while never shying away from the ambiguities in her argument. Forer is most persuasive when she describes the erratic nature of most criminal behavior, its irrationality, and how this single factor has been the downfall of rehabilitation. She also admits that—

we simply do not know how to treat violent, dangerous offenders so that they can be "cured" of violence, unreason, and hostility. Until such time as there are developments in psychotherapy, chemistry, and medicine, the legal system will have to isolate these people who pose an unreasonable risk to society.

In her final chapter, "Agenda for Reform," the judge enumerates several other possible means of curtailing violent crimes. She is a tireless advocate of gun control. She strongly believes that the education of drop-outs, the creation of jobs for street criminals, the spending of federal monies to combat spouse and child abuse, the elimination of disparities in sentencing (especially for white-collar crimes) and, of course, that her seemingly simple but ground-breaking proposal of redress for victims might bring us closer to a sane society.

Even though Judge Forer has avoided all taint of ideology, she has in this last chapter sided with traditional liberal humanism; thus she has made herself an easy target for conservative invective. But the worth of her book has less to do with political factions than with simple compassion. Devotion to an ideal of ethics and morality can easily be made to resemble the mawkishness of a "bleeding heart." But what is obvious in Lois Forer's book is that she does not agonize; she thinks, then acts accordingly. □

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Cynthia Fuchs Epstein

Women in Political Thought

WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT, by Susan Moller Okin. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 371 pp. Cloth, $22.50; paper, $4.95.

Why some ideas are picked up and developed and others lie fallow is a question insufficiently addressed by the sociology of knowledge. Gregory Bateson, in his book *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*, asks if there is some sort of natural selection that determines the survival of some ideas and the extinction of others. He does not go so far as to suggest that survival of the fittest is operative here (what would the fittest ideas be?) but this conception surely provokes one to ask why certain ideas survive, who controls their selection, and what purposes their selection serve.

Looking at a (selected) chronology of Western political thought as identified in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and John Stuart Mill, and those of two major social scientists of our time, Talcott Parsons and Erik Erikson, Susan Okin shows how the lines of thinking that legitimate the curtailment of rights for women have endured while at the same time they argue for individual rights and freedoms. Indeed, those views suggesting that women are deserving and competent to administer individual and collective freedoms have been neglected throughout cultural history though effectively argued by such thinkers as Plato and Mill whose other ideas survived. One can identify a "natural selection" of ideas of inequality with regard to women from the pens of Aristotle and Rousseau to the committee rooms of Detroit where the Republican party voted platform provisions withdrawing support for an equal rights amendment and advocating revocation of constitutional support for the right of women to abortion.

In the competition of ideas, the evolution of the rule of reason as applied to women has not had many successful advocates. (One might ask, Do numbers of advocates count for the survival of an idea? Does quality not count?) Mill was, of course, the best of them, and how modern he sounds. Mill foreshadows the famous Broverman et al. studies,* which show that when a healthy person is rated, the qualities evaluated are those of self-sufficiency, assertiveness, assurance, and so forth. These are the qualities of the healthy male. But the healthy female, according to the "common" view, is opposite; she is dependent and passive. Mill provokingly inquired why what was meritorious for a man is the opposite for women. He suggested that even such attributes as unselfishness and restraint, attributed to women by his philosophical peers, could be explained by their structured dependence on others. He argued generally (and specifically in an interesting correspondence with Comte cited in Okin's book) that physiological explanations are highly questionable. Physical size, for example, which Comte believed made the male brain larger and therefore better, would suggest that tall and large men would be smarter than shorter and slimmer men, and that elephants and whales would have it over them all in competence. Mill futher pointed out that the best and brightest (not his terms) were those who had both masculine and feminine qualities. Perhaps this should raise the question of why this view was not naturally selected—especially by those leaders of mind and polity for whom the joust, discus, or football had no special attraction.

Okin suggests it is the logic assigning to women the role of maintaining the family unit that ties all the social philosophers and that has legitimated the inferior position of women in all societies. Aristotle and Rousseau argue that women, by nature, are suited to family roles and unsuited to other roles; and Plato and Mill argue that although women may enter the world of public affairs, they will be mainly responsible for the home. Both lines of reasoning insured that women would be in a structural position of subordination. Okin argues there has been a consistent view that Man is a focus of humanity and the individual, but a focus on women (no capital letter here) is a focus on the family and its collective needs. What do men *do*? And what are women *for*? These, Okin claims, are the persistent intellectual questions that lead to inequities in meshing individual rights with the collective good.

The challenges of Orkin's book go beyond the functionalist specter she evokes for the condition

* I. K. Broverman, et al., "Sex Role Stereotypes and Clinical Judgments of Mental Health," *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, vol. 34 (1970), pp. 1-7.

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of women to her identification of the penetrating inquiry into the inequities between men and women of such figures as Plato and John Stuart Mill. Interestingly, the selection process chose not to remember these ideas of Plato and Mill and instead enshrined such assertions as Rousseau's "Women cannot discover principles, as men can, but they have better heads for detail! . . . it is their task to apply the principles discovered by man, and it is up to them to make the observations that lead man to discover these principles."

Why was the time right for the common culture's capture of Rousseau's ideas and not right for Plato's vision of philosopher queens as well as kings (in the *Republic*) and not right for Mill's recognition of women's capacities as shown by Joan of Arc, Madame de Staël, George Sand, and Queen Elizabeth? Why was the time right in the 20th century for those philosophical questions that explored the creative and leadership qualities in human nature but still not right to recognize these qualities in women?

Why did Erik Erikson, as Okin points out, become this century's Rousseau and Talcott Parsons the modern Aristotle, defining women by their child-rearing responsibility and their family integration roles and assuming that by nature and right the ". . . outer world space belongs to the men"?

All philosophers, of course (and I include Parsons and Erikson among them) have seemed limited by their myopic entrenchment in a bourgeois family setting that was then extrapolated to the world. (Okin does not comment on Marx's and Engels's observations of the impact of the family on women.)

Mill asked the kinds of questions that proper application of the scientific method should have answered about the capacity of women to function as intellectuals and leaders. Why that didn't happen for so long shows that any method is only as good as the questions that are asked. Of course, an intellectual interest in investigating those questions may well have been (or be) against the class interests of powerful men who have an investment in keeping women subservient. It did, after all, fall to women, now organized and made more powerful by their participation in the "outer world," to explore the age-old concept of their innate deficiencies and to find them incorrect.

Marx pointed out that the bourgeois family served the interests of the powerful in being the mainstay of the stratification system. Okin does not explore the connection between the family and the economic and political systems. She limits her conclusion to pointing out that the age-old views outlined in the book that women should serve and support the family both conceptually and structurally determine their second-class status. She argues that, unless work in the home and child care is shared by men, women will do no better in the modern era than they did before. But there is no questioning of the basic issues as to whether the family is an ideal form (for the just society); or whether it is precisely women's family role that limits their integration in the most favored positions in society.

Okin has demonstrated that there were founding philosophic fathers whose ideas could have served the cause of equity between the sexes, as there were those who reinforced inequity. Yet those ideas survived that served inequity as they also served certain classes of men, unchallenged by the burden of proof and logic. This is not a phenomenon limited to the discussion of justice with regard to the rights of sex. It is an enduring intellectual curiosity that humans have a capacity for holding contradictory beliefs disproved by facts. It is clear, as this book reminds us, that we must ask again and again what knowledge is used, what it is used for, and who are its ultimate consumers. □

Laurent Stern

Early Lukacs

THE YOUNG LUKACS AND THE ORIGINS OF WESTERN MARXISM, by Andrew Arato and Paul Breines. New York: Seabury Press. 256 pp. $16.50.

About 25 years ago, when the work of George Lukacs—and especially of the young Lukacs—was hardly known outside a rather restricted circle, it was easy to see what motivated his interpreters in wanting to find a new audience for him: they expected that his critique of cultural history and social theory would enable them to claim a tradition for their own work. Values had to be defended against those who were seen to be the vulgarians and authoritarians of the left. The available models were not exactly well cast for the roles they were assigned. The more politically minded claimed the *The Prophet Unarmed* for

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their tradition, while those more conversant with theoretical issues assigned that role to the author of *History of Class Consciousness*.

What motivates today the writing of a book on the young Lukacs? The major works of both the pre-Marxist and Marxist Lukacs are now available in English translation. Paul Ernst or Charles-Louis Philippe may be forgotten by all but specialists in the minor works of German or French literature—yet these writers are alive for readers of Lukacs's early work, now reissued in German and translated into English, French, and Italian. These authors, however, come to life in the essays of Lukacs not as writers of literary works but rather as models for solutions to a question formulated under many guises: *how to live*? Surely, Lukacs's own formulations were more sententious and more suitable to the intellectual style of Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany. It sounds paradoxical, but the author of these books, ostensibly about literature—*The Soul and the Forms*, and *Theory of the Novel*—was not much interested in literary works.

Arato and Breines, the joint authors of this fine book, may find this claim somewhat excessive. They rightly insist that Lukacs's disclaimer of 1918 should be taken seriously. He did not consider himself a critic, since he was "interested only in the axiology and philosophy of history of works, not in the works themselves." Literary critics who claim Lukacs for their own ranks—one even compared him to Edmund Wilson—are clearly mistaken. The reception of Lukacs's work supports this judgment. Many of his admirers turned to his other books, but not even his major commentators took the trouble of reading or rereading the literary works he wrote about. It would be difficult to find admiring readers of a literary critic or of a theoretician of literature who would be satisified to read him, but would never turn to the works he discusses.

Until 1918 Lukacs's writings are informed by a romantic anticapitalism and philosophical idealism. He defends the values of *Gemeinschaft* (organic community) against *Gesellschaft* (atomized society). Realists, positivists, and utilitarians are treated as philistines. Beginning at least with the essay "On the Poverty of Spirit" (1912), a strong religious element can be in found in the background of these writings. In a planned work on Dostoevsky (*The Theory of the Novel* is part of this project), a confrontation between what Hegelians call "objective spirit," the state and religious institutions, and what Lukacs calls "soul" is projected. The ideals mentioned in this context are represented by Dostoevsky's Alyosha Karamazov, Prince Mishkin, and Sonia. These ideals are at first presented in an elitist setting but later, under the influence of Russian Social Revolutionaries, they are reaffirmed on a collectivist foundation.

ARATO AND BREINES RIGHTLY INSIST that Lukacs's choice of communism and Marxism in December 1918 must be understood in the light of his earlier cultural critique of capitalism. Lukacs must have seen the revolutionary upheavals at the end of World War I as the beginning of the realization of his vision of man who is no longer alienated and and who is "everywhere at home." With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy for us to see that the revolutionary movement did not take place in the more advanced, industrialized countries of Western Europe and America; and in the Eastern countries, where revolutions did take place, they were brought about by Leninist vanguards who claimed to act on behalf of a proletariat or of "workers and peasants."

The adversaries of Marxism saw both these points a long time ago, but their significance was not well understood. Leninist theories in the Eastern countries emphasized the voluntaristic aspects of Marxism, because no organized industrial proletariat could be relied upon to bring about evolutionary change. In Western industrialized countries the deterministic aspects of Marxism were emphasized, because the organized industrial workers were quite successful in gaining gradual improvements. The prevailing intellectual climate in Western industrialized countries favored skepticism, positivism, and democratic ideals; the act of faith required for wagering on the collapse of capitalism and on the final victory of socialism was thoroughly alien to these heirs of the Enlightenment. But skepticism, democratic ideals, and the tradition of the Enlightenment were never at home in the less advanced Eastern countries, where the call for an act of faith in final victory fell on more fertile ground.

Leninist theories proclaimed, in effect, that wherever there is no large industrial proletariat the vanguard can arrogate to itself the historic mission of the proletariat, while disregarding the actual proletariat. Defenders of the actual proletariat were relegated to the "dustbin of history." At the time Lukacs wrote the essays that were to be published as *History and Class Consciousness* (1923), the vanguard theory had been put into practice for a few years. Lukacs's contribution was

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primarily to provide historical and sociological foundations for the theory. But even there he was not completely original. The central problem of these essays concerns class consciousness and reification. Proletarian class consciousness is not the empirical consciousness of individuals or groups but rather what the consciousness of the proletariat would be, if it could comprehend its class interest and its historical role. Class consciousness is ascribed to a class and depends not only on the interests of that class but also on the relation of that class to the whole society. Some classes have the objective possibility to reorganize society. The concept of reification is introduced to account for the absence of proletarian class consciousness. The fragmented critique of some aspects of capitalism by the proletariat is the expression of reified consciousness. The proletariat can grasp more easily the economic aspects of capitalism than its political or cultural aspects. Proletarian class consciousness would be the complete understanding of these fragmented aspects. The objective possibility of reorganizing society can be realized by the historic subject—the proletariat—which has achieved class consciousness.

Although, after some hesitation, Lukacs finally designated the Leninist vanguard as the repository of proletarian class consciousness, his views were found to be wanting by Communist officialdom. Arato and Breines describe in the third part of their book the career of *History and Class Consciousness*. The Communist authorities rejected Lukacs's views despite the role he assigned to the Leninist vanguard. The tension between normative and descriptive claims, between objective possibility and reality was unacceptable to the one-dimensional ideologues of communism. The impelling force of Lukacs's book was the search and discovery of a historic subject capable of achieving the realm of freedom. In this search, Lukacs was even willing to view critically the established Marxist tradition. What was unacceptable to the Communist ideologues was precisely what attracted readers to this book after World War II; these readers rejected the role assigned by Lukacs to the Leninist vanguard.

ARATO AND BREINES TRACE THE ORIGIN of what they call "Western Marxism" at least partially to Lukacs's book. But they are themselves superb guides to the irony buried in the notion of Western Marxism, especially if this is understood in the context of *History and Class Consciousness*. For whatever is Western in Lukacs's book is hardly Marxist and whatever is Marxist is not quite Western. Lukacs's notion of objective possibility made its first appearance in a somewhat different form in the work of Max Weber; his notion of alienation comes from Georg Simmel. Since Marx's early manuscripts were not published until 1932, Lukacs could not have learned about alienation from Marx. In fact, the reconstruction of Marx's views that could be verified only after the early work was published is one of the unintended achievements of Lukacs's book. On the other hand, while the wager on the vanguard as repository of class consciousness could be called Marxist, it is not Western. The apocalyptic vision of the collapse of capitalism and the eschatological hope for the final victory of socialism may be Marxist, but it has not much in common with Western understanding of Marxism. The significance of these hopes and images is religious, and they are more at home in the early pre-Marxist work of Lukacs—*and* in the early pre-Marxist work of Marx—but they have not much in common with a sober theory of society.

According to the authors,

> One of the most compelling aspects of Marx's early work (1843-44) is its fusion of the Enlightenment and Romantic standpoints into a single vision, grasping modern scientific culture and industrial technique as both liberating and imprisoning forces. With some exceptions (for example, Diderot) Enlightenment thinkers and their early nineteenth-century Utilitarian heirs stressed the former view, Romantics the latter.

In the later work of Marx, "the Enlightenment root (faith in science and technology) blossomed while its Romantic half was snuffed out." As we have seen, the social critique of the pre-Marxist Lukacs was also prompted by Romantic anticapitalism. It is the romanticism of the young Marx and the young Lukacs that must have struck a sympathetic chord in their new readers in the mid-1960s. But romanticism is hardly a sufficient foundation for a viable social theory and practice.

Arato and Breines see the development of Marxism in cycles of dogmatism and formalism (the German Social Democratic movement prior to World War I; Stalinism), interrupted by upheavals, such as those in Marx's time between 1847 and 1849, in the aftermath of World War I and, finally, in "the New Left and the student and civil rights revolts." At the time of these upheavals the revolutionary "practical-critical" activity—in the sense of Marx's first thesis on Feuerbach—gained in importance. These were the times of Romantic Marxism, when the alienated were expected to liberate themselves and society through their own

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revolutionary action. Arato and Breines do not include the Commune of Paris in their list of revolutionary upheavals. It may be a bit embarrassing for their thesis that Marx and Engels—or their disciples—did not return to their earlier Romantic views under the impact of that experience. On the other hand, they view "the New Left insurgency of the late 1960's" as sufficiently important to be included in that list. They view that movement as an "internally contradictory human phenomenon of revolt, consisting of students, youth, national minorities, women as women, radical religious groups, and so forth."

No sober social theory could support the view that such a heterogeneous collection of groups could ever become the historic subject capable of reorganizing society. Excepting a very small minority, these groups were passive. Their revolutionary rhetoric served as an excuse for harassment and violence by adversaries and state authorities. Their martyrs should be remembered, but this does not transform them into a significant revolutionary movement. □

George Eckstein

The Prague Spring

NIGHTFROST IN PRAGUE: THE END OF HUMANE SOCIALISM, by Zdenek Mlynar. New York: Karz. 300 pp. $16.95.

The Prague Spring of 1968 remains one of the traumatic experiences of the left. It revealed both the tensions at work beneath the surface of the Soviet-dominated world and the Russians' determination to maintain their control regardless of cost.

Zdenek Mlynar, one of the most prominent participants, wrote a postmortem on the tragic events immediately after leaving Czechoslovakia in 1977. *Nightfrost in Prague*, published two years ago in West Germany, is now available to the American reader in a good translation by Paul Wilson. At the time of the events, the then 38-year-old Mlynar was at least a decade younger than most of his co-actors in the drama; as secretary of the Central Committee of the Czech Communist party, and briefly as a member of the Presidium, he belonged to the inner circle of power. Trained five years for high office at the Moscow University Law School, and his mind (and doubts) later sharpened at the Prague Academy of Science, he combines in his reflections the firsthand experience of a participant with a dispassionate analytical approach.

His book follows the Prague Spring from its incubation period under Novotny in the early '60s, through its flowering in the first half of 1968, to the armed intervention of the Warsaw Pact powers, and the capitulation in Moscow at the end of August 1968. Mlynar traces the Spring's explosion to the coinciding activity from above and below; a softening up among those in power; a spread of public criticism among intellectuals and journalists. Mlynar's own position was a centrist one, between the ardent reform Communists on one side, and the small, more or less openly Russia-oriented faction on the other. His attitude seems to have been representative of the majority of the Party leadership, which wanted reforms, but reforms within its control. Thus the Action Program of May 1968, of which Mlynar was the chief author, while permitting free expression, still retained one-party rule for an indefinite period. However, Dubcek's lack of decisiveness allowed the long-suppressed liberating stream to overflow.

In retrospect, Mlynar is no longer sure of the validity of the centrist position:

> For if the reforms had been limited to institutional changes from above—which in all likelihood would have provoked a military intervention anyway—there would not have been such an enormous, intense and united resistance by the entire nation, coupled with extraordinary discipline and political confidence in Dubcek's leadership.

But most of the leaders, and above all Dubček, acted under the illusion that, as long as Czechoslovakia would remain faithfully in the Warsaw Pact and would keep the more radical reformers in line, the Soviet Union would acquiesce. Thus, with few exceptions, the party leaders did not seriously consider the possibility of military intervention. Nor did they prepare against it—either by mobilizing the workers or by looking for political support abroad. Dubcek held on to his illusions even in the face of Kadar's barely veiled dramatic last-minute warning of the imminence of the invasion, which ended in Kadar's incredulous question: "Do you

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really not know the kind of people you are dealing with?"

Behind such delusions stood, of course, the lingering ideological solidarity with the Soviet system. Hence the shock when, during the fateful last meeting in Moscow, Brezhnev made it abundantly clear that the whole matter was strictly a question of power, and that Moscow would not tolerate any internal threat to its hegemony within its sphere of influence. In this connection, the following passage in Mlynar's book is worth quoting in full:

> "For us," Brezhnev went on, "the results of the Second World War are inviolable, and we will defend them even at the cost of risking a new war." And then he said in so many words that they would have undertaken the military intervention in Czechoslovakia even if the risk had existed. But, he added, there was no such danger. "I asked President Johnson if the American government still fully recognizes the results of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. And on August 18 I received the reply: as far as Czechoslovakia and Rumania are concerned, it recognizes them without reservation; in the case of Yugoslavia, it would have to be discussed. So what do you think will be done on your behalf? Nothing. There will be no war. Comrade Tito and Comrade Ceausescu will say their piece, and so will Comrade Berlinger. Well, and what of it? You are counting on the Communist movement in Western Europe, but that won't amount to anything for fifty years."

It would be interesting to find out whether Brezhnev actually had this exchange with President Johnson (in which case the equivocal reply regarding Yugoslavia would be particularly disturbing); or whether Brezhnev only invented it to put the Czech delegation under final pressure.

These words, in any case, had the desired effect. Eventually all but one of the members of the Czechoslovak Presidium present signed the protocol of capitulation. The only one to hold out was Frantisek Kriegel, the man called "that Galician Jew" by Piotr Shelest of the Soviet Politbureau, whom the Russians at first had refused to deal with, and whom they had already held captive and had released only when some of the Czech leaders refused to return without him.

IN REFLECTING on the causes for the Russian intervention, aside from the desire for absolute control within their zone of hegemony, Mlynar sees another major factor in "the competing interests of a power struggle in the Soviet leadership." By ending the Cold War, Mlynar argues, Khrushchev had initiated a more dynamic but also more risky global role for the Soviet Union. This policy succeeded in penetrating various areas in the world, through trade in the West, by diplomatic and military means in the Third World. At the same time, however, the ties in the satellite countries loosened, "the Communist movement outside the bloc began to disengage itself as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy," and China grew as a threat.

To the military, in Mlynar's judgment, the newly gained influence in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere was not sufficient compensation for the loss of absolute control within the Soviet empire proper. Hence the tension within the Politbureau, which, after the failed Cuban adventure in 1962, resulted in Khrushchev's fall, and later in the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Mlynar is somewhat vague on the role of Brezhnev and Kosygin, aside from pointing to the matter-of-course way in which they lorded it over their vassals. He seems unsure whether to believe Brezhnev's hints of being under pressure himself from the military. At any rate, he considers the lines of conflict within the Soviet ruling elite not sharply drawn; even within the military he senses differences between the old-style tank-warfare marshals and the exponents of the new missile technology. Mlynar raises these points in the limited context of the crushing of the Prague Spring. Needless to say, they weigh even more heavily on the global scale, especially at a time when a relatively cautious generation of leaders is about to be replaced.

A final note: Mlynar, the man from the Party's upper reaches, subtitles his book, *The End of Humane Socialism*. The German version of another memoir covering the same events, written by Jiri Pelikan, parliamentary deputy and head of Czechoslovakia's state television network in 1968, is entitled *Ein Frühling der nie zu Ende geht*—"A Spring that Never Ends." Who's right? The answer to this question depends largely on one's perspective. Will future "Springs"—as Pelikan seems to believe—be able to provoke sufficient political (and military) support from fellow states in the Soviet camp and from nonaligned countries (Yugoslavia?) to make Moscow hesitate? Can any such "Spring" succeed without involving the active backing of the West, and that means in the last resort of the United States—a backing fraught with risks to a precarious status quo between the two world powers? □

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B. J. Widick

Communists' Role in the Unions

Labor and Communism: The Conflict That Shaped American Unions, by Bert Cochran. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 394 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $6.95.

As a participant and survivor of the labor and radical struggles of the 1930s and 1940s, Bert Cochran has substantial credentials for undertaking this major study. The result is a fascinating, controversial, and important book. Cochran knows politics, trade unionism, and had the benefit of personal experiences with many Communist and non-Communist union leaders.

For students of the American left, this is a valuable reference along with such publications as Theodore Draper's two volumes on the early days of the Communist movement and the history of the American Communist party by Lewis Coser and Irving Howe. Cochran fleshes out previous portraits of a variety of figures, among them Jay Lovestone, John L. Lewis, Walter Reuther, Harry Bridges, Earl Browder, and Philip Murray. The research is impressive and his analysis well-documented.

These virtues are also a weakness. For the knowledgeable reader, weaving one's way through the maze of events and personalities is an exciting expedition into the past. For the uninitiated, however, it must be a political nightmare.

Cochran describes the CP as a "travesty of a radical party," but he also points out that—

> even after the Party had become thoroughly Stalinized at the end of the twenties, and its uncritical enthusiasm for the Russians had been transformed into abject slavishness in following Kremlin dictates, the overwhelming mass of the Party's activities consisted of holding meetings, organizing demonstrations and rallies, issuing newspapers and publications, gathering signatures, running candidates and subscription campaigns, raising funds, recruiting new members, and the like. In other words, it was engaged in the usual round of activities associated with Marxian or other left-wing organizations; it was appealing to the public and trying to recruit members to its cause as an American radical organization of a Marxian type. In the four decades from the time of its formation to the time of its disintegration, the violence with which the Communist movement was generally associated was the traditional sort that arose out of bitterly fought industrial strikes, or from public demonstrations and marches, not out of plots to seize government installations, blow up arsenals or assassinate public figures. When Communist leaders were tried for violations of the Smith Act—the Alien Registration Law of 1940—the testimony against them was of advocating violence in study classes and lectures for the organizations of a revolution at some indeterminate future date, not of hatching current plots.

A review of the activities of the Communists in the 1920s—a decade of failure by Cochran's standards—features the Gastonia strike in 1929. It was as suicidal as the Charge of the Light Brigade. However, Cochran balances his critique with a reminder that an AFL-led textile strike suffered the same brutal consequences, even if run by the respectable unionist (and later an assistant secretary of labor) Edward P. Grady.

Perhaps the book's best chapter is devoted to the issue of the political strikes in the defense period up to World War II. Cochran demonstrates that John L. Lewis and other nonradical unionists did far more damage to the "war effort" than the Communist-led strikes. He directly challenges Sidney Hook's "conspiracy theory" of the role of the CP. But throughout the book Cochran also debunks the mythology in the spate of books by ex-radical and CP writers who depict themselves solely as working-class militants fighting capitalism. Cochran details how many times the CP union leaders were either dupes or victims of party policy. The career of James Matles is a case in point. No political party ever destroyed its union leaders more systematically than the CP, and this story is well told by Cochran.

My major quarrel with Cochran is on other grounds. After all these years, Cochran appears unable to evaluate the costly mistakes other radicals, including he himself, made in those turbulent times. Nor does he appear less a Reuther-baiter now than he was in 1946—a regrettable bias in an otherwise fine study.

THERE IS a large dose of cynicism—not skepticism—in Cochran's remarks on current labor.

> There is no necessary juxtaposition between bureaucratization and union officials' venality, extortion, bribe-taking, alliances with the underworld, terrorization of opponents, big salaries, looting of union treasuries, "sweetheart" agreements and other forms of corrupt collusion with employers. The two phenomena are often yoked together in journalistic writing, and indeed are often intertwined. They are none-

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theless distinct, discrete phenomena. The auto union under Reuther has been offered as a classic study in the development of bureaucracy and authoritarianism; yet the auto union is clinically free of the kind of malfeasances disclosed by the Senate McClellan Committee.

What a pity that Cochran is still so biased on the subject of Reutherism that he ignores the fact that an integral and vital part of Reuther's legacy was decent and honest unionism—something scarcely in surplus in the American labor movement. Or that, compared to any other institution in American society, the UAW remains a viable, democratic social force—whatever its limitations.

There is much to be said for Cochran's general thesis that the conflict involving the Communist party in unions in modern times helped shape American unions. Other factors, however, have to be considered. The self-destruct policies of the CP—and other groups—led to the demise of radicalism in the American labor movement. McCarthyism didn't kill the left. It had largely committed political suicide by the '50s. Furthermore, the viability and relative success of American capitalism, emerging after the Great Depression and the devastations of World War II, cannot be underestimated in shaping both the course of labor and radicalism in the United States. □

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Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Abel's Exegesis from Malicious Gossip

There is no contemporary figure of international public life more closely associated with a thorough, rigorously elaborated political economy than I am. Hence when Lionel Abel writes [in *Dissent*, Fall 1980], ". . . the lack of foundation for LaRouche's position in some theory of political economy," we have in such a statement adequate, conclusive proof that his opinions on LaRouche as a whole are not only fraudulent, but willfully fraudulent.

That is the most glaring among a series of familar sorts of frauds permeating Abel's article as a whole. He alleges that my associates and I have made specific characterizations of a variety of persons including Henry Kissinger, Isaac Newton, and David Hume, all without any supporting documentation. It is true that my associates and I are responsible for compiling certain revelations. All these categorizations were circulated internationally in the form of either books, substantial pamphlets, or through lengthy newspaper and magazine articles, in which those categorizations are presented as the conclusion of extensive documentation. It is clear either that Mr. Abel is lying, or that he is almost totally ignorant of what he purports to be writing about.

The willful fraud of Abel's conduct in such isolable features of his article is coherent with the character of the article as a whole. Despite his attempts to achieve the "Fleming effect" of literary believability, with selected references to give the false appearance of extensive scholarship, the evidence of the article is clear. Abel's article was composed on the basis of something equivalent to a file handed to him. This file consisted chiefly of regurgitated false and malicious gossip against me, plus a few isolated items taken outrageously out of context, and used to imply verisimilitude.

Two isolated, but key sentences in Abel's article as a whole suffice to prove that that article was not written on the basis of direct study of my writings and activities as a Democratic party presidential candidate. Taken together, these two sentences show that Abel has relied large on lying, malicious gossip conduited from discredited circles proximate to the notorious former Senator Joseph McCarthy aide Roy Cohn.

I refer first to what appears to be an innocent error in the second sentence of Abel's article as a whole. "In a few television appearances (as a candidate for the presidency in 1976, and once again this year, in the New Hampshire primary). . . ."

In fact, during the New Hampshire Democratic primary my campaign deployed more radio and television broadcasting than any two other Democratic or Republican candidates combined, including two nationwide half-hour television-network broadcasts during that period. In addition to substantial state and regional campaign broadcasts, usually half-hour televised features, in Wisconsin, California, Texas, and elsewhere, my campaign's major nationwide television coverage totaled four half-hour broadcasts and one quarter-hour broadcast.

This correction of Abel's sentence is not a quibble. Any journalist or other writer assigned to cover my campaign would have relied chiefly on the coverage of my campaign in the national semiweekly newspaper *New Solidarity*, in which my campaign advertised repeatedly all upcoming nationwide television appearances, as well as many of the principal local television appearances. That newspaper also published substantial excerpts from the principal nationwide television broadcasts, as well as events such as my address to the Texas State Democratic Convention's plenary sessions.

Since Abel purports to be something of an independent journalistic authority on the entirety of the LaRouche campaign, the factual error, "once again this year," is a revealing blunder.

The second of the telltale sentences points to the authorship of the file on which Abel actually based his piece. "How could people with that background" (referring to his ill-informed version of the political history of me and my immediate associates) "have come all the way around to what has been called by Dennis King in *Our Town* a 'neo-Nazi' outlook?"

The editor of the weekly shoppers' throwaway *Our Town*, one Ed Kayatt, is a convicted felon, who served time in prison in connection with fraud. Without the legal services of Mr. Roy Cohn's friends, including the defense of *Our Town* in major libel actions arising out of the very lies which contributor Abel borrows from that source, it is doubted that *Our Town* would have survived the adversary attention of many forces, including Mr. Cohn's adversaries around the New York City *Village Voice*. Nor is Mr. Abel's cited authority, *Our Town* contributor Dennis King, usually regarded as a creature burdened with empyreal qualities of probity.

Yet, Abel uses the cited sentence concerning King's allegations as the implied premise of his own article as a whole. In effect, whether wittingly or not, Abel has crawled into bed with the notorious Roy Cohn. The sources of the libelous file from which Abel cribbed his own paraphrases are rather well-defined.

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The "Neo-Nazi" Charge

ACCORDING TO the notarized transcript of a tape-recorded conversation with Jeremiah Novak, the proposal to libel me as a "Nazi" originated with his circles intersecting the office of Senator Jacob Javits. Another affidavit, this reporting statements volunteered by Canon Edward West of New York's Anglican Cathedral of St. John the Divine, identified the authorship of the libel more broadly, "We," Canon West stated, referring to the British Order of St. John of Jerusalem, "are going to tie them up with Jews." The affidavit explains how the financier interests associated with the Anglo-Canadian Order were going to divert the attack of LaRouche and his associates from their own door by directing elements of Zionist organizations to conduct a diversionary attack on LaRouche as "anti-Semitic."

That won't work against LaRouche, Novak criticized the authors of the "anti-Semitism" slander. We have to attack him as "Nazi." Novak, speaking back in 1978, added, "I'm going to Europe" to get the "Nazi" libel against LaRouche underway.

It is true that I am the target of threats as well as hatred of the Jewish Defense League, with which Mr. Dennis King has been working publicly over most of the past 12 months, as well as threats from the Khomeini supporters of the international Muslim Brotherhood. In part, this Jewish Defense League attack is simply what the affidavits of Canon West's and Jeremiah Novak's statements imply.

It is also true that my alliances with certain Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish forces against the "Greater Israel" fanatics of the Menahem Begin government has earned me the hatred of that faction of Israeli intelligence, centered in the Mossad, for which the Jewish Defense League is a well-known cover inside the United States. Although my associates and I oppose Zionism as a theological absurdity, in the same terms as many rabbis, the state of Israel within its internationally recognized borders is a fact, and it is past time that the Israeli refugees from the horrifying experience and image of Auschwitz found security through comprehensive and durable peace with their Arab neighbors. Therefore, my wife and I support the efforts of our cherished and lovable acquaintance, Nahum Goldmann. He is not only a beautiful personality, but represents a sound outlook for Middle East peace—notwithstanding his personal regard for Henry Kissinger, Bernard Lewis, and Zbigniew Brzezinski. My public support for Nahum Goldmann's proposals has increased the hatred against me from the faction of Israeli intelligence which deploys the Jewish Defense League.

Abel Does Not Represent *Dissent*'s Interest

IT IS emphatically true, of course, that *Dissent* and I represent opposing political-philosophical viewpoints. Abel's borrowing of the scurrilous "neo-Nazi" premise from the orbit of Roy Cohn serves to divert the debate away from those important differences our two points of view ought to be fighting out. Let us use this occasion, therefore, to begin that productive debate.

I believe that Mr. Irving Howe and others would accept the stipulation that their views lie within the range of what scholarship identifies as "British philosophical radicalism." We should confide to your readers who do not happen to be specialist scholars in such matters that "British philosophical radicalism" is usually traced to Jeremy Bentham, and is otherwise associated with the 19th-century British and Viennese "utilitarians," including the economists Jevons and Marshall. This "utilitarianism," the social doctrine of the "felicific calculus" ("hedonistic calculus"), is rightly viewed as a consistent outgrowth of the British empiricism of Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Adam Smith, and David Hume.

I believe that most of the editorial community of *Dissent* would stipulate that they recognize, and are opposed to the political-philosophical current which I represent: that of the "continental" Neoplatonic republicans, from Dante Alighieri, through Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, the Erasmians, the school of Raphael, the French Oratorians and *politiques*, and the networks associated with Leibnitz, including the Ecole Polytechnique and the Lafayette-centered, international "American System" conspiracy of such American notables as Henry Clay, Henry C. Carey, Friedrich List, and Abraham Lincoln during the 19th century.

It is not wildly presumptuous of me to assume that that editorial community situates itself within the anglophile-liberal "revisionist" interpretation of American history. Although members of that association might disagree with specifics of William James, John Dewey, Charles A. Beard, Walter Lippmann, Thurman Arnold, William Appleman Williams, and Gabriel Kolko, they locate themselves within the orbit of that community of liberalism.

Since there are economists among the members of *Dissent*'s editorial community, that part of the community, at least, knows that I represent something more than a continuation of the "American System" political-economy of Hamilton, Carey, and List. What distinguishes me from modern professors of 19th-century American political-economy is work I began approximately 1952, applying the physical-geometrical methods of Bernhard Riemann to a then-unresolved principal problem of mathematical economics: the problem of determining changes in the rate of economic growth consequent to changes in the rate of introduction of more advanced productive technologies.

When I intervened personally into "New Left" ferment of the middle to late 1960s, to recruit selectively the nucleus of an elite replica of the old Platonic Academy, I became best known for my application of Riemannian methods to correct the central error of Karl Marx's four-volume *Capital*, emphasizing the elementary fallacy most clearly underlined by the concluding, fragmentary chapter of *Capital* II. The gifted (chiefly youthful) personalities who became closely associated with me through their agreement with that Riemannian critique of Marx's system define the now-matured international network of American System-oriented Neoplatonic republicans among whom I continue to be primus inter pares today.

Although the computer-based method of economic forecasting and analysis known as the "LaRouche-

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Riemann Model" is but a predicate of my more generalized political-philosophical method and outlook, everything that my associates and I represent is sufficiently implicit in that predicated political-economic feature of my associates' common work and outlook generally.

For example, this application of Riemannian physics to economic processes cross-fertilized our work in plasma physics and related topics. Within the international scientific community, my associates and I have come to play a contributing part in the efforts to advance control of thermonuclear fusion by resurrecting neglected features of the development of differential equations, such as the work of Legendre and Riemann, in connection with solutions to problems of isentropic compression. Moreover, progress in that aspect of physics research has benefited most considerably our study of improved conceptions of elliptic functions applicable to computer-based analysis and forecasting applying the LaRouche-Riemann Model to whole economies.

Such predicates of application of Neoplatonic method—what used to be termed by the British the methods of "continental science"—imply our outlook toward every aspect of life, including our historiography, and our overview of such matters as constitutional and natural law.

My associates and I made the transition from obscurity toward our present, rapidly growing participation in international policy-formulating circles during the 1974-75 period. The principal cause for this transition was the international circulation of the proposal to replace the shards of the Bretton Woods system with a new, gold-based international rediscount facility, which I named tentatively a new "International Development Bank," beginning with my first public announcement of this proposal by means of a Bonn, West Germany, press conference in April 1975.

My proposal was immediately taken up with great interest by leading circles of numerous emerging nations, as well as among European bankers and others. Reception of my proposals was especially favorable among those concurring with the outlook of France's Jacques Rueff and supporters of the 1967 *Populorum Progressio* of Pope Paul VI. This also subjected me to international "dirty tricks" deployed under the personal direction of Henry A. Kissinger. That is documented in part by FOIA documents, including key documents signed by Kissinger, as well as by personal report of high-level officials of both Western European and emerging-nation governments and other leading circles.

When France's President Giscard d'Estaing and Germany's Chancellor Helmut Schmidt launched the new European Monetary System in July 1978, a number of leading financial officials in Europe and the United States reacted to that initiative by describing me as "the intellectual author" of the new system—with special emphasis on what is often called the "Phase II" implementation of the new European system. This was a broadly accurate appreciation of my policies. From then to the present date, I have been a vigorous supporter of the new monetary system—and have incurred as my enemies those who have come to hate President Giscard and Chancellor Schmidt on account of this and related issues. Those enemies include, most prominently, the Mont Pelerin Society and its U.S. propaganda arm, the Heritage Foundation, as well as Roy Cohn's cronies of the New York East Side Conservative Club.

In addition to the broad political-philosophical hostility my outlook and policies evoke among anglophile-liberal currents generally, and in addition to the specific enmity I enjoy from Henry Kissinger's circles, I have vigorously attacked the neo-Malthusian Club of Rome for its genocidal proposals of global reduction of the population. Those, too, are my pledged adversaries. Nor has my associates' exposure of the financial side of the estimated $200-billions-plus international drug traffic found me new friends among those identified circles.

The widespread calumnies spread against me from such sources are understandable. Considering the combined forces' influence over much of the nationwide news media, it is not astonishing that those news media have not carried a stick of objective reporting of my actual campaign and other activities—even when such activities are reported in the leading press abroad. Rather, the same influenced news media which ordinarily suppress news accounts of my activities turned in by their journalists, spent millions of dollars' worth of coverage, in multithousand-word libels in principal print media, to circulate lying defamation modeled on the hoaxes originally conduited through the pages of a felon-edited throwaway rag produced from the orbit of the most authentic of "McCarthyites," Roy Cohn. Such conduct is in the order of things; my adversaries "fight dirty." It is not a habit they have acquired recently, simply out of rage against me.

Such simplistic sorts of libel and covert-operations containment efforts against me have had their day. The exposure to tens of millions of citizens effected through major nationwide television broadcasts and intensive campaigning in a number of states and regions has undermined the credibility of continued efforts to attack me with such wild lying slanders. The effort to characterize me by some new, ever-wilder calumny, attempting to suppress all reference to the policies I represent, now works to discredit more or less immediately the sort of thug who attempts to spread such lying filth.

As for *Dissent* itself, it is merely moot to speculate whether or not more than one or two members of *Dissent*'s editorial community might be won over to my political-philosophical outlook. Yet, that speculation aside, there are a number of specific policies of current importance to liberals on which we must tend to find strong agreement. Do we not agree, for example, that the United States must not be plunged into an avoidable depression worse than that of the 1930s? Do we not agree that the imminent death of tens of millions of Africans from famine, epidemic, and murderous, armed gangs must be halted immediately?

As liberals, *Dissent* editors may be among those drawn into the "environmentalist movement's" orbit, but are they willing to follow that neo-Malthusian doctrine to the point of multibillion-person genocide recently proposed by the terms of the Carter administration's "Global 2000" doctrine, the doctrine already directly responsible for imminent genocide in most of black

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Africa? Are they willing to tolerate such genocide merely to satisfy hostility against "industrial capitalism," to tolerate genocide on grounds that life-saving modern technology represents "ethnocide"?

On a range of such issues, my policies coincide in effect with the dictates of the American traditionalist-liberal conscience. *Dissent*'s collective conscience obliges it to brush Roy Cohn-copied lying calumnies against me to one side, and to debate both our philosophical differences and these crucial issues honestly.

The Shift in the U.S. Political Process

IN ADDITION to the issues associated with the policies I (actually) represent, there is currently in process a profound shift in U.S. political institutions, a shift which explains, at least in significant degree, my successful emergence as a growing factor within the Democratic party.

This second aspect of my recent role has provoked worried attention of the sort echoed in the opening eight paragraphs of Abel's piece.

It is not necessary to engage in mystical sorts of metaphysical speculations, as Abel does in debating whether or not I possess the mystical Machiavellian property of *virtu*. Quite apart from the malicious sort of speculation concerning my alleged *virtu*, Weberian *charisma*, or whatever else is dredged up to similar effect, even presumably well-educated Americans suffer a defect which prevents them from comprehending the sort of political transformation currently under way. It is this defect which spills over into such specific attempts as Abel's malevolent estimation of my imagined mystical properties.

In respect to myself, I have observed that among nominally better-educated Americans, only my Jesuit opponents and some among their, unfortunately, rarer Augustinian adversaries have manifested any real comprehension of my underlying, and ultimately governing dedications and outlook. Generally speaking, chiefly because of the influence of British empiricism in our universities over the course of this century, Americans have become "philosophically purblind."

This is in paradoxical contrast to the state of affairs among the British elites. Although the British intelligentsia is fanatically empiricist overall, such British empiricists are much better educated than the run of graduate students from our anglophile universities. The American product of such influences ingenuously accepts empiricism as "simply the normal, right way of thinking." The British intelligentsia, although fanatically empiricist (at least in the broader sense of that term), is not only conscious of opposing philosophical outlooks, but commands some degree of systematic insight into the philosophical viewpoints to which it is opposed. In France, in what survives of the old Neoplatonist tradition of Catholic West Germany, among India's elites, and so forth, the situation is different. Bastions of the philosophical outlook of "continental science," of Augustinian Neoplatonism and its parallels persist. Most such nations are far more cultured than educated Americans on this important point.

In our country, the situation has been reached today, that the very name of "philosophy" has become so emptied, so degraded that almost any old curmudgeon sprouting disjointed, bucolic sentimentalities from a back-porch rocking chair might be labeled a "philosopher" without offense to public opinion. We are, generally, become a nation of the "philosophically purblind."

Nonetheless, our population is deeply divided in direction of impulse by profound differences in unconscious philosophical tendencies. People are significantly governed in their judgments and behavior by the influence of such philosophical tendencies, but even while acting under such influences would usually deny that such a comprehensible distinction as a "philosophical tendency" might be adduced from their conduct.

This "philosophical purblindness" is a crucial influence in the current transformation of our nation's political processes and institutions.

During recent times, Americans have not responded directly to issues of political policy, at least not as the term "policy" woud be understood by an educated European, Mexican, or Indian. To most Americans, "policy" is degraded to signify a specific posture toward some isolated issue, down to the level of such debatable issues as the frequency of refuse collection in neighborhoods. Toward such isolated issues, each taken more or less one at a time, Americans usually respond by adopting a "right-wing," "liberal," or "left-wing" posture, usually choosing that posture according to mere label—as of "conservative," "liberal," and so forth—the posture bears by reputation.

Despite Americans' habituated tendency to align in support of or opposition to such postures on the basis of such meaningless labelings as "conservative," "liberal," and so forth, a period of deepening crisis brings such mere labels into increasing discredit. When such habituated, Pavlov-reflex-type labels lose their former knee-jerk-prompting authority, people tend to fall back upon their unconscious philosophical tendencies.

What happens then, as has occurred in all major perceived social-political crises of this century to date, is that new political currents and institutions emerge, defining a kind of double-counterpoint in contrast to the persistence of formerly habituated, weakened political labels and institutions. That is what is occurring now. The contrast between the growth of my own role within the Democratic party to the differentiated effects of the Jerry Brown and John B. Anderson candidacies illuminates the development.

Both Jerry Brown and John B. Anderson, like Jimmy Carter in 1976, reflect the growth and consolidation of an irrationalist, charismatic social ferment centered around the theme of "The Age of Aquarius." Jerry Brown proved less credible than John Anderson as a 1980 candidate of this trend because Brown's public statements and associations were excessively explicit. Even Brown's potential supporters were not generally ready to hear the implications of their philosophical drift confronting them in such explicit terms. Anderson, scrupulously saying next to nothing on every subject, but in a style of barefoooted frankness, appeals to the philosophical tendency Brown represents, yet without

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embarrassing his supporters with detailed exposition of the practical implications of that philosophical drift.

My actual and potential constituency is directly opposite to that of Brown's and Anderson's. I represent such predicates of my own philosophical outlook as continued economic growth through promotion of sciences and technological progress, which means building on traditional values of family household, and clear-headed technological individual achievement. As citizens whose underlying philosophical tendency resonates with my own belief that traditional political formations have become ineffective, are capitulating to the onrush of the philosophical tendency represented by Brown and Anderson, they are impelled, correspondingly, to adopt my effort as the drift toward a neo-Malthusian utopian order.

Thus, mass political behavior currently involves a declining adherence—for perhaps one last time—to the vestiges of the old knee-jerk politics-by-label, and is in process of shifting toward political formations and policy debates more directly premised upon underlying philosophical tendencies. The habituated "philosophical purblindness" of our 20th-century culture inevitably slows down the rate at which citizens are able to make the shift from knee-jerk label politics, to real politics based on the practical implications of opposing philosophical tendencies.

My choice of political pathways is governed by a continual study of the problem from this standpoint.

I am persuaded that the safest and best pathway for the evolving transformation of U.S. political life is to focus efforts on strengthening the viable features of existing political and other institutions. I judge it intolerably dangerous to risk the process of building entirely new political institutions out of the general disorder, the uncertain chaos of allowing the ongoing shattering of the Democratic party to continue.

As Mr. Howe and others already know, I care less than nothing for Thomas Jefferson, Aaron Burr, and Andrew Jackson. What is real and important in the Democratic party of today is that under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, especially during the war years, the party became sociologically the most appropriate instrument for revival of the American Whig combination, Henry C. Carey's "harmony of interests" among industry, agriculture, and labor. This qualification was enhanced in a crucial way by the cross-over of Republican Negroes to the Democratic party from the time of the Al Smith candidacy onward. The Democratic party of Roosevelt is the congress of mass-based constituencies through which to develop a common national policy of industry, agriculture, and labor appropriately efficient in serving the interests of all.

It is that sociological-political potential of the constituency-based Democratic party of Roosevelt which must be salvaged from the wrecking-process the party has suffered since approximately the 1966-68 period. To this sociological potential of such a constituency-based party, there must be added the made-conscious philosophical outlook and appropriate programmatic domestic and foreign policies which fulfill the sociological potentialities.

In the New Hampshire primary, this effort produced an estimated 23-24 percent vote for my candidacy. On the basis of a block-by-block, name-by-name canvass and recanvass of individual voters precommitted to my candidacy, about 17 percent of the New Hampshire Democratic primary vote is attributed to me on a name-by-name basis. Exit polls, as corroborated in part by statements of Kennedy and Brown exit-pollers in a number of key wards, indicate the total vote for my candidacy to have been between 23 and 24 percent of the total. However, as the scandal around the election of Senator Durkin indicates, and as shown by the massive proportion of tombstones built into New Hampshire local voting lists, New Hampshire is as vote-fraud-prone as Mississippi is popularly reputed to be.

Although massive vote fraud and Roy Cohn's allies' control over the libel policy of every New Hampshire daily newspaper could affect the vote in that and subsequent primary elections, fraud merely masked, but could not extirpate the effects of the campaign itself. So, my attacks on candidate George Bush and his backers on the Trilateral Commission issue played a decisive part in shaping the margin of Reagan's victory in New Hampshire, and hence, his securing the nomination through the reconsolidated momentum developed in that first primary. The cumulative effects of more than four nationwide half-hour television addresses were cumulative influence, mounting recognition, and cumulative credibility.

There is nothing mystical in the fact that the efforts of Roy Cohn's friends to obliterate my candidacy did not prevent me from emerging as an important factor in the Democratic party nationally, despite the equivalent of tens of millions of dollars' worth of effort expended against me, and massive dirty tricks from the Carter White House and John White's circles of the Democratic National Committee. Reality asserted itself. There is a process in motion in the nation's political life, a process whose probable outcome is beyond the precalculations of those "philosophically purblind" fellows exerting waning degrees of control over our nation's mental-political life.

If this nation survives the desperate adventures of strategic confrontation looming before us now, the future of this nation will belong entirely either to the philosophical tendency represented by Jerry Brown and John B. Anderson or to that I represent. The tendency toward an "Age of Aquarius" utopia has preponderant support among leading Anglo-American circles of power, but about three-quarters of the American adult population is governed ultimately by an unconscious philosophical tendency which converges upon my own.

Thus far, only a limited number of my close friends, and some Jesuits on the opposing side, really understand this process. My included purpose is to make that process, and the choices it represents for practice, generally understood by a better-informed citizenry. □

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Lewis Coser

On Misperceiving the Dangers of LaRouche

In the last two years Lyndon LaRouche and his followers have published articles claiming that the murder of six million Jews in the Holocaust never happened, that international Zionism controls part of the drug traffic in America, that the B'nai B'rith plots treason against the United States, that the Rothschilds are engaged in a British-based conspiracy to dominate the world and are "the avowed enemies of the entire human species." Christopher White, one of LaRouche's key aides, has written that the "British" [a code word for Jews] are subhuman genetic degenerates whose destruction the United States Labor party must "joyfully ensure" in order to free humanity "from the grasp of that specific form of lower life." Yet Lionel Abel, himself a Jew, rejoices in the intellectual clarity and forcefulness of LaRouche.

In a paper on LaRouche ("Our First Serious Fascist," *Dissent*, Fall 1980) he overestimates the intellectual qualities of this anti-Semitic mystagogue in a preposterous manner while at the same time failing to realize the seriousness of the fascist movement that LaRouche has created mainly through the infiltration of his followers in a variety of strategic locations.

Abel thinks that LaRouche "is clearly a master of the concepts he has chosen to discuss." I debated LaRouche a few years ago, in the days when he still belonged to the kooky left and before he moved to the fascist right, and found him to be a raving paranoid of medium intelligence who felt himself surrounded by a variety of conspiracies led . . . by the Rockefeller interests. If he is a master of concepts so were Hitler and Goebbels.

Abel thinks that LaRouche "has at least brought a modicum of excitement to the political scene." If that be so, one wishes that such excitement had been spared us. Besides, the Rev. Jim Jones brought considerably more excitement to the political scene, but Lionel Abel did not then feel impelled to comment on his political appeal.

LaRouche, according to Abel, exhibits the "very quality Machiavelli thought most essential for political success, i.e., *virtu*." I hold no brief for Machiavelli, but to believe that a two-bit demagogue embodies Machiavelli's highest virtue is a gratuitous insult to the great Italian thinker.

Abel believes that "no other candidate for president . . . would be capable of analyzing intellectual-political problems with that much assurance and verve." And he also is convinced of the "superiority LaRouche . . . has shown over the Democratic and Republican candidates for the presidency." If you can believe this, as the Duke of Wellington said on quite another occasion, you can believe anything. In addition, I find it morally outrageous to compare politicians, for none of whom I have particular regard but who are committed to *democratic* principle, to a fascist totalitarian anti-Semite on grounds of his alleged superior intelligence. How would Abel react if someone were to argue about the intellectual superiority of Goebbels or Goering over the Social Democratic leaders of the Weimer Republic?

I find Abel's genuflexions before the superior intellectual virtues of LaRouche, his admiration for the forcefulness and decisiveness of his judgments, disconcerting, to say the least. When he deems it necessary, in addition, to drag in not only Machiavelli but also Leibnitz and neo-Platonism when describing the spirit and logic of this fascist demagogue, the cup runneth over. One is accustomed to grant Lionel Abel a certain amount of idiosyncrasy credit, but this time he has overdrawn his account by too much.

At a time when an avowed Nazi candidate can gain 56,000 votes in a North Carolina Republican primary, and a member of the Klu Klux Klan can win the Democratic congressional nomination in a Southern California district, it hardly behooves us to prattle about the intellectual superiority of fascist politicians. Some matters are too serious to be left to intellectual *enfants terribles*.

After LaRouche's outfit decided to enter the Democratic primaries, he received some 170,000 votes in 14 of them. He outpolled Jerry Brown in Connecticut by some 1,000 votes and gained 36,000 votes in Ohio and more than 70,000 in California. Before moving into the Democratic primaries, LaRouche's United States Labor party ran independent candidates between 1973 and 1979 and received between 8 percent and 32 percent of the popular vote in some 20 local and congressional races. It seems quite possible, if not likely, that LaRouche might be able to do better in the parlous state of the nation that is likely to follow this year's dismal election. And yet Abel talks of *virtu*.

LaRouche and his followers have gathered considerable sums of money from individual contributors as well as from Presidential Primary Matching Payments amounting to over $400,000. He controls a $5 million-a-year computer software firm. He enjoys unofficial alliances with powerful Teamster officials, with the Liberty lobby, and with nuclear power companies who rejoice in his campaign for the building up of nuclear energy. He publishes a variety of publications and newsletters, some traveling the high road and most traveling the low. He manipulates a variety of front organizations such as the Fusion Energy Foundation and the National Anti-Drug Coalition. He maintains security teams trained in "counterterror force," which in the early '70s engaged in more than 60 violent attacks on members of the Communist party.

There is no need to go on. Readers who wish more information are directed to the writings of a first-class investigative reporter, Dennis King, who has made it his mission to expose LaRouche's nefarious activities. I drew much of the above information from an article by

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King that appeared in the October 15, 1980 issue of the *New Haven Advocate*.

Lionel Abel is an old friend and a jolly good fellow, but his paper on LaRouche is an unmitigated disaster and testifies to a good deal of moral obtuseness as well as political ineptitude. □

Lionel Abel Replies

The two replies to my piece on Lyndon LaRouche, one by Mr. LaRouche himself, the other by Lewis Coser, are on about the same intellectual level: both writers evidently prefer name-calling to reasoned argument. I must add here that Lewis Coser has had the bad taste to remind me and my readers that I am a Jew, as if in my piece I had not taken note of the fact.

First I must consider Mr. LaRouche's comments. He has certainly not disproved my suggestion that his political deliverances are tilted, in style and substance, toward a kind of *fascism*; but by his answer he has raised some doubt in me that he is *serious* in whatever he is doing or thinks he is doing. I suggested that he is a fascist and his reply is that I have obviously not heard all his television broadcasts. Now I did not say that I had heard all of them. The few I did hear were quite sufficient to make the judgment of him I made. To my quotations from his book, which indicate the zest and virulence of his anti-Semitic bias, he replies that he has not been quoted fully. However, he was quoted accurately by me.

What else is there to say on this most unpleasant matter? One thing does puzzle me, though. Why does not Mr. LaRouche have the courage of his own expletives, and admit in the pages of *Dissent* what he has written elsewhere of Henry Kissinger, Walter Lippmann, the Jews, the British, Isaac Newton, Clark Maxwell, and David Hume? Why leave just the readers of *Dissent* in doubt about what he is so intent on repeating in his various publications?

Now as to Lewis Coser's remarks. Quite frankly, I cannot understand them. He seems to be saying that I underestimate the menace of LaRouche, but swinging counterweight, he charges me with taking him too seriously. He seems to be saying that LaRouche is worse politically, that is to say, more dangerous, and on the other hand, less appealing intellectually, that is to say less dangerous, than I made him out to be. And he accuses me of insulting the memory of "the great Italian thinker" Machiavelli by suggesting that LaRouche has *virtu*, that is to say, "toughness" of spirit. Will it also be an insult of Machiavelli to say—I have said this, too—that Hitler and Mussolini had *virtu*? I say it again, and I will say this of any politician who I think is possessed of this quality. I may be wrong in my judgment, but why does this mean I should apologize to the "great Italian thinker" who saw *virtu* in the infamous poisoner Cesare Borgia?

Mr. Coser says that it is "morally outrageous" of me to assert that LaRouche is intellectually superior to the recent Democratic and Republican candidates for the presidency. Once again, I am perhaps mistaken in my judgment. I may be wrong in thinking Mr. LaRouche more intelligent than President-elect Reagan and wrong, too, in thinking he knows more about science and history than President Carter or Senator Kennedy. But why is it *morally* outrageous to say this if that is indeed what I think? Since when has it been immoral to be mistaken in one's judgment? The only outrage I can see here is the one done to language by Mr. Coser in his ludicrous use of the word "moral."

Apparently Mr. Coser's animus against me comes from the fact that he thinks my attack on LaRouche may have been helpful to the latter. Here Mr. Coser's feeling for the political is as deficient as his feeling for language and logic. If Mr. LaRouche were as untalented as Mr. Coser claims him to be, how explain the appeal of the LaRouche movement to some of the best trained and most intelligent of American youth? One may win some of them away from LaRouche by describing him correctly, never by just calling him names.

Here an anecdote may be instructive. One night in Rome in 1962, I had dinner at the Chiaromontes with Ignazio Silone, who had just returned from a visit to Yugoslovia. The Italian socialist and antifascist was a most engaging conversationalist, and that night at the dinner table, he regaled us with stories about the Yugoslavian dictator Tito. Chiaromonte found the tone of these stories somewhat too favorable to Tito and reminded Silone that Tito was in no sense a democrat. "I don't have to be told that," Silone responded. "What I do say is that he's more interesting than the democrat De Gaspari." "If you're going to take that line," Chiaromonte replied, "then you'll have to put Mussolini above both of them." "You won't find me objecting," said Silone. "Mussolini was by far the most brilliant of the three."

To my way of thinking, there was nothing outrageous about Silone's comparative judgment of the two dictators as against a democratic politician. Mr. Coser asks, "How would Abel react if someone were to argue about the intellectual superiority of Goebbels or Goering over the Social Democratic leaders of the Weimar Republic?" Of course the question, like everything else in Mr. Coser's comment, is badly put. No one would argue for Goering's intellectual superiority. With Hitler, however, the case is somewhat different. Simone Weil wrote that Hitler ". . . strikes directly at the imagination." Trotsky also insisted that Hitler had far more imagination than Stalin, and the historian Trevor-Roper credits Hitler with great powers of mind. Many of those who were content to just call Hitler names ended up in his concentration camps.

This discussion is now closed. — Eds. □

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LETTERS

Thank You

Editors:
I am replying to the fund-raising letter that I received today. *Dissent* is probably one of only a few causes that I support without reservation but I lack the means with which to back up my ideological support. I am a 100 percent disabled veteran and seem to be constantly losing ground in my attempt to provide for my two teenaged sons on a disability pension. You have so enriched my life this past year in those other more valuable areas that I hope this small check will be of some help and I also enclose a check to extend my subscription for two more years.

PAULINE T. SHARIT
Castro Valley, Calif. □

"The Academicizing of Marxism"

Editors:
I am dismayed by Frank Parkin's blanket denunciation of Marxist academics in the Spring 1980 issue of *Dissent* ("The Academicizing of Marxism," pp. 172-80). Parkin's critique of Althusser and Poulantzas is useful but says nothing that has not already been said by such Marxist writers as E. P. Thompson (in *The Poverty of Theory*; London: Merlin Press, 1978), M. H. Best and W. E. Connolly (in "Politics and Subjects: The Limits of Structural Marxism," *Socialilst Review*, Nov.-Dec. 1979, pp. 75-100), and E. O. Wright ("Class Boundaries in Advanced Capitalist Societies," *New Left Review*, no. 98, pp. 3-41). Parkin even uses Wright's work in his article, yet he still concludes that "this [Althusserian] science . . . is a typical product of the new intellectual stratum of professional Marxists . . . " which uses "arcane language" in order to "secure its newly won respectability."

I fail to see that Parkin's own writing is more accessible than that of Wright or Thompson, but then the double standard for Marxists is nothing new in academia. The new generation of American Marxist intellectuals did not simply "rise on the crest of the wave of university expansion in the 1960s" as Parkin would have it. They developed out of the student movement and participation in struggles against racism, the war in Vietnam, sexism, etc. They are now, for the most part, instructors and assistant professors without tenure and few are having an easy time of it in this period of budget cutbacks and conservatism. Here at Berkeley Michael Reich, the only Marxist in the economics department, has so far been unable to win support for tenure from his department and I have just heard that Fred Block has been denied tenure at the University of Pennsylvania despite support from his department.

One form of attack on Marxist professors is the hypocritical critique from the left used by Parkin in counterposing Marxists "in the service of the working-class movement" with those "in the service of the university." After all, if they were good Marxists they would be away on "the barricades" not in the university, while bad Marxists are obviously not needed in the university either. It was in this vein that John Roche, former White House intellectual-in-residence, assailed Bertell Ollman, who had just been refused appointment at the University of Maryland, because he was a "soft" Marxist, unlike the hard-hitting revolutionary Marx about whom he, Roche, was teaching his students and for whom he professed the greatest respect. I would hope that this kind of red-baiting sophistry is far from the intentions of anyone writing for *Dissent*, but that is the way Parkin has stated his case. The relation between Marxist intellectuals in the university and the working class is a serious problem, just as it is for Marxist intellectuals who work in party or union bureaucracies or as journalists. In *Dissent* I would hope that it could be the subject of serious discussion, not the occasion for cheap shots.

STEPHEN E. BARTON
Berkeley, Calif. □

The Draft and the Poor

Editors:
I am replying to "The Draft and the Poor," by Jerry Watts, in your Fall 1980 issue. Peacetime draft registration is an almost certain prescription to increase irresponsible military activity—not a good idea in a nuclear age. Obviously, standing armies are the enemies of freedom and friends of social reaction. Soldiers in the ranks do not decide policy; they obey orders and are summarily punished for questioning these orders. White middle-class soldiers may be marginally more likely to protest absurdities and atrocities than black lower-class soldiers, but this is no sane argument for the draft. The majority of soldiers of any class must conform out of necessity. . . .

Although the poor will still have to do most of the dying, a government has no trouble getting volunteers from all social classes when it can convince its citizens that their vital interests are in danger. This is obviously not the case in the U.S. today. The U.S. government cannot convince anyone that it is sweet and fitting to die for the Seven Sisters oil monopoly. . . . And if the government has the bodies, it will eventually use them; if not, not.

No doubt, much of the current opposition to registra-

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tion is based on self-interested class prejudice. Standing armies have always been recruited from the most powerless classes of society. . . . and few persons would "volunteer" for options open to the poor today or in the past. Many poor youths today prefer enlisting to hanging around ghetto street corners. For many the military is the only available path of upward mobility. And if the army is given a choice between training middle-class persons or lower-class persons in special skills that might later lead to good civilian jobs, it will naturally choose those with the highest level of preexistent skills, and the poor will lose out. Indeed, many democratic socialists believe that the military is less solicitous of the true interests of the poor than those bourgeois draft protesters who do not wish to be used as canon fodder at the Strait of Hormuz.

Forcing the middle class to share the military servitude of the poor might increase multiclass political protest, but only at the cost of increasing the total sum of human misery, which is already high enough.

J. Quinn Brisben
Chicago, Ill.

Jerry Watts Replies:

The letter of J. Quinn Brisben does not merit a response for it is not an argument but a series of non-sequitur assertions. Two assertions should however be challenged, for I fear they may be both pervasive and indicative of the prevailing naiveté of some democratic socialists. First of all, we should forget the nonsensical belief that the United States government cannot convince anyone that it is "sweet and fitting to die for the Seven Sisters oil monopoly . . . , " lest we never grasp American political culture. There is no Seven Sisters Oil Monopoly in the eyes of the domestic populace. The oil companies, though seen as raking unfair levels of profit, are primarily seen as Gulf, Esso Mobil, individualized places where our uncles work and where our mothers buy their gas, and the sponsors for our favorite television programs. Second, we never fight in behalf of oil monopolies. We fight in behalf of U.S. "vital interests." When the populace is convinced that our vital interests were threatened as in the current Iranian-Afghanistan Middle East crisis, the President was able to institute a pre-draft registration movement that was so overwhelmingly successful as to leave the least idéalistic pacifist stunned. Whence comes this naiveté, that nobody will fight? Forget it, even during the height of the Vietnam war protests, the black urban riots, and the counterculture movement, the U.S. armed forces were not understaffed while keeping 500,000 men in Vietnam.

Finally, I must again reject the claim that the army is an upward-mobility mechanism. It may have been for generations past, but what data supports that claim now? Again, we must ask socialists, if the key to black unemployment should be a de facto mercenary military. I tremble when self-proclaimed socialists write as if it does not matter what types of tasks blacks do in order to remedy their unemployment problems. If this is your argument, then perhaps you'll find some creative insights toward a solution by realizing that black unemployment was not a problem until after slavery. □

Reviewing *Apocalypse Now*

Editors:

I was rather surprised to see Francis Coppola's production *Apocalypse Now* excoriated so misguidedly by David Bromwich in your pages (Spring 1980) as I thought it was one of the most intelligent and imaginative films of recent years. His article is a series of interpretations that repeatedly try to force this expansive and ambivalent film into a strait-jacket of simplistic ideology. He reduces the film not only to propaganda but to prowar propaganda which criticizes the Americans for fighting with the "two burdens of a liberal state, conscience and technology." He finds the film a "mindless spectacle tailored to a public tired of thinking." This of a film which exposes America's involvement in the Vietnamese War as a thing of the cruelest sort for the Vietnamese and the American soldiers.

A close look at the most "spectacular" sequence in this spectacle, the helicopter attack on the Vietcong village, will dispel the notion that the film is propaganda. The scene begins with dozens of helicopters taking off. The airborne cameras put the viewer right in the middle of the assault force. The expectation of the battle to come along with the vicarious sensation of flying combine with Coppola's quick editing and Wagnerian soundtrack to excite the audience and get them ready for the kind of climactic visceral experience that helped make "Star Wars" such a huge popular success. But in the midst of this, Coppola cuts to a stationary low-level shot of the village school being evacuated. The viewer now realizes that the target of the attack is a village with a school, children, homes. More than that, with the juxtaposition of the moving aerial shots from the helicopters and the static eye-level shot of the village the viewer is suddenly placed in the position of the villagers who can only move as fast as their legs can take them. Only now does the battle begin. The sheer thrill of the scene remains but it is laced with sympathy for the victims of the attack and distaste for the Americans who are involved so mad Colonel Kilgore can watch a few of his men go surfing. Coppola never lets the viewer sit back complacently but constantly confronts him.

Bromwich also misinterprets the Kurtz character and the meaning of the conclusion. For some unknown reason Bromwich seems to think that the film supports Kurtz's war against the Vietcong. This, in spite of the fact that Kurtz's camp is a nightmare of death. Hanging bodies are visible every few yards and in one scene Kurtz drops the decapitated head of one of the ship's crew in Willard's lap. As the film makes clear Kurtz's final

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opinion is that nuclear bombs should be dropped on Vietnam. "Drop the bomb—exterminate them all!" The film does not hold up Kurtz's eschewal of American technology and his lack of conscience as an example of what American policy should have been. However, he has not hidden from the reality of the war as the generals at headquarters did with their high altitude bombing strikes and bureaucratic jargon.

MICHAEL H. GITLIN
Brooklyn, N.Y.

DAVID BROMWICH Replies:

The "weird trip," the imperialist romance, and the record of the horrors of war: *Apocalypse Now* contains all three elements, with a result that seemed to me not ambivalent but confused. Coppola was banking on liberals to pick out the antiwar film from all that tangle, and call him one of their own. I refused and still refuse.

Mr. Gitlin gives a sympathetic antiwar view of the helicopter attack. He forgets only one touch: the beautiful village woman, dressed in a flowing white gown, who deposits in the downed helicopter what looks like a basket of eggs but is really a basket of grenades, and blows up the helpless soldiers within. So that one moral of the episode is, How innocent is any "innocent villager"?

As for the film's attitude toward Kurtz, it takes a lot of death to glut some appetites, and I do not believe Coppola and Milius looked on their "nightmare of death" with the same eyes or the same heart as Mr. Gitlin. The key speech is Kurtz's, about what he could have done with the right cadres: once, he inoculated all the children in a village to protect them from disease, and found the next day that the Vietcong in revenge had hacked off every arm his medicine had touched. He then understood that the only way to fight this war was as the enemy does, without pity. In his own camp Kurtz has made a beginning.

This speech summarizes everything Willard has learned on his own journey, and the film wants us to take it very seriously indeed. □

No Fascism Ahead

Editors:

Lionel Abel, in his piece in your Fall 1980 issue on Lyndon LaRouche ("Our First Serious Fascist?"), asserts that U.S. military "defenses are down" and that the U.S. "retreat before the Communist push" is threatening to "become a rout." Yet the Soviet attempt to crush the Afghan rebels continues to be unsuccessful; the Soviet economy is suffering from a severe agricultural shortage; and U.S. defense spending, in both conventional and nuclear areas, continues to rise. This doesn't appear to add up to a U.S. "retreat before the Communist push." I am also disturbed by Mr. Abel's almost fatalistic attitude toward current problems. "What," he asks, "are the real causes of inflation? How can it be brought down?. . . And how are we to deal with the Soviet Union, and how with the nations of the Third World? All of these problems have been responded to differently within recent years, and we no longer feel that there is any particular viewpoint especially qualified to address them." But surely some approaches to these problems make more sense than others, and in many cases the more promising ones have yet to be tried.

Finally, I am surprised by Mr. Abel's view that "LaRouche and his followers have some prospects" for seizing political power in the '80s. Abel's discussion of LaRouche's pernicious opinions makes it clear that LaRouche is a genuine fascist. And unless one accepts the extremely dubious assumption that conditions in the U.S. of the '80s are going to duplicate those of Weimar, it seems implausible to suggest, as Abel does, that LaRouche might gain power in the coming decade as a result of the (prospective) failure of American foreign and domestic policy.

LOUIS F. COOPER
Washington, D.C. □

Church & State in Poland

Editors:

I was surprised by your publication of "Two Views on Church and Democracy in Poland" (Summer 1980).

The author expressing one view, J. Gross has recently published an outstanding book on the Polish Society under German Occupation (1933-44), yet this does not make him an expert on Church and democracy in Poland after World War II. Indeed, his analysis proves the opposite. He writes, for instance: "It took three decades for the secular intelligentsia of Poland to discover the Catholic Church as its ally in the quest for political freedom and social justice." No doubt, he means here the so-called party intelligentsia. As if the politically silenced majority of the Polish secular intelligentsia did not exist at all, as if its conscious recognition of the role of the Church were of no consequence. This analysis is inspired by the book by Adam Michnik, *The Church, the Left, the Dialogue* (published in Polish in Paris by *Kultura*, 1977), who makes exactly the same mistake. They both indicate that a number of ex-Communists have recently learned how to take advantage of the power of the Catholic Church in Poland, without mentioning those numerous intellectuals who have long supported the Church's patriotic and democratic mission, independently of their religious beliefs.

The contribution by L. Kolakowski is similarly misleading, since it takes the same position. Michnik in his book describes him as one who "recognized religion as one of the few guarantees of culture and norms among

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human beings," adding that he did so ". . . after 1968, during his stay in England and the U.S.A."

This authority on Marxism, Church and Democracy, one of the revisionists who to use his words, attacked "the Communist tyranny and the Leninist doctrine," was also one of the most overzealous intellectual leaders and engineers of the Party policy aimed at destruction of religion and of the moral values defended by the Church. He was editor-in-chief of *Argumenty*, a Party journal established to fight and destroy Catholicism in Poland . . . and the journal's aggressiveness and doctrinairism were detested by all Polish intellectuals who struggled to retain their integrity under the humiliating conditions. . . .

Perhaps your readers will be better served if next time *Dissent* invites some other, more genuine specialists to speak on Church and Democracy in Poland.

With best regards and congratulations on your excellent work for the past 26 years,

ADAM PODGORECKI
Ottawa, Canada □

The New Immigration

Editors:

Professor Michael Piore's response ("Another View on Migrant Workers" to my article on immigration ("The New Immigration"), both in the Summer 1980 *Dissent*, indicates how difficult it is to induce intelligent people to face a new set of conditions with fresh thinking. He not only avoids hard thinking, he avoids plain facts, which astonishes one who (like myself) has always respected his scholarship. He disputes my estimates of the size of the illegal population in the U.S., and while controversy is inevitable in this complex and obscure area, Piore underestimates the numbers at every point. This is clearest where legal migration is concerned. How can a reputable scholar tell your readers that "the U.S. admits about 400,000 immigrants annually" when the official figures have for several years been half again as high, and in 1980 will apparently be twice as high? (Alien admissions under immigrant status, plus refugees, was 601,442 in FY 1978 and will approximate 800,000 in FY 1980.)

Let us not dispute estimates of illegals, where Piore is not flatly wrong, but merely consistently guessing on the low side. What matters, as economists know, are rates and trends, and here Cornell's Vernon Briggs has hit the nail: "Actually the precise number [of documented workers residing in this country] is irrelevant if one concedes—as everyone familiar with this issue does—that the number of people involved is substantial and that the direction of change is toward annual increases."

But we need not snarl your readers in "the numbers game." It is enough to correct the error on annual legal immigrants, to note that Piore consistently takes a position on the extreme, minimalist end of the complex "numbers" debate, and that his (and Wayne Cornelius's) position that a large proportion of illegals intend to and will return is in hot dispute by other scholars. I side with those who argue that the research on which the "temporary" theory of illegal immigration rests is flawed, and invite your readers to study the European experience with guest workers. There host governments were stunned at the difficulty of inducing workers' and their families' return, and in all cases (but Switzerland) terminated guestworker programs.

Let us turn to the important matter of causation, where one of Piore's insights fails to take on proper significance because of the narrowness of his perspective. It is important to correctly analyze the reasons for the influx in order to devise appropriate remedies. Refugees aside, where special circumstances often account for a massive uprooting, illegal aliens come to the U.S. for a complex set of reasons. Major push factors, population pressures, and economic hardship are brushed aside by Piore but are of course part of the explanation for contemporary migration. Piore's special expertise leads him to focus upon *one* of the pull factors, the existence within the U.S. economy of a secondary, lower-tier labor market. His important earlier work has helped us to understand the dimensions and characteristics of that labor market, and though he has a stronger sense of its unattractiveness to native workers than other scholars find acceptable, he makes valuable and pointed policy suggestions for upgrading as much of that sector as possible in wages and working conditions. Here I am in complete agreement. But readers must surely see that there is no compelling logic in his odd assumption that enforcement efforts are ineffectual in managing the problem until secondary markets are reformed. I argue, as do all other students of the matter known to me, that the nation must do both at once—obviously.

But it is important not to fashion an integrated policy response to illegal immigration built only upon economists' advice. Immigrants come, legally and illegally, for a cluster of reasons, including long-term exposure to U.S. culture via close military or political ties (as in Taiwan, Korea, Iran), the inviting cultural pluralism within American society where relatives and kinsmen are already well established, and rumors of lax enforcement—that is, all the factors setting up "chains of immigration" with enormous momentum. Generated as it is out of multiple and reinforcing causes, illegal immigration is much more sizable and for the future will continue on a larger scale than people like Piore realize, and it will not be controlled by single remedies alone such as the labor market reform he correctly advises.

I am taxed, in his response, with having underestimated the difficulty of devising and enforcing a fair but decidedly restrictionist immigration policy. I can't imagine why. All my writing on the topic confesses the technical, emotional, and intellectual difficulty of the issue. Mr. Piore has offered *Dissent*'s readers a good example of how the thicket of difficulties is composed. First he underestimates the problem, then proposes a single-policy remedy and doubts its effectiveness, and then tells us with admirable candor that he is one of

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those who will resist restriction because he wants (perhaps) to get the rest of his extended family into the country. . . . Loyalty to one's family is admirable, wherever they reside. In some cases that may give one a stake in a porous, unenforced immigration policy. But I formulated a moral position raised somewhat higher than concern for family, composed of concern for a sustainable national future for all of us and our children and their children. This requires population control, and the time to begin is now.

I am glad that Mr. Piore eloquently noted the debt we surely owe to all of humanity, upon whose shoulders any civilization in some sense stands. But I profoundly doubt the old and unexamined view that the way to acknowledge that obligation is to maintain open borders at U.S. territorial boundaries until American ecological and economic decline solves the immigration problem by ending the attractiveness of our nation. We have many moral obligations, to self, family, group, nation, planetary humanity, perhaps planetary ecology. My main effort was to suggest that however we weigh them, they are not met any longer by the invitation engraved on the lady in the harbor to endlessly send us the poor of the earth. I suggested that, in the vastly changed circumstances of today and tomorrow, we end our historic faith in the immigration process, on a mass scale, as a way of solving problems. It is intellectually bankrupt, though perhaps understandable, to continue to welcome massive and virtually uncontrolled immigration into the U.S. I had hoped that the immigration discussion would not be closed by tropistic charges that restrictionists are the authors of suffering, but opened for a searching debate over whether and how accepted moral positions need to be adjusted in the light of changed circumstances.

Otis L. Graham, Jr.
Chapel Hill, N.C. □

On Eleanor Marx

Editors:

The review of Yvonne Kapp's fascinating two-volume biography *Eleanor Marx* by Rosen and Ratner gives sufficient reasons why the study of the youngest of Karl Marx's three daughters should be widely read. I did, however, find missing from the review any reference to the many pages dealing with Eleanor's Jewishness.

The importance of the omissions arises from the rather common knowledge that Marx, the "founder of scientific socialism," held some of the most drearily malevolent notions of Jews, their social role, and sad history. Much of it was rascally anti-Semitic, repeating the worst clichés of Christian anti-Semitism. . . .

Thus, it was delightful to read how Eleanor Marx, actively involved in the early socialist and trade-union movement in England, deeply touched by the economic and social oppression of thousands of Jewish immigrants in London, proclaimed her solidarity with "her people." She was the only one of Marx's children to do so. Obviously, all the Marx children knew of his views for they were familiar with his writings and heard oral expressions of them in the close-knit family circle.

During the Dreyfus affair, Eleanor declared, "I am a Jewess." According to Kapp, it was known that "she told Max Beer she was the only member of her family to be "drawn to the Jewish people."

On October 21, 1890, on her return from Germany, she found an invitation from Jewish workers to speak to them and replied: "I shall be very glad to speak at the meeting of Novbr. 1st, the more glad, that my Father was Jew." There is reason to believe that Marx would not have been flattered by the reference.

Eleanor was introduced to a Russian woman, Zinaida Vengerova, by her socialist friend Stepniak. Vengerova was in London studying early English literature and became friendly with Eleanor. She quotes Eleanor, who was by then fluent in English, French, German, and Norwegian (she translated Ibsen plays), as saying: "My linguistic acquisition is Yiddish. I even deliver lectures in Yiddish. . . . [It] is akin to my blood," and Vengerova adds:

> . . . Eleanor explained to me that she was active among Jewish working women in Whitechapel, and that in the interests of socialist propaganda it was more sensible for her to learn Yiddish than to wait for the ignorant masses of immigrants from Eastern Europe to become Anglicised.

One other very important reference in the book is to Morris Winchevsky who has been called the "grandfather" of Yiddish socialist literature, a respected figure in the American Jewish socialist movement, but active in the London movement before reaching the United States.

In 1893, when Winchevsky was a British delegate to the Socialist International congress in Zurich, it happened that he traveled to it in the same railway compartment with Eleanor and her husband, Edward Aveling. Winchevsky hoped to speak at the congress about the new unionized Jewish workers to a gathering that did not believe very strongly that there was such a thing as a Jewish worker. But he felt that with 65 British delegates, he would have little chance of speaking. It was Eleanor who took the information that Winchevsky represented eight trade unions with 600 Jewish proletarians and spoke in the Congress and conveying it "in German, French and English to great applause."

In the great Zurich street parade of the Congress, Winchevsky was not sure where he belonged and he was not sought out by the organizers. He records that:

> Eleanor ran up to me in great haste. She placed me next to herself with Will Thorne [a fellow unionist] on one side and Edward on the other. "We Jews must stick together," she said.

No doubt, many elements went into forming Eleanor's Jewish consciousness and sensitivity, not least of them her socialist convictions and hatred of all oppression and exploitation. They were feelings deep enough to permit her to express demonstratively convictions in sharp conflict with the bitter anti-Jewish writings of her brilliant father.

Albert Glotzer
New York City □

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